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Abstract 
The personalization of election campaigns has to date been analyzed mostly in single-country 
case studies based on modernist macro-approaches. Comparatively, however, personalization 
not only caters to modern media or works as a replacement for ideological guidance in a 
complex political world, but also can enhance a candidacy’s unique selling point and depends 
on party professionalization. Thus, this study complements modernization arguments with 
institutional, competition patterns’ and party resources’ explanations to parties’ general and 
leadership personalization strategies.  
With a new dataset of TV and newspaper advertising in national, regional, and supranational 
elections of Canada, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland, the influence of macro- and 
partisan factors on the choice for personalization as a campaign strategy was tested 
comparatively with Bayesian beta-regression models.  
Contrary to modernist expectations, mediatization does not systematically explain 
personalization, yet political complexity does. The strongest predictor is an interaction of 
presidentialization with a party’s choice to run an executive candidate. Electoral systems, 
competition patterns, professionalization and incumbency show mixed results, whereas 
populism cannot be empirically linked to more personalization. 
Regarding this empirical non-link and personalization’s heuristic benefits, normative claims 
that personalization is harmful for democratic decision making cannot be upheld. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Wahlkampfpersonalisierung wurde bisher mehrheitlich modernisierungstheoretisch in 
Einzelfallstudien analysiert. Im Vergleich ist sie aber nicht nur auf moderne Medien 
zurückzuführen und ist auch nicht nur Ersatz für Ideologie im Angesicht politischer 
Komplexität, sondern theoretisch zudem ein Alleinstellungsmerkmal von Kandidaturen und sie 
wächst mit Parteiprofessionalisierung. 
Diese Studie ergänzt Modernisierungsargumente um institutionelle, Parteienwettbewerbs- und 
ressourcenbasierte Erklärungen für allgemeine und Führungspersonalisierungsstrategien. 
Mithilfe neuer Daten aus TV- und Zeitungswerbung wurde der Einfluss von System- und 
Parteivariablen auf Personalisierung als Wahlkampfstrategie in nationalen, regionalen und 
supranationalen Wahlen in fünf westlichen Demokratien mithilfe bayesianischer Beta-
Regressionen getestet. 
Entgegen modernisierungstheoretischer Erwartungen erklärt Mediatisierung Personalisierung 
nicht systematisch, politische Komplexität jedoch schon. Präsidentialisierung kombiniert mit 
der Aufstellung eines Exekutivkandidaten hat die grösste Erklärungskraft. Wahlsystem, 
Parteienwettbewerb, Professionalisierung und Amtsinhaberboni zeigen uneinheitliche 
Resultate, wohingegen Populismus empirisch nicht zu mehr Personalisierung führt. 
Hinsichtlich ebendieses negativen Befundes und des heuristischen Nutzens von 
Personalisierung können normative Überlegungen, dass Personalisierung der demokratischen 
Entscheidungsfindung schadet, nicht aufrechterhalten werden.  
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1. Introduction: The Personalization of Politics 
When the CDU campaign team for the German Bundestag election in 2013 unveiled a gigantic 
70x20 m billboard showing Angela Merkel’s signature gesture, the “Merkelraute”, it instantly 
became big news on all channels. Bare of any political statement, the billboard was seen as the 
embodiment of the CDU’s central campaign strategy, betting entirely on the popularity of their 
leader. Two years before, also at election time, the Swiss newspapers’ paid space was full of 
sympathetic faces of politicians either promoting their cause, their party, or, in the majority of 
cases, themselves. The statements in these ads were either ascribed to them or framed as 
citations, directly addressing the readers and asking for their support. And when the citizens of 
the European Union were called to decide on their representatives in the elections to the 
European Parliament in 2014, the two biggest Europarties felt obliged to select their respective 
Europe-wide frontrunner candidates for the head of the European Commission beforehand, 
Jean-Claude Juncker for the European People’s Party and Martin Schulz for the Party of 
European Socialists, a novelty in the history of EP elections. Juncker and Schulz held three TV 
debates and made a great effort to attract attention throughout the campaign. These are only 
three examples of a development observed with interest but sometimes warily by pundits and 
scholars alike, a focus on persons instead of parties, policies, or institutions in election 
campaign messages, called personalization. What drives parties, candidates, and, in most of the 
cases, their campaign managers to use personalization as a strategy? In the following endeavor 
I plan to contribute to answering this question.  
Why should we actually care about the personalization of politics in general and of election 
campaigns in particular? Answering the second part of the question first, election campaigns 
are located at the heart of the democratic process. They are the “High Mass of Democracy” 
(Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2013, translation: MB) where parties, candidates, and voters interact in 
a condensed way and the most elemental and far-reaching democratic political meta-decision, 
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the vote, is prepared. Therefore campaigns, their effects, and strategies for their successful 
conduct are gaining a growing amount of attention in the study of elections. Contrary to prior 
belief and in line with modernization arguments of increasing volatility, “campaigns are viewed 
as playing a key role for the information processing of the citizens, providing voters with the 
necessary information for making a choice in line with their preexisting preferences” (Kriesi et 
al., 2009). Especially for independent voters, who are only weakly or not at all influenced by a 
long-standing party identification, short-term influences to which voters are exposed during an 
election campaign make a difference. In Western democracies, the group of independent voters 
is growing steadily and it is precisely this group that decides which parties are the winners or 
the losers of an election, as the independents are the most volatile and persuadable group of 
voters (Vetter & Gabriel, 1998; Schmitt-Beck & Farrell, 2002). One of the most visible short-
term factors able to influence voters’ decisions is the personality and image of a candidate. 
Leadership qualities – be they real or perceived –, competence, or even good looks (Olivola & 
Todorov, 2010; Verhulst et al., 2010) can systematically influence voting decisions.  
And why care about personalization? Pundits and scholars alike also agree on the notion that 
politics at least since the late 1960s have moved away from ideology to more modern, media-
friendly, and flexible driving forces (Mair, 2005; Mancini & Swanson, 1996; Roper et al. 2004). 
The megatrend of societal modernization and individualization, paired with, and consisting in 
part of, technological and media development, has been identified by modernization theorists 
as the main cause of one striking aspect of this process: the personalization of politics (Mancini 
& Swanson, 1996: 14; Adam & Maier, 2010; Karvonen, 2010). Broadly speaking, this process 
is defined as directing a larger proportion of political attention towards persons at the expense 
of parties, institutions, and policies. This personalization plays out in several political domains, 
like electoral institutions or campaign organization becoming more candidate-centered 
(Karvonen, 2010), media coverage concentrating on leaders (Kriesi, 2012), and citizens’ 
electoral decision-making increasingly influenced by party-leader effects (Garzia, 2014; Costa-
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Lobo & Curtice 2015). Political campaigns also see their fair share of personalization in 
organization and content, and explaining variations in level and type of personalization in the 
content of election campaigns will be the scope of the present research endeavor.  
The personalization of election campaign content in particular is widely regarded as a 
normatively questionable, but inevitable phenomenon of modern societies. Professionalized 
campaigning and political advertisement via the channels of an increasingly commercialized 
mass media environment seem to produce a form of political communication and reporting that 
shifts its focus away from problems, parties, and programs to the political and even private 
qualities of politicians as persons, allegedly leading to inferior decision-making by voters, who 
are distracted by personal traits from political standpoints, consequently harming the quality of 
democracy. Be this true or not, to be able to assess potential effects of personalization on the 
quality or functioning of democracy, often only implicitly stated by critics, we must first have 
an idea of where it comes from and what its drivers are to be able to assess its independent 
effects. The less normatively loaded academic “personalization hypothesis” (Adam & Maier, 
2010) or “personalization thesis” (Karvonen, 2010), a widely shared explanatory approach to 
this phenomenon, is threefold.  
First, personalization offers a way to distinguish alternatives in an increasingly cartelized party 
competition. Mainstream parties struggling to distinguish themselves from their competitors for 
the median voter can use personalization for enhancing their unique selling point. At the same 
time, populist challengers to parties’ programmatic linkage with the voters can transport 
alternative charismatic linkage through the images of leader figures and candidates. 
Second, an increasingly commercialized media environment disproportionally advantages 
news-worthily presented political information, including personalization as a quality criterion. 
The political actors, who are able to deliver their message in a personalized, for example human 
interest, context, receive more attention than the ones concentrating on complex and deliberate 
political issue statements. Parties and candidates who want to be electorally successful 
4 
 
strategically anticipate this fact and adapt their campaigns accordingly. This mechanism is 
especially visible in the coverage of party or executive leaders. Closely interacting with the 
modernization of the media environment, especially two political-institutional developments, 
nationalization and presidentialization, make the person behind the ideas and political positions 
he or she should decide on or implement more interesting than the content, sometimes even 
outside of the function as an office-holder (Wheeler, 2013: 87–88). First, the nationalization of 
politics (Caramani, 2004: 205–206), a development which in turn is also fostered by the 
distribution of political news via mass media, circumvents interactive direct personal contacts 
between local voters and candidates or party rank-and-file and replaces it by rather one-sided 
mediatized exposure of citizens to the party leadership, creating a mediatized party image 
closely linked with its leading personnel. Second, the presidentialization of politics (Poguntke 
& Webb, 2005), a shift in power towards the executive branch and especially to the head of the 
executive, is observed in many established democracies, even of the parliamentary kind. Both 
globalization, where chief executives get leverage from their position in “two-level games” 
(Putnam, 1988) in a growing number of international negotiations, and modernization, leading 
to state growth and consequently to bureaucratic complexity hard to control by the legislative 
branch, combined with a decline in traditional cleavage politics, facilitate autonomous decision-
making by said chief executives. These power resources result in disproportionate voter and 
media attention for leaders, on which campaign strategists try to capitalize by personalizing 
campaign content. 
Third, personalization is seen as an informational shortcut for citizens to reduce information 
costs associated with the decision on which party or candidate to vote for, a task becoming 
increasingly difficult in a complex modern world of fading ideological guidance. The added 
value of structured information candidates as “attractively packaged commodities” (Dalton & 
Wattenberg, 1993: 208) provide can guide and enhance as well as replace ideological 
considerations in the voters’ decision-making process. 
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In addition to these modernist explanatory factors, electoral institutions fostering candidate-
centered campaigning like single-member districts or open lists, the institutional setup of 
political systems like presidentialism or federalism as well as electoral by-laws and institutions 
like the establishment of TV debates have to be taken into account to be able to draw a complete 
picture of what drives personalization in campaigns’ content. 
The three explanatory factors mentioned first – cartelized party competition, media 
developments, and the need for informational shortcuts – have in common that they are 
postulating aspects of modernization as causing personalization. Modernization is theorized as 
inevitable and steadily growing or gaining importance in all established democracies, creating 
the notion of a development or unstoppable trend towards personalization rather than 
fluctuation or variation (Adam & Maier, 2010: 216). Since these factors play out in a stable 
institutional framework, the common perception is that inter-country variations regarding this 
phenomenon in western democracies, associated with an allegedly inevitable development of 
party cartelization, media modernization and commercialization, and increasing complexity of 
the political world and the world as a whole, is just due to different stages in a steady process 
which a country has reached. But the empirical evidence of an overarching and steadily 
modernizing tendency towards personalization is still missing. Evidence for a time dimension, 
may it be caused by a changing media environment or increasing complexity of political 
decisions, has at best been mixed in political personalization research (Adam & Maier, 2010; 
Karvonen, 2010), as this research literature has to date mainly been produced in single-country 
or even single-election case studies. Even a considerable proportion of longitudinal studies of 
the personalization of politics in media, voting behavior as well as election campaigning (for a 
summary, see Karvonen, 2010: 7–9 , 11–13, 96–99) could not identify a general linear increase 
in personalization over countries and time. This is partly due to the fact that these studies 
stressed a specially selected set of factors influencing personalization, which are more or less 
obviously tied to modernization, but could or did not take variance in other factors like 
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institutions, resources, and competition into account (exception: Kriesi, 2012). Especially the 
competition patterns of parties in an election campaign are just beginning to be studied in a 
comparative manner with regard to personalization. Furthermore, many studies of 
personalization take an exclusively macroscopic perspective on personalization of a political 
system or campaign, whereas meso-level factors like party qualities that are providing 
incentives for personalization in election campaigns are neglected. A macroscopic perspective 
cannot account for intra-country, for example inter-election or inter-party, variance in 
personalization of electoral campaigns. Looking at intra-election variance between candidates 
and parties allows us to get a better understanding of driving mechanisms behind the choice for 
or against personalized campaigning beyond the influence of the modernity of the context. So 
an approach differentiating variation in contexts as well as party qualities appears more 
promising than assuming a universal time dimension to personalization, which still remains 
short on empirical evidence.  
So to answer the question “what exactly drives the personalization of politics in general and of 
election campaigns in particular”, context factors like specific institutions, party constellations, 
and qualities of different parties and candidates must be taken into account simultaneously with 
aspects of modernization when we want to explain why parties choose personalization 
strategies. In this research project, I will contribute to explaining the choice for personalized 
campaign strategies by taking modernization arguments seriously, but complement them with 
the important explanatory contributions that a comparative analysis of institutions, party 
competition patterns, and eventually party and candidate qualities make. This approach adds to 
the body of literature comparing country case studies (Karvonen, 2010; Swanson & Mancini, 
1996; Adam & Maier, 2010) and will tackle the question of personalization in a comparative 
and eclectic framework. This approach takes one step away from the implicit assumption made 
by modernization scholars that personalization is following a trend, and one step towards a 
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comparativist notion that takes into account cultural, institutional, and historical idiosyncrasies 
not as anomalies, but measurable variation. 
1.1 Personalization as a Campaign Strategy 
Unfortunately, the concept of “personalization of politics” has been notoriously plagued by 
semantic imprecision and lack of analytical clarity (van Aelst et al., 2012: 204). In political 
communication research, the term personalization has been used to describe and analyze a broad 
and often empirically coinciding bundle of phenomena.  
“On the one hand, personalization refers to a stronger focus on candidates/politicians 
instead of parties, institutions or issues. On the other hand, the personalization 
hypothesis claims that it is not only individuals per se, but it is their personal, non-
political characteristics that become more relevant.” (Adam & Maier, 2010: 216)  
To ensure comparability with the literature as well as to contribute to an establishing standard 
of analytical classification of personalization, I will define this study’s main object 
“personalization of election campaigns” in the following and place it in an analytic framework 
related to van Aelst et al.’s (2012) classification of personalization of media coverage. 
Political personalization, as scholars have indicated since the adaption of this term in political 
science research, is a broad concept including more than one type and dimension (Rahat & 
Sheafer, 2007; Adam & Maier, 2010; van Aelst et al., 2012). So clarifying the scope and aim 
of the definition of personalization employed here is in order. Rahat and Sheafer (2007) 
identified three domains in which personalization and its effects are most relevant for political 
research: institutions, the media, and behavior, where they differentiate between behavior of 
politicians and the public. My contribution aims to explain the personalization of politicians’ 
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behavior, especially their strategic behavior in election campaigns1. I will answer the question 
which parties’ campaign management will under what circumstances resort to which relative 
amount of personalization in their campaign messages. The other types of personalization 
mentioned by Rahat and Sheafer (2007) – institutional, media-related, and the public’s behavior 
personalization – play a key role as mechanisms motivating campaign managers to apply 
personalization and therefore in explaining campaign personalization, but will not be included 
as outcomes in this analysis. Of course, institutional personalization, referring to changes in 
rules and mechanisms enhancing individual politicians’ importance, such as adoption of open-
list electoral systems or single-member districts (Zittel, 2015: 13; Shugart et al., 2005), clearly 
influences the incentive structure favorably for personalized campaigning. Also media 
personalization, for example an increase in media coverage of individual politicians compared 
to parties or policies, contributes to the use of personalized campaign content. Anticipating 
increased media attention for personalized information, spin doctors in party offices are eager 
to take advantage of this free augmentation of their message. And of course influencing the 
public’s personalized political behavior, especially voting behavior, is the main goal of 
personalized campaign strategies (Garzia, 2014). All these types of personalization are 
empirically tightly intertwined phenomena, whose relationship with each other I will theorize 
in this thesis. But the focus of the analysis lies in the personalization of political communication 
by political actors, namely parties in election campaigns. 
In the political communication literature, on whose conceptualization of personalization I will 
base my definition, personalization is broadly defined as the increase of media attention and 
coverage of persons compared to other (collective) actors or issues. In the political domain, 
                                               
1 By marketing scholars “personalized” is understood as “tailor made for the individual customer”. Although the 
development of communication technology, especially but not only the internet, social networks, and consequently 
“big data” enabled party strategists to microtarget advertising messages to an ever smaller and more specific 
audience, which for example was decisive in the election of Barack Obama (Kenski et al. 2010), this notion of 
personalization will not be the objective of the present study. 
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these non-personal actors and issues would then be institutions, parties, collective actors of civil 
society as well as political problems, ideologies, or policies. Borrowing from this empirical 
concept of media personalization, I define the amount of personalization in a campaign as the 
proportion of campaign communication that concentrates on persons vs. parties, issues, and 
institutions. The more campaign content features persons as actors, objects, or messengers, the 
more personalized the campaign. However, my research deals with personalization not as an 
empirical feature of the media system or a mere pattern in election campaign coverage. The 
choice for personalized campaign strategies has an agency component to it which has to be 
included in the working definition of personalization employed here. So to answer the present 
research question of how one can explain the choice for personalization as a campaign strategy, 
I define personalization as the conscious choice of party officials, campaign managers, and 
candidates to advertise persons and their qualities, aiming at electoral gains. So in addition to 
measuring the mere proportion of personalized information transmitted, I will theorize the 
process that leads to the decision for personalization to be driven by a certain notion of utility.  
After this first step of defining the object under investigation and clarifying its scope, there is 
still the need to differentiate between two dimensions of personalization: individualization vs. 
privatization and concentrated or leadership personalization vs. general personalization. The 
bulk of research about personalization of politics deals with the question to what extent media 
coverage is personalized. In this context, different dimensions of personalization have already 
been defined and categorized to enhance conceptual clarity. Because I already based the 
definition of personalization employed here on media scholars’ contributions, I will also draw 
on the classifying concepts developed in this strand of research (Adam & Maier, 2010; van 
Aelst et al., 2012) to frame this research project’s object and scope.  
On the first dimension, two elementary forms of personalization are distinguished in the 
literature: Personalization as a shift of focus from parties and institutions to politicians, labeled 
individualization (van Aelst et al., 2012, 206), and a focus shift from the political to the personal 
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life of candidates, labeled privatization (van Aelst et al., 2012: 207). I will first concentrate my 
analysis on the individualization aspect of personalization, the proportion of candidates’ 
appearances compared to issues and parties. For example, a TV ad showing a politician making 
a statement is considered more individualized than a TV ad in which a voiceover suggests a 
party’s policy proposal remedies a depicted problem. A quantitative assessment of how 
personalized the content of several election campaigns is, compared to (or also in conjunction 
with) party and policy, and the reason behind that will be the first endeavor of this project. 
There is also an internal differentiation of this concept in order, constituting the second 
dimension of analysis. Individualization can come in two forms, a focus on leaders, 
concentrated individualization, or a focus on persons/candidates in general and regardless of 
rank, general individualization (van Aelst et al., 2012: 207). These two subtypes of 
personalization follow different logics and serve different purposes when it comes to election 
campaigning, so I will consider the effects of modernization, institutions, party competition and 
party as well as candidate qualities on these types of personalization in separate analyses.  
The second part will be dealing with privatization of election campaigns, primarily concerned 
with the amount of mentioning traits of candidates compared to genuine political qualities like 
ideological stance or policies. Some scholars following Lass (1995: 60) advocate a further 
dimension of personalization differentiating between personal traits relevant, like leadership 
qualities, and irrelevant, like hobbies, for political purposes, but this distinction is 
argumentatively hard to hold up, especially in election campaigns. Candidates and their images 
as “attractively packaged commodities” (Dalton & Wattenberg, 1993: 208) are hard to separate 
from each other. If a voter does not see a candidate as a replaceable party soldier, perceives him 
or her as a person potentially representing his or her interests in parliament, it is not justifiable 
to qualify the voters’ attention paid for example to the candidate’s way of life, character traits, 
or other personal information as apolitical. Following Pitkin’s (1967) concept of descriptive 
representation, all kinds of personality traits or demographics of a candidate can have an impact 
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on his or her perceived and actual suitability for a mandate or government office and there is 
no reason to treat indications of these traits differently if they are framed in a public or private 
personalized context. In addition to this argument, personal traits of candidates can also be used 
by voters as heuristic shortcuts to reduce information costs for making a rational decision. 
Therefore, my analysis will include traits of candidates as indicators of personalization as 
privatization, regardless of whether “role-near” or “role-distant” (Lass, 1995: 60).  
 individualization privatization 
general personalization 
concentration on 
candidates instead of 
institutions, parties, and 
policies 
(e.g. ads showing 
candidates’ faces) 
concentration on candidates’ 
traits 
(e.g. display of a politician’s 
hobbies) 
leadership personalization 
concentration on leaders 
instead of institutions, 
parties, and policies 
(e.g. ads showing leaders) 
concentration on leaders’ 
traits 
(e.g. showing leader with 
family) 
Figure 1.1 Dimensions of campaign personalization 
Figure 1.1 summarizes the four types of campaign personalization under investigation here and 
gives short examples. After this neutral conceptualization and description, however, some 
words about the (often implicit) normative assumptions and evaluations of personalization in 
election campaigns are in order. 
1.2 Normative Evaluations and Implications of Campaign Personalization 
The personalization of politics in general has been theorized as a symptom of, a consequence 
of, but also a remedy for the crisis of modern democratic representation. On the one hand critics 
of personalization claim that it is responsible for the success of populist challengers to 
representative democracy (Pasquino, 2008). These challengers would receive disproportionate 
attention towards their charismatic leadership based on stylizing themselves as personification 
of the volonté générale or “man of the people”, hollowing even further the institutions and 
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functioning of representative democracy (Kriesi, 2014; Mair, 2013). Also, personalization is 
accused of unduly replacing “real” political information and thereby contributing to a lack of 
political sophistication and information in the population, which causes an “erosion of the 
public sphere” (Langer, 2007). Personalization here is said to further push back genuine 
political information about ideology and policy needed to deliberate and make adequate 
collective decisions to hold elites accountable. The already small amount of attention paid to 
politics by citizens should not be spoiled.  
On the other hand, both these critiques rely on strong assumptions. Personalization as 
populism’s accomplice can only be normatively relevant if populism is defined as inferior to 
other forms of political representation or as by itself harmful to democracy. Theorists of 
populism have largely emancipated themselves from this normative assumption (Canovan, 
1999). Furthermore, even if one accepted populism’s inferiority in collective decision-making 
or harmfulness for democracy, personalization’s (empirically sound) link with populism is 
theoretically not as clear as assumed by the critics. Populism can be conceptualized either as an 
ideology, or as a political strategy (Kriesi, 2015; Urbinati, 2014). Its main ideological 
components, postulating an antagonism between “the pure people” and a “corrupt elite” 
(Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2004) and the necessity for unmediated execution of the people’s will 
(a notion that can be considered illiberal, but not undemocratic, rather very or overly 
democratic), however, only constitute a “thin ideology” (Stanley, 2008) unable to serve as an 
encompassing framework for responding to problems in all domains of life. It has to be 
combined with thicker ideologies like nationalism or socialism able to define for example who 
belongs to “the people” and who its enemies are. Therefore, the undemocratic exclusionary 
tendencies towards foreigners or “the rich” are not necessarily the fault of populism, but of the 
ideologies combined with it. And within these normatively questionable and questioned 
ideologies, personalization does not even appear, because it mainly plays its role in populism 
as a political strategy. Ideologically, there is no immediate need for a leader figure, but 
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strategically, a personalistic leader as an unmediated executor of “the people’s will” is a feature 
most populist movements (or parties) share to gain support for their policy projects (Weyland, 
2001). Populism in this analysis is understood as a political strategy, of which personalization 
as concentration on a leader figure is a crucial part. But the chicken-or-egg problem of whether 
personalization facilitates populism, as some media scholars argue (e.g. Mazzoleni, 2008), or 
whether populism drives personalization, remains unsolved. 
The argument made by alleged defenders of the public sphere is even harder to uphold (Adam 
& Maier, 2010: 220-223). It relies on the assumption that there is “real” and “fake” political 
information, which is hard to justify when thought through. Distinguishing useful or harmful 
political information is just as hard as separating role-near or role-distant traits of politicians. 
Every piece of information shapes the individual’s perspective on politics and therefore should 
not be dismissed a priori. Reevaluating this normative categorization of personalization as 
harmful pseudo-information makes way for the realization that it can even contribute to a 
remedy of a crisis of participation and therefore democracy. In fact, personalization can 
contribute to alleviating crises of the public sphere, both as “the spoonful of sugar that makes 
the medicine go down” as well as a way to ensure descriptive representation should substantive 
representation continue to be dysfunctional. In making political information and competition 
more entertaining, accessible, and therefore salient to citizens (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), also 
those disaffected with democracy or not willing and/or able to engage in political deliberation, 
personalization can on the one hand help alleviate the ever growing inequality in political 
effectiveness and efficacy predicted by scholars of political participation (e.g. Brady et al., 
1995) and promote political engagement via popular politicians’ “star power” (Wheeler, 2013: 
170). On the other hand, it can also function as a heuristic shortcut alleviating information costs 
for all citizens, whether willing or unwilling to invest cognitive resources into politics. 
Personalization thereby helps make political decisions more accurate in facilitating the 
ordering, processing, and evaluating of information in a way the human mind is used to: 
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Evaluating persons (Hoffmann & Raupp, 2006: 459). Estimating a person’s belonging, 
qualities, and intentions is an everyday task for which the human mind is very adequately 
trained. Complex political information however, especially when concentrated in election 
campaigns, overwhelms the human mind regardless of individual capability. Personalization 
makes this information more accessible and contributes to economic decision-making under 
bounded rationality. So an individual or voter should not be deemed lazy or underinformed 
when opting for the informational shortcut personalization offers, but economically rational, 
making the best of his or her resources. In addition, personal traits can function as carriers of 
descriptive representation (Pitkin, 1967). Likeness in sociodemographics can be a valid cue for 
likeness or agreement in issue orientation, though mediatized spin and image management, 
giving a desired more than an actual picture, as well as societal individualization, making 
likeness on the growing number of relevant traits improbable, undermine this personalized 
cue’s value. 
Thus, it would be premature to reject personalization on normative grounds as a threat to 
democracy. Its potential usefulness for democratic decision-making depends clearly on its 
relationship with other forms of political information. As mentioned in the introduction, to be 
able to assess potential effects of personalization on the quality or functioning of democracy, 
we must first have an idea of where it comes from, what its drivers are, and who uses it under 
which circumstances. 
1.3 Overview of the Thesis 
To get a clearer picture of personalization as a campaign strategy, I will theorize its drivers and 
constraints in the next chapter. In chapter 3, the study’s design, case selection, 
operationalization, and method of analysis will be presented and justified, followed by an 
overview of the dependent variable’s distributions in chapter 4. Chapter 5 will deal with 
explaining general individualization, the most overarching type of personalization, candidates’ 
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visibility in newspaper ads and TV spots. A theoretically as well as practically highly relevant 
subset of candidates, namely leaders and individualization concentrated on them, will be the 
subject of chapter 6. In chapter 7, I will turn towards the privatization dimension of 
personalization, explaining when and why candidates’ traits are portrayed strategically in 
campaign advertisements. In chapter 8, I will pay special attention to privatization concentrated 
on leadership, before I conclude with a summary and evaluation of the results in light of the 
normative claims surrounding personalization in political communication in chapter 9. 
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2. Drivers and Constraints of Personalization in Election Campaigns 
Personalization of campaign content is a result of several correlated and intertwined phenomena 
in party competition and organization, media environment, and electoral institutions. In this 
chapter, I will theorize the main drivers behind the personalization of election campaigns. First, 
I will theorize and explain modernization’s influence on parties’ campaign communication in 
the crisis of programmatic representation. Over the last decade, party competition has lost a 
considerable amount of programmatic political content. The big ideologies like socialism, 
liberalism, or political Catholicism, which structured the party systems of the interwar period 
in the western world (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) and stayed influential beyond (Bartolini & Mair, 
2007) have lost a considerable amount of their appeal and therefore their structuring power in 
the process of modernization. They have been partly complemented and partly replaced by 
alternative linkage strategies of parties, namely technocratic valence appeal, issue voting, 
economic voting, and not least populism and charismatic linkage, both conducive to 
personalized election campaigning. 
Second, mediatization of politics in general and political communication in particular 
contributes to an increase in personalization of political campaigns. With the advent and later 
the pervasion of mass communication in the mediation of political information, political actors 
have been adapting to a “media logic” (Esser, 2013) of news value at the expense of the political 
logic that governed political coverage and mediation before. 
Thirdly, related to the decline in programmatic linkage as well as mediatization, also the 
increasing complexity of the political arena makes personalization as a form of heuristics 
attractive for voters to be able to orientate themselves in a complex political world. 
However, all these facets of modernization play out in specific institutional contexts. Electoral 
systems with small districts or open lists, concentrated executive power, centralization vs. 
federalism as well as the institutionalization of TV debates and the development and regulation 
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of personalization-friendly campaigning techniques shape the incentives for a higher or lower 
level of personalization.  
After theorizing these four groups of macro-drivers of personalization below and the 
mechanisms through which their influence on party strategists operates, I will conclude this 
chapter by deriving testable hypotheses on different levels of analysis, taking the institutional 
framework, the mediatization of the political system as well as the party organizations, parties’ 
positions in the programmatic electoral competition as well as the perceived complexity of 
politics by voters into account. 
2.1 Personalization and the Crisis of Representation 
The personalization of politics has been repeatedly linked to a crisis of representation. It 
allegedly shows, deepens, but in some circumstances also alleviates problems that stem from a 
decline in programmatic linkage between parties and voters. The representative connection of 
parties with their voters is deemed indispensable for functioning party government as we 
observe it in the western world (Poguntke, 2000; Mair, 2013). This ideally stable connection, 
known in the political science literature as linkage, describes the interchange and 
communication between parties and their followers vital for organizing modern mass societies 
along partisan lines to provide representative, responsive as well as responsible government. 
Three types of linkage have been theorized to connect party elites with their followers: 
clientelist linkage, programmatic linkage, and charismatic linkage (Kitschelt, 2000). All three 
of these linkage mechanisms have been present in different mixing ratios throughout democratic 
history. Charismatic linkage is most conducive to personalization. Based on a leadership 
person’s personal traits (=charisma), this sort of linkage continues a straight line from the divine 
right and absolute power of the pre-democratic monarchs, via the elite parties of the 19th 
century, to popular celebrity leaders of mediatized democracy nowadays. Charismatic linkage 
therefore embodies a continuing tradition of personalized claims to power, which are based on 
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a leader’s traits, not convictions or ideology. Clientelist linkage is based on direct exchange of 
private goods for electoral and political support, more often than not at least bordering 
corruption2. Programmatic linkage, based on ideology and policy proposals for the whole of 
society deduced from this set of ideas, is seen as a more democratically mature way of linking 
parties and followers. But this type of linkage has come under siege in the process of societal 
modernization. A rapid growth of the middle class, diversifications in occupation as well as 
worldviews and values, and new challenges resulting from globalization have made it harder to 
organize representative government along established party and cleavage lines (Kriesi, 2013, 
Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000).  
In this development, not only voters, but also parties transformed away from the class-based 
“mass parties” dominant in the political arenas of the 1920s to 1960s (Poguntke, 2000). First, 
their more narrow ideological appeal designed to cater to a specific “classe gardée” was 
replaced by a strategic centrist and more overarching repositioning in the context of forming 
catch-all parties (Kirchheimer, 1966) beginning in the 1960s. Subsequently, the development 
of these parties into “cartel parties” (Katz & Mair, 1995) further loosened the programmatic 
linkage of parties with voters in favor of a closer connection of parties with the state. This 
process not only affected the relationship between party leaderships and their partisans, but also 
the competition patterns in the political arena as a whole. The necessity to cater to a diffuse 
“center” of political competition caused established parties to shift their programmatic stance 
further and further to the middle of the ideological spectrum, not only leading to the dilution of 
their individual policy offers to the voters, but also, since the vast majority of established parties 
converged to the middle, to a competition where viable political alternatives became more and 
more alike, generating a party cartel of consensus. A tendency to depoliticize controversial 
                                               
2 Clientelist practices are in a great majority of cases not suitable for organizing national mass politics, as they are 
interpersonally based and have unlimited potential to be publically scandalized by political opponents, a big price 
to pay for uncertain political gains, should the interpersonal relationship in a mass society be difficult to hold up. 
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issues by invoking technocratic commissions also did not alleviate the problems of cartelized 
party competition (Mair, 2013). 
To add to programmatic leadership’s dysfunctionality, even the ideological space as an arena 
of party competition is not guaranteed to be perceived to be the same by every voter. With the 
rise of issue voting, replacing or complementing the choice for or against ideological packages, 
programmatic linkage is further weakened by thematic fragmentation (Green-Pedersen, 2007). 
The salient issue of the day (i.e. in the weeks before Election Day) can become a decisive factor 
(Lachat, 2014) but ownership of these issues shortly relevant to voters provides a more unstable 
form of party-voter linkage contrary to established ideological positioning. And for an even 
greater group of voters “it’s the economy, stupid”, motivating them to reward or punish the 
sitting government most consistently on egotropic (Fiorina, 1981) or sociotropic (Kinder & 
Kiewiet, 1981) evaluations of the economic situation on election day, leading to even more 
instability in ideological linkage as the mixture of generalized clientelism and economic single-
issueness that is economic voting gains in importance. 
The consequences are paradoxical but clearly visible: Identification of voters with established 
parties declined steadily in a process of dealignment (Dalton, 2000), consequently voter 
volatility increased, yet still alternation in government is largely taking place between 
established parties of the center without challengers having sustainable chances to participate 
in government and enact alternative policy options. All in all, party competition has become 
increasingly dysfunctional and showing a pattern of cartelization.  
This creates severe problems for parties’ legitimacy as main players in organizing government. 
Their function as organizers of democratic political competition vitally depends on credibly 
providing alternatives, responsiveness, and responsibility. So to secure ongoing support without 
delegitimizing themselves, especially centrist mainstream parties can resort to showcase 
competition on a dimension besides policy. One viable alternative dimension is the personality, 
popularity, or charisma of leaders and candidates. Personal information on leaders and 
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candidates (be it role-near or role-distant, see Adam & Maier, 2010) is easily accessible and 
provides, from a political marketing perspective, a unique selling point for parties competing 
for voter support. Even if the parties largely agree on policies, replacing or enhancing their 
political message with personal characteristics of candidates creates visible differences between 
them and an illusion of competition, even when substantive differences are small. So even 
though party competition is cartelized, and the voters actually prefer cooperation of party elites 
over tough bargaining and the cumbersome process of finding compromises3, there is still a 
desire for at least holding up the façade of competition at election time, which can be provided 
by personalization. This “spectacle, image and theatre” (Mair, 2013: 83) of competition is 
particularly useful in mediatized environments, as we will see in the next section. 
In addition, if citizens face this development towards the decline of a vital part of the democratic 
process – programmatic linkage – they become increasingly disaffected with parties and their 
role in organizing democracy. Democratic government as party government gets hollowed out, 
leaving a “void” (Mair, 2013) for other forms of linkage to fill. Technocratic and populist 
challengers with a clearer policy stance defined by an a priori notion of the volonté générale 
are offered a chance to gain access to parliamentary seats and even government portfolios. On 
the one hand, technocratic challengers to representative government or even actors affiliated 
with the established parties stress their capacity for responsible government allegedly not 
provided by the party cartel, which supposedly only aims for short-term electoral gains. They 
try to expand depoliticized party competition to an additional valence dimension (Stokes, 1963, 
1992; Clark, 2009), aiming for electoral gains by advertising and displaying their competence, 
integrity, and (especially in the case of incumbents) reputation for getting things done. Populists 
on the other hand rely on charismatic linkage provided by leadership figures and a strategy of 
                                               
3 In Germany for example, averaging popularity scores over 18 years, the grand coalition of the Christian 
Democrats and the Social Democrats has been the most preferred coalition alternative (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 
2015). 
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stylizing them as embodiments of the “people’s will” claiming to fix the lost responsiveness of 
the political system, be it alleged or substantial (Caramani, forthcoming). “[C]harismatic 
leadership and direct communication between the leader and ‘the people’ are common among 
populists [and] facilitate […] populism” (Mudde, 2004: 545, emphasis original), even more 
than populist party programs’ or subordinate candidates’ appeal (Kestilä-Kekkonen & 
Söderlund, 2014). Personalization thus is often observed when challengers from outside the 
established and cartelized channels of representation try to make their claims heard, but also 
the established parties can resort to the strategic use of populist discourses or arguments when 
challenged. Especially populist qualities can credibly be transported by emphasizing the 
individual qualities of these challengers’ political personnel versus the alleged loss of touch 
with the common man attributed to candidates brought forward by established mainstream 
parties. Management qualities and integrity as well as charismatic embodiment of the people’s 
will in a leader or candidate therefore makes personalization a suitable vehicle for these 
challenges to representative party democracy and allow challenger parties as well as defenders 
to use their personnel’s qualities for their electoral advantage. 
So from a linkage perspective, personalized election campaigns can reach voters via two 
mechanisms. First, in addition to the dysfunctional ideological dimension, personalization 
provides a type of political competition of alternatives that is no longer guaranteed by 
mainstream cartelized parties due to ideological and programmatic convergence. Second, 
personalization emphasizes and provides charismatic and personalized linkage for challenger 
parties, especially of the populist kind, as another, “real” alternative for voters disaffected with 
the dominant party cartel. 
2.2 Personalization and Mediatization 
The personalization of political communication in general and of election campaign content in 
particular results not only from changes in party competition and linkage to the voters, but to a 
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large extent as well from a change in the relationship between politics and the media. Since the 
advent of mass communication, scholars of media systems as well as mass media channels like 
commercial press, TV, and the internet have observed mass media growing more and more 
important to ultimately be the monopolist in bringing political information to the voters 
(Strömbäck & Esser, 2014), a job that was previously, in the age of mass parties, also performed 
by parties and their satellite organizations, oftentimes assisted by partisan media outlets 
(Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). Especially the advent and ubiquity of television has been 
identified as a driving factor in this process. Nowadays, citizens have a plethora of outlets to 
choose their political information from, which however are similar in one aspect: They follow 
a non-partisan media logic of news value, a need for commercial appeal, and professional 
distance to politics, resulting in a more active role in shaping political communication, not only 
passively transporting information (or linkage). In the course of professionalizing and 
commercializing, journalists changed their role from “silent sceptics” to “vocal cynics” 
(Patterson, 1993), so that the media increasingly influences society and politics as an actor in 
its own right in this process of mediatization. Political information that does not fit the media 
logic and its criteria for newsworthiness does not get reported and so parties and political actors 
in general have to provide content which is deemed reportable to be recognized as a viable 
alternative in the electoral arena. Thus, this development alters the rules of the political 
communication game; it gets mediatized (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014). 
Definitions of mediatization oscillate between an overarching “metaprocess” (Krotz, 2007: 22) 
and a more relational approach. In the former approach, media and its distinct logic are argued 
to have penetrated, taken over, and made nearly all of society’s subsystems, including politics 
(Mazzoleni, 2014), dependent on their logic (Hjarvard, 2013: 17). The more relational approach 
to mediatization postulates a change in the transmission of information in interplay with other 
societal domains like politics (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014; Donges, 2008), but also fostering “the 
institutionalization of media logic in other societal subsystems [, influencing] the actions of 
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individuals” (Schrott, 2009: 42). Both these approaches share the notion that a particular “media 
logic” is spreading in modern societies and their subsystems, causing actors with the need for 
communication, here politicians and parties, to adapt to this logic and cater to the interests of 
the media to increase the salience of their message. There are different components to media 
logic, developed in the process of modernization of mass media, namely professionalism, 
commercialism, and media technology (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). 
Media professionalism is defined by Strömbäck and Esser (2014: 17–18) as independence from 
other societal subsystems (especially politics), a pursuit of generally accepted norms and values 
of journalism, and a claim to serve the public interest. Again, these factors are thoroughly 
intertwined, but the common notion of norms and values of newsworthiness are especially 
conducive to personalization. Already in their classical analysis of what constitutes news value, 
Galtung and Ruge (1965: 68–69) defined personalization (or personification, as they called it) 
as one important criterion making a piece of information “news”4, and even as later scholars 
revisited their criteria catalogue, personalization and its related news-value factors like picture 
opportunities gained even more prominence (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001). 
Also media commercialism, the modern notion that media outlets have to function as 
businesses, contributes to personalization. News about people, their deeds, opinions, and flaws 
are generally cheaper to produce than investigative in-depth coverage of scandals or political 
processes. For example, an interview or just a soundbite are easy to come by, whereas 
uncovering and interpreting classified documents needs time and resources. This tendency is 
reinforced by the fact that public personalities like politicians, who want to use the media to 
bring messages across to the voter for them, or even better: who want to publicly attack a 
                                               
4 Following Galtung and Ruge (1965: 68–67) personalization in its own right (be it about elites or common people) 
makes information newsworthy, but also being a consequence of other factors such as cultural idealism of human 
free will, identification, elite concentration, frequency, and not to forget: picture opportunity (Harcup & O’Neill, 
2001). 
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competitor, will readily provide content, from which news outlets only have to pick the best-
fitting parts, leading to a form of media complicity, especially with populist leaders (Mazzoleni, 
2008). Coming back to the example above, no politician planning to stay in office will as readily 
provide information for investigating secretive government activities as he or she will provide 
a personal statement. Also, the commercial need for infotainment to appeal to a wide audience 
is conveniently satisfied by personalization. Horse-race coverage of campaigns concentrating 
on leading candidates (Patterson, 1993), private stories of candidates, and other personalized 
content is very suitable for media, gets reported, and thus is also readily provided by campaign 
organizers, one type of crucial player of the political communication game in a mediatized 
political arena. 
However, not only the game is changing. The players, here collective political actors like parties 
(Donges, 2008), parliamentary groups, party boards, or campaign organizations, also change 
with regard to the media logic of modern political communication and campaigning, they “self-
mediatize” (Esser, 2013). This process is also part of a profound modernization and 
professionalization in political communication, but here on the part of parties instead of media 
outlets (Gibson & Römmele, 2009; Mancini & Swanson, 1996, Panebianco, 1988). More 
precisely, parties mediatize their organization (Donges, 2008). They adapt their organizational 
structure, profile, and actions, be it intentionally or non-intentionally (Panebianco, 1988), to the 
prevailing media logic in order to be fit for spreading their message through said media. During 
this process, parties install and keep up a professional standing unit for press liaisons in the 
respective organization, allocate resources to external spin doctors and advertising agencies, 
and increase their communication output in quantity as well as by channel diversification 
(Donges, 2008: ch.8). These organizational and behavioral changes then enable political actors 
to cater efficiently to the needs of media to make their voices heard. The organizations now 
have the capacities to adapt messages to the media logic in the political arena, including 
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personalizing campaign content with the aim of making it more newsworthy and media-
friendly. 
Thus mediatization fosters personalization of campaign content on two intertwined levels. On 
the systemic macro-level of the political arena, the level of influence exerted by media logic 
compared to political logic can be a predictor of the personalization of campaign 
communication in general. Personalized content is more salient to the media and promises 
disproportionate attention, which is of key importance to a successful campaign. On the party 
level, the more self-mediatized a party organization has become, the more one can expect it to 
personalize its campaign to reap the benefits of the aforementioned media salience.  
2.3 Personalization and Psychology 
Personal characteristics of politicians have long been regarded as influential for voters’ 
cognitive decision-making. In the classical Michigan model (Campbell et al., 1960), candidate 
effects (although mediated by party identification) are one major building block in explaining 
voters’ choice, which even gained in importance in subsequent revisions and expansions as well 
as critiques of this approach (Garzia, 2014: 18–22). Political personalization’s appeal as a 
campaign strategy therefore also stems from psychological factors, emotional as well as 
rational, related to voters’ decision-making (Lavine et al., 1998). Its emotional component 
contributes inter alia to affective personalized charismatic linkage, because it provides a sense 
of belonging and likeness between candidates and voters. Social groups and parties are less and 
less able to offer this kind of connection to atomized voters, whose social and political group 
ties grow less and less meaningful for their political identity and choice.  
The alleged increase in influence of personality factors on voting decisions, and therefore its 
usefulness as a campaign strategy (van Zoonen & Holtz-Bacha, 2000), can be related to the 
decline of ideological linkage mentioned above (Garzia, 2014) and an increase in 
individualization of political thinking as well as belonging. Paralleling the political 
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homelessness because the voter cannot find a rationally fitting programmatic appeal of parties 
anymore, he consequently also does not emotionally connect to a party. Voters are more and 
more volatile in behavior as well as identification (Dalton, 2000), not only due to a lack of 
ideological guidance, but also because they miss a sense of belonging. In addition, seeing 
oneself as an individual and thus identifying with an individual is more relevant for political 
choice today than in the past (Caprara, 2007: 161).  
This emotional void described above can be filled by “political personae” (Corner, 2000), the 
self-stylization of politicians in mediated (see above) discourses and campaigns. The (self-) 
presentation of candidates and their personality traits can compensate for the loss in 
programmatic and group appeal of parties in offering “a kind of similarity heuristic, conducive 
to liking those perceived similar, and thus supplying the emotional glue that is needed to cement 
preferences” (Caprara, 2007: 158), a notion that can also be found in the tradition of Pitkin’s 
“descriptive representation” (1967). 
But personalization’s and the political persona’s psychological appeal goes beyond the affective 
domain. It also provides rational heuristics for voters confronted with an overwhelming amount 
of political information (especially concentrated in election campaigns), which they are not 
willing or able to process economically. Abundant political information that saturated voters 
are confronted with can be more easily organized and processed with candidates as an anchor 
and guiding post. Humans are bound by cognitive limitations (Simon, 1985; Zaller, 1992), but 
they can use personalization as an informational shortcut to process, order, and make sense of 
abundant, unclear, and, more often than not, conflicting information about parties, platforms, 
and policy alternatives (Caprara et al., 2008). The merits of personalization for voters therefore 
lie in breaking down the complex task of deliberative political decision-making to an easier 
cognitive task with which the human mind is more familiar: Recognizing and judging persons. 
Judging people is a task the human brain is doing automatically without much effort (Hoffmann 
& Raupp, 2006), whereas deliberating and deciding on policy issues for example is cognitively 
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more demanding, because it requires concentrated attention rather than intuitive judgement 
(Evans, 2008). Campaign managers are eager to offer these heuristics to voters in times of 
election campaigns in the hope that personalized information is more likely to be reported (see 
mediatization) as well as to stick and mobilize or persuade potential voters. 
Both these factors are assets too convenient for party strategists not to be used in campaigns: 
Replacing party and group identification with a more individualized appeal of political personae 
as well as the heuristic usefulness of personalization both make political campaign content more 
accessible for voters and should therefore be used whenever promising electoral gains. 
2.4 Personalization and Institutions 
As encompassing and influential as post-war societal modernization changes have been in the 
western world, they still took place in a relatively stable institutional framework of electoral 
rules and regulations. Voter dealignment and realignment, individualization and increased 
volatility, media commercialization, and professionalization all took place in political systems 
where changes over time in formal institutions like from presidentialism to parliamentarism, or 
in the electoral system, or of electoral by-laws were scarce. Yet variance existed and exists 
between countries and levels of government along with elections to different representative 
bodies, for example upper and lower houses of parliament. Therefore, a comparative study of 
personalization as a campaign strategy also benefits considerably from a rational choice analytic 
perspective on this variance in institutions conceptualized as rigid exogenous rules of the game 
not to be changed in the course of one election campaign. The formal arrangements governing 
elections define the choice set (Sniderman, 2000) which the actors can pick from and allocate 
expected utility to these alternatives. In the context of election campaigns, the utility is easily 
quantifiable in vote shares and seats. Remembering our working definition of personalization 
as a campaign strategy being a choice to advertise persons, made by rational actors for political 
gains, institutions have to be an integral part of the explanation of this phenomenon. Although 
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campaign strategists cannot foresee every single turn of events during a campaign, we can 
expect them to choose their advertising strategy based on a probability calculus of success, 
influenced greatly by the institutional arrangements in which the election takes place. 
Therefore, conceptualizing campaign managers as rational actors within a fixed set of 
institutions can contribute a lot to our understanding of the choice for personalization as a 
campaign strategy. The reasons for and consequences of assuming campaign managers as 
rational actors for the generation of hypotheses will be justified in detail below, but we first 
turn to theorizing the expected effects of the institutional context on campaign personalization. 
In line with the argument presented above, Rahat and Sheafer (2007) state that personalization 
of institutions, like the adoption of open lists or direct elections of heads of government, 
preceded all other forms of political personalization, namely in the media and in politicians’ 
and voters’ behavior. So incentive structures provided by institutions have to be taken into 
account when explaining political behavior like campaign strategies. Karvonen (2010: 23–24) 
comprehensively laid out the merits of various schools of institutionalism and institutional 
analysis for studying the personalization of politics in general, also claiming a fundamental 
effect of institutions on political personalization. Also Farrell (1996: 162) listed institutional 
factors to consider when investigating campaign styles and strategies. The characteristics of the 
political system at large, for example presidential vs. parliamentary systems or the degree of 
centralization, should be taken into account along with electoral by-laws and established 
campaign practices when evaluating the utility of strategic components of election campaigns. 
Besides institutional factors structuring utility of negative vs. positive campaigning or 
decentralized vs. centralized campaign organization, Farrell also observes that they affect the 
strategic use of personalization, for which presidential elections for example are clearly more 
favorable than parliamentary systems with a coalition executive (Farrell, 1996: 164–168). So 
let us review the different institutions relevant for personalization and their expected influence 
on the choice for a personalized campaign strategy. 
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As a framework of frameworks, different types of political system beyond the immediate 
electoral process clearly offer varying incentives for campaign personalization. First and 
foremost, the amount of power vested in the executive cannot be neglected when explaining the 
choice for a personalized campaign strategy. Especially concentrated personalization on leaders 
is more likely in election campaigns for executive offices. Furthermore, in the process of the 
presidentialization of the parliamentary governmental systems of western Europe (Poguntke & 
Webb, 2005) with an ever growing institutional as well as public focus on prime ministers as 
supreme leaders, campaigns for legislatures determining the selection of an institutionally 
strong parliamentary executive like the German Chancellor or the British Prime Minister can 
be expected to be personalized to a similar extent as presidential campaigns, much more than 
in political systems led by institutionally weak prime ministers or collegial government bodies 
like in Switzerland (Kriesi, 2012: 827–828).  
Besides this immediate effect of presidentialism or presidentialization, the executive’s power 
and visibility also influences the campaign styles of parallel legislative elections. The literature 
on popular American presidential candidates’ coattail effects helping legislators of their 
respective party into office (Calvert & Ferejohn, 1983) as well as leader effects in parliamentary 
elections (Garzia, 2014) show these political celebrities’ potential for influencing the level of 
personalization of a campaign, even when they are not directly linked to the appointment of 
chief executives. This effect is most visible in parallel elections of the executive and the 
legislature as well as in parliamentary systems, where the top legislative candidate is the 
designated chief executive. Campaign managers try to capitalize on the visible top candidates’ 
popularity and therefore have an incentive to associate other candidates of the same party either 
as similar or friends with the popular frontrunner, or actively seek endorsements by him or her. 
But this also works in the opposite direction. Particularly unpopular candidates make an easy 
target for negative campaigning against parties and candidates associated with them, so that the 
opposing side can be expected to actively communicate or imply a link between an unpopular 
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top candidate as a liability for his or her fellow party members (Pruysers & Cross, forthcoming). 
Both these strategies especially increase the amount of concentrated personalization.  
As a second influential institution, the electoral system, or more specific the electoral formula, 
comes to mind when talking about institutions structuring electoral behavior on the demand as 
well as the supply side of the electoral market. Strategic decisions by voters as well as parties 
are heavily preconditioned by the institutional context of electoral systems (Cox 1997). 
Ultimately, the electoral formula structures seat allocation based on vote shares and therefore 
governs the ultimate goal of election campaigns. Its effects on the personalization of politics 
are twofold. First, it offers different degrees of incentives for candidates to cultivate a “personal 
vote” (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Colomer, 2011), which means support by voters based on 
personal reputation or services and not party membership. To gain and maintain this personal 
vote, a personalization strategy can naturally be expected to contribute. Candidates in open-list 
systems have incentives to present themselves as persons with a firm ideological rooting in their 
party, but also to be different from their ballot-mates to generate vote advantages when it comes 
to seat allocation within a list, leading to a more personalized campaign strategy. Also parties 
can be expected to invest in a personalized strategy in a more candidate-centered electoral 
system. To present their candidate as distinguishable from the competitors in a single member 
district, party strategists also have incentives for personalization as policies are expected to 
converge in races for single seats. 
Second, the electoral formula also determines the usefulness of personalization as one form of 
information shortcut (Shugart et al., 2005). In open-list systems, information requirements for 
voters rise with increasing district magnitude, because the number of potential winners is 
proportional to the seats available and the potential rank-ordering of candidates is not fixed 
beforehand (Shugart et al., 2005: 440–441). In these systems, voters are left alone by parties 
with the decision of how to compose or balance the ballot in favor of their best interests and 
have to rely on the personal information about candidates which is provided to outperform 
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competitors on the same list. However, in closed-list systems the voter’s information 
requirements about the candidates increase with smaller district magnitudes. To come to an 
informed decision in this context, party cues work as a better heuristic the larger the district 
gets (Shugart et al., 2005: 440), because (mathematically) the voter can only rely on a balanced 
ballot reflecting the party’s overall ideological and policy stance when the district is large 
enough. Consequently, in closed-list systems, the smaller the district’s number of seats, the 
more personalized information has to be taken into account by voters. These information 
requirements make attractive a personalization strategy in which persons are offered as 
commodity packages of information to voters, who can then heuristically save information 
costs. 
But not only does the electoral formula shape the utility of choosing a personalized campaign 
strategy. Electoral by-laws and campaign regulations also have an effect on the expected 
advantage of personalization. If they restrict the use of media outlets which are more receptive 
to and suitable for personalization than others, they diminish these channels’ direct effects as 
well as their spillover effects on the utility of personalization as a campaign strategy. A ban on 
TV advertisements for example, the advertising form most receptive to personalized messages 
(Farrell 1996: 173–175; Karvonen, 2010: 86), devalues the utility of personalization generated 
by its appeal to this media outlet as well as delaying its potential spillover effect on 
personalization in other media outlets. The same can be argued for the presence or absence of 
TV debates between leading candidates. The personalization spillover into other media outlets 
and the horse-race journalism these debates create, namely announcements in other news, the 
buildup before the debate, and the analyses afterwards, is considerable (Reinemann & Wilke, 
2007) and a ban or non-establishment of this particular form of campaign advertising makes 
the choice especially for concentrated leadership personalization much less promising to 
campaigners.  
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Last but not least, the decentralization of a political system, be it federalism, devolution, or 
other forms of power sharing between levels of government, also has to be taken into account 
when explaining the choice for personalized campaigning. However, the potential mechanisms 
at work linking relative amounts of personalization to decentralization are rather complex and 
include numeric considerations, expectations about difference of national and regional 
representation in salience, as well as a notion of regional and local government and legislatures 
to be closer to the people.  
First of all, there are simply more prominent politicians available for campaign personalization 
in decentralized systems, for example national leaders supporting their regional co-partisans 
with campaign visits, or regional leaders as candidates for national office, trying to capitalize 
on their recognition value for the national party. Whether these patterns are systematic (e.g. 
federalism showing more personalization than unitarian systems) or idiosyncratic (e.g. a 
particularly popular regional leader running for national office generating a lot of 
personalization, or an unpopular national leader’s party running in a European contest and not 
wanting to be associated with said leader generating less personalization) will be a question to 
answer in the analysis of determinants of personalization.  
Second, the variance in salience of elections on different levels of government also has to be 
taken into account when predicting levels of personalization linked to decentralization of a 
political system. Assuming that personalization is a costly strategy (e.g. in need of paid public 
relations consulting) and party strategists as rational actors only engage in it when the expected 
gains are high enough, elections with lower salience can be expected to systematically show 
lower levels of personalization. In the tradition of second-order election theory (Reif & Schmitt, 
1980) and its adaption to regional elections (e.g. Burkhart, 2005), national first-order elections 
then should show the highest level of personalization. But since we are unsure if this link holds 
true, and since we should not a priori assign second-order status to all regional and European 
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elections in all contexts (Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Schakel & Jeffery, 2013), the formulation of 
directed expectations will not be straightforward. 
Third, although interpersonal contact between politicians and voters, and therefore the 
cultivation of a personal vote, intuitively should be more likely in the smaller constituencies of 
municipalities and regions than in nation states, most type I regions (municipalities are not 
covered here, see Hooghe & Marks, 2003) that are vested with considerable political power, 
and their institutional setup therefore including a regional legislature and executive (Marks et 
al., 2008), represent populations of hundreds of thousands of people or more, which makes 
organizing these polities by interpersonal contact equally inefficient as in nation states. Parties, 
cleavage-based programmatic linkage, and mediatized communication by politicians are also 
the norm in type I regions as are the ones under investigation here. For all these reasons, regional 
and European elections should and will not be conceptualized as fundamentally different from 
or a priori subordinate to national elections here (Jeffery & Schakel, 2013), especially since 
campaign personalization can work as a reinforcement of as well as a remedy for “closeness to 
the people”, but their situative differences will be taken into account.  
Between decentralized and centralized political systems as a whole, however, quantitative and 
qualitative differences in personalization of election campaigns can still be reasonably 
expected. With regard to general personalization, as discussed above, campaigns in 
decentralized systems should be more personalized just because of the fact that more prominent 
politicians like regional heads of government or leaders of regionalist parties are available for 
campaign managers to work with. This effect should be visible in national and European 
elections in decentralized systems, where the above-mentioned regional celebrities can support 
the national party, as well as in regional elections, where the national leadership can provide 
coattails for party comrades or targets for negative campaigning by the opponent. In addition, 
institutional decentralization also begets decentralization in campaign organization, where sub-
chapters of parties or single candidates have additional incentives to personalize their party 
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communication with regard to regional and local political celebrities (Zittel, 2015). 
Concentrated personalization, however, can be expected to be highest in centralized systems, 
where power and the subsequent media attention is concentrated at the top of the national 
executive, be it directly elected in a presidential campaign or a contest between the top 
candidates of the largest parties for a government-forming majority.  
All these institutionalist arguments explaining campaign behavior can be tested best in cross-
sectional comparative research (Bowler & Farrell, 2011: 668). This type of research design 
aiming for variance between countries, institutions, parties, and candidacies allows the 
conceptualization of campaign strategy as an interplay between circumstances and actions of 
motivated players in the election campaign game. In the following, I will theorize campaign 
managers as rational actors facing the circumstances above and derive hypotheses about the 
levels of personalization as a result of their rational strategic behavior. 
2.5 Personalization as a Party Strategy 
How can the amount of strategic personalization in an election campaign be explained? I 
defined personalized campaigning above as a purposeful act aiming for the goal of electoral 
gains. It therefore should be conceptualized as the outcome of a decision by rational actors, like 
campaign managers or party officials. This conceptualization facilitates the theoretical 
inclusion of not only established modernization approaches to explaining personalization, but 
further important institutional and party-level complementing factors. In the following, I will 
discuss the appropriateness of conceptualizing party strategists as rational actors, review the 
modernization arguments explaining personalization from this actor-conscious perspective, and 
derive hypotheses combining the contributions of modernization, institutions, party competition 
as well as party and candidate qualities to explaining the choice for a personalized campaign 
strategy with a rationalist argument for choosing personalization strategies. 
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2.5.1 Campaign Strategists as Rational Actors 
To explain the amount of personalization in an election campaign, I will rely on four 
assumptions. First, the goal of every election campaign is to maximize vote shares and seats. 
Second, personalization helps in reaching this goal. Third, campaign managers are rational 
actors pursuing this goal. And fourth, parties in election campaigns can be treated as unitary 
actors. Some might find this last assumption problematic (Zittel, 2015), but in explaining 
personalization strategies on a party level, it is justified for the following reasons. First, even 
without having complete control over every candidate, resource, or ground-worker, the party, 
represented by campaign leadership and assisted by PR divisions or external consultants, still 
provides the overarching strategy by coordinating and selectively offering support to candidates 
and sections following their strategy. It controls the lion’s share of campaign expenses 
(although the distinction between party and candidate budget is hard to make in one-person 
parties) as well as the indispensable political brand name under which candidacies still have to 
run to be recognized as viable alternatives (Mair, 2013: 95). Second, personalization helps to 
align the interests of leadership, party base, and candidates. Leadership wants to reap the 
benefits of coattail or celebrity effects as well as the potential additional appeal of popular 
candidates (be it through compensating for centrist policy or through charismatic linkage), 
aligning their interests with the backbencher candidates who want to advertise their uniqueness 
to the end of increasing their chances of securing a seat. Also, a personalization strategy by the 
party motivates candidates to invest their own celebrity status and personal resources as well as 
networks into the central party campaign5. The party base benefits from personalization because 
it is offered a potential for identification, which not only makes campaigning in their local 
constituency easier, but also motivates them to invest their volunteering capacities into the 
central campaign, aligning their interests with leadership and candidates. Some might argue 
                                               
5 This strategy was for example deliberately chosen by the Social Democrats of the canton of Zurich in 2011. 
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that institutions like federalism, decentralization, or small districts might predetermine a 
fragmented campaign organization incompatible with conceptualizing parties in campaigns as 
unitary actors. But given that increased fragmentation of party organization theoretically should 
only lead to more or equal, but never less personalization, this organizational fragmentation can 
only function as a mediator variable in explaining campaign personalization. All explanatory 
factors considered here which are related to increased fragmentation (federalism, catch-all 
profile, candidate-centered electoral formulas) have been theoretically included to explain 
increased personalization. So even if campaign organization is empirically decentralized, 
analyzing the personalization of campaign communication, which aligns the interests of party 
leadership, candidates, and party base, justifies this unitary-actor assumption. 
Following these four assumptions, we can model campaign managers’ behavior as directed to 
reach the goal of the campaign. To explain personalization, the subset of behavior we are 
interested in, a combination of exogenous givens (e.g. the electoral formula), their position 
relative to others (e.g. their party’s ideological stance), and their resources (e.g. professional 
staff) have to be taken into account. Since we conceptualized the party in an election campaign 
as a unitary actor steered by the campaign management, a political marketing approach for 
“selling” the party to the voters is the consequence of rational actions of the party. In political 
marketing, personalization contributes to the attraction of voters as customers on the political 
market in three stages (Kotler & Kotler, 1999: 8): Making a political message suitable for media 
coverage in the communication stage of marketing a political candidacy, reducing complexity 
as a heuristic for voters in the image-building stage, and contributing to the unique selling point 
of a candidate or party in the stage of positioning. Not coincidentally, these three stages of 
political marketing correspond neatly to the general factors fostering political personalization 
theorized above: Media suitability, complexity reduction, and providing alternatives to 
dysfunctional ideological competition and linkage. 
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Personalization makes campaign communication more visible by making the personalized 
content appeal to modern commercialized media. If political communication content is framed 
in a personalized way, media tends to receive, process, and distribute this content more readily, 
because the message fits easier in its logic of news value. Thereby, the campaign 
communication also generates “more bang for the buck” as a result of personalization.  
Personalization also contributes to the direct psychological appeal of campaign communication 
to voters. In the complex world of political decision-making, candidates and personalized 
campaign content can serve as heuristics to order information, making classical political 
information more accessible to the cognitively and motivationally limited individual that the 
average voter tends to be. Personalization as a heuristic limits information costs for voters and 
therefore alleviates political apathy. Ideally for the campaigner, it alleviates the apathy of voters 
tending towards the candidate or party issuing the personalized campaign message.  
Last but not least, personalization contributes to the unique selling point of a candidacy by 
adding to or framing information about political positions, ideology, or valence. Especially in 
the modern, de-ideologized context dominated by catch-all parties’ and cartel parties’ 
competition for the median voter, persons and their presentation can make the crucial difference 
and contribute to the unique selling point of a policy offer brought forward by a party in an 
election campaign. This can be done via personalization concentrated on leadership, but also 
by promoting lower-level candidates, for example as mavericks or bridge-builders at the rim of 
the party ideology, as the “social conscience” of a party, or other roles to increase appeal to the 
voters and widen the party’s appeal to a larger segment of the electorate. Also, populist 
challengers can facilitate advertising their uniqueness as embodiments of the “will of the 
people” when concentrating on a charismatic leadership figure. These three effects of 
personalization contributing to the success of an election campaign should motivate managers 
responsible for campaigns to consider personalization as a part of their strategy, especially if 
they are driven by utility-maximizing motivations. 
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The means to reach electoral goals that a personalized campaign can provide have now been 
identified: media suitability, reduction of complexity, and distinction from alternatives. But in 
which circumstances do these means work better and in which do they perform worse or not at 
all? To analyze this question we incorporate lessons from rational choice institutional analysis 
(Shepsle, 2006). A rational campaign strategist has to take several factors into account to come 
to a decision: his or her resources, the rules of the game, modernity of the context as well as the 
action of others. Therefore, we will cover all these facilitating and restricting factors in the 
explanation of personalization in election campaigns in the following hypotheses. 
2.5.2 Personalization: A Modern Phenomenon 
Personalization of election campaigning has been theorized as part of a more general trend 
towards modernization of campaigning, including further aspects like professionalization of the 
party and campaign apparatus, media orientation, and detachment of citizens from parties in 
particular and politics in general due to increasing complexity (Mancini & Swanson, 1996: 14–
16). But theoretical approaches relying on modernization are notoriously plagued by a bundling 
of driving factors, interlinked phenomena, and a teleological time dimension. Modernization 
explains individual phenomena only to a certain extent, because the relationships of causes and 
effects are unclear. For example: Did commercialization of media outlets lead to a 
professionalization of party apparatus feeding the media with personalized information, or did 
this information increase the potential for the media to earn money, leading to 
commercialization? Probably the first is true, but without a restructuring of the modernization 
arguments with the help of the rational paradigm, we cannot put these hypothesized 
relationships to a satisfactory test. It therefore is essential to conceptualize and hypothesize the 
influence of mediatization and complexity separately.  
A modern media environment which is receptive to personalized communication is one of the 
prerequisites for a choice of personalized campaigning. If campaign strategists cannot hope that 
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their personalized message is received and transported by the media, the act of personalization 
would lose one of its three big advantages, the media appeal. Above we discussed what makes 
a media system favorable towards personalization: professionalization, commercialization, and 
technological advance. As in most of modernization theory, these factors tend to occur 
simultaneously, but in different intensities at different points in time. They also tend to be seen 
as universal and converging (Kriesi, 2012: 828).  
H1:  The more mediatized an electoral arena, the more personalized the campaign 
content used in it. 
Another integral consequence of modernization is the increased complexity of the world as 
such, as well as the political sphere to regulate this complex world. As stated above, 
personalization can help here to reduce this complexity by offering candidates as heuristics for 
voters. Candidates and persons representing a certain political brand, a bundle of ideological 
and policy offers, can in addition to the party label help voters to make informed decisions when 
information costs are high and the capacity and motivation to gather information are low. 
H2: The more complex the political arena appears to the voters, the more personalized 
an election campaign conducted in it. 
Modernization also affects the actors in a system responsible for the choice for or against 
personalized campaigning, here campaign strategists and party officials, in the process of self-
mediatization theorized above. I will discuss these implications together with the other 
predictors on the party level below. 
In addition to the necessity for disentangling the facets of modernization actually influencing 
personalization of election campaigns, which I took into account here, one also has to consider 
factors unrelated to societal or media modernization. The constellation of resources, 
opportunities, and restrictions, as well as competition patterns, that campaigning actors face are 
influenced by far more than just the modern society and media environment.  
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2.5.3 The Fixed Context: Formal Institutions and Regulations  
Rahat and Sheafer (2007) postulate that the personalization of institutions lies at the root of all 
other forms of political personalization. Consequently, we must include the institutional 
environment, the rigid rules of the game, in the analysis of personalization as a campaign 
strategy. We have to take four types of institutions into account: the electoral system, the 
electoral regulations and by-laws, the regime type mainly determined by the executive’s power, 
and the decentralization of the political system.  
The electoral system underlies two interrelated advantages of personalization. First, candidate-
centered systems for example with single-member districts increase the utility of 
personalization for the unique selling point of the candidacy. Second, these candidate-centered 
systems also have different information requirements for the voters, in which personalization 
is a useful heuristic. In candidate-centered systems, personalized cues work better for voters to 
make an informed decision influencing the outcome of the election in line with their preferences 
than in others. 
Electoral systems are seldom changed, so since this feature of the electoral competition is 
known widely before the election, campaign managers can be expected to take these merits of 
personalization for the unique selling point and the heuristic accessibility into account. 
Consequently: 
H3: The more candidate-centered the electoral formula, the more personalization in the 
election campaign. 
In addition, campaign managers also face the fallout of the presidentialization of politics in 
institutions and political communication. In a globalized and mediatized world, the executive, 
and especially its chairperson, have gained in influence. This trend is conceptualized as 
universal, but especially important on the national level. The campaign for the main spoils of 
the election, the chief executive’s office, therefore attracts more media attention, making 
personalization’s news value useful, and, since it is fought as a competition for one seat, also 
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benefits from personalization via the unique-selling-point mechanism. Political systems with 
strong executives, which are especially attractive for candidates as well as their spin doctors, 
therefore should generate a higher level in personalization compared to regional or European 
executives or executives in consensual systems. 
But not only do we have to take the direct effect of strong presidential or presidentialized 
executives as the spoils of a campaign into account. Parallel or timely close executive elections 
also have indirect presidentialization spillover effects on legislative campaigns, namely by 
coattail as well as demonstration effects of executive candidate centeredness in media attention 
and campaign strategy. 
Finally, presidentialization via televised debates of candidates for chief executive office and/or 
top candidates of smaller parties’ lists also concentrates media attention to presidential or 
presidentialized candidates. This special campaign forum is highly conducive to personalization 
of leadership. When publicly broadcast debates are established, the campaign at large can also 
be expected to be more personalized. The spillover effects of TV have been theorized to be one 
of the strongest drivers of campaign personalization. So we also have to cover this media-
related facet of presidentialization when measuring it. 
H4: The more presidentialized the electoral arena, the more personalized the election 
campaign. 
But not all parties are challenged or can profit equally from disproportionate attention to the 
executive race. Those parties which run a candidate for (chief) executive office can exploit 
these candidates’ visibility gains much better than smaller parties with no chance of ending up 
in top government positions. Therefore, the effect of presidentialization of hypothesis 4 can be 
expected to not only contribute to a more personalized campaign environment in general, it 
should also additionally increase personalization in campaigns of parties running candidates for 
(chief) executive positions. 
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H5.1: Campaigns of parties running candidates for executive office are more 
personalized than campaigns of parties running no candidates for executive 
office. 
H5.2:  This candidate effect is larger in highly presidentialized systems. 
Another set of arena-specific factors is the level of government on which the respective election 
takes place, as well as the country-specific context. Both these factors will be included and 
modeled in the process of hypothesis testing, but since the defining features of the countries’ 
systems with regard to personalization are already captured in systematic fashion above 
(presidentialization, electoral formula) and the expectations towards the levels of government 
are variable and highly dependent on context (see section 2.4; Jeffery & Schakel 2013), I do 
not formulate explicit hypotheses for countries and levels of government. 
The influence of institutional factors, combined with mediatization and complexity, is supposed 
to affect every party and candidate competing in the same arena. But as we have already seen 
in the case of presidentialization, party qualities also have to be taken into account. To get a 
comprehensive picture of campaign personalization including intra-election variance, we have 
to add further partisan qualities and their relative position in the political competition to our 
explanation and assess the influence of these factors. 
2.5.4 The More Fluid Context: Party Competition in the Electoral Arena 
When thinking about determinants of personalization as a campaign strategy, the competitive 
situation of the respective electoral arena cannot be ignored. In competitive democracies, parties 
and candidates do not only have to attract attention and convince voters of their fitness for 
office, they also have to make clear that they are the better choice than other alternatives present. 
Those are the main purposes of election campaigns and therefore also a factor influencing the 
choice for or against a personalization strategy. 
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From a marketing perspective, a candidacy has to offer a unique selling proposition as well as 
concept specificity (Kotler & Kotler, 1999). Both of these factors can be enhanced by 
personalization of an election campaign. Crucial in this respect is the question of product 
positioning (Kotler & Kotler, 1999: 15). A candidacy classically offers a bundle of policy 
suggestions to the voters, tied together by ideology. But in frameworks where these bundles are 
cartelized and virtually indistinguishable, or if parties compete for the median voter in single-
seat districts, the policy and ideology propositions cannot provide a unique selling proposition 
anymore. Here, personalization as additional information can be used by party strategists to 
infuse the candidacy with uniqueness. Assuming unimodally distributed voter preferences, the 
following hypothesis will be tested: 
H6: The more centrist a party’s position is in the competition, the more personalized its 
campaign. 
Personalization also contributes to populist parties’ unique selling propositions. However, they 
advertise a special kind of uniqueness: The embodiment of the “people’s will”. Regardless of 
their ideological stance, personalization helps populist parties to appeal to the voters presenting 
them a leader figure whose charisma and guidance they should follow. Consequently: 
H7: Populist parties’ campaigns are more personalized than other parties’. 
Taking these factors into account alleviates the problems single-country or single-election 
studies have with testing the classic modernization hypothesis of cartelized party competition 
and charismatic linkage patterns on the systemic level only. Coincidental false positives or 
negatives can be prevented by looking at the specific party constellation of an election already 
on the meso-level. Controlling for the competitive setup of a campaign, this theoretical 
framework allows the influence of context on personalization to be examined more thoroughly 
than before. 
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2.5.5 Willing and Able to Personalize: Resources for Personalization in the Party 
Having dealt with the contexts in which parties and candidates compete and the likelihood of 
personalization derived from those, I now turn towards the qualities of the actors themselves. 
Since the choice for a specific action is not only determined by the expected payoffs, but also 
by the costs an actor faces in doing so, these actors’ resources and qualities are integral to the 
explanation. When it comes to the choice for personalization as part of a campaign strategy, 
one has to keep in mind that this is costly for political actors. Qualified personnel as well as a 
certain amount of financial resources are required to professionally and successfully implement 
a properly personalized campaign that can provide media suitability, distinction from 
alternatives, and reduction of complexity.  
Both these highly intercorrelated prerequisites have been identified as necessary for campaign 
professionalization (Gibson & Römmele, 2001; Gibson & Römmele, 2009), which increases 
the probability for personalization (Holtz-Bacha, 2002). In addition, these two main factors 
conducive to the professionalization of campaigning, financial resources and professionalized 
staff, also make parties more receptive to business-like conduction of media campaigns in 
contrast to volunteer-driven campaigns.  
H8:  The more professionalized a campaign, the more personalized its content. 
Last but not least, a campaign also needs suitable persons as candidates to capitalize on when 
stressing their qualities as a strategy. But what constitutes this suitability? Locality (Shugart et 
al., 2005), good looks (Verhulst et al., 2010), actual or perceived leadership qualities (Langer, 
2007), morality, and many more traits have been theorized and tested to make candidates appear 
more favorable to voters and therefore convincing as the best alternative. Without digging deep 
into the complex interplay of these factors appealing to different subgroups of the electorate 
and probably not finding a convincing answer, I will rely on an approximation of all these 
quality dimensions, which indicates a real-world test result for each and every candidate’s 
combination of qualities: incumbency. Especially in executive and small-magnitude elections, 
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incumbents can be assumed to already have convinced a fair share of voters of their suitability 
for office and therefore also carry suitability for personalization. Furthermore, the name 
recognition these incumbents enjoy as well as their track record also make them a suitable 
carrier of brand heuristics, reducing complexity in the voting booth.  
H9:  Incumbents’ campaigns are more personalized than non-incumbents’. 
With this discussion of incumbency in the choice for personalization strategies, all relevant 
explanatory levels have been covered. Assessing the relative importance of each factor and the 
interplay between them will be the task I tackle in the following chapters. 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
The list of potential theoretical explanations for the choice for personalization as a campaign 
strategy is long. In addition to classical modernization arguments like media system 
receptiveness and increasing complexity of the world, I have discussed the theoretical 
contribution of institutions, party competition, party qualities as well as candidate traits. To test 
this wide variety of arguments, a comparative approach is inevitable. Fortunately, data on 
campaign strategies of party sections in regional, national, and European elections in five 
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland) under different institutional rules 
have been collected in the framework of the “Making Electoral Democracy Work” project 
(Blais, 2010). This rich variety of campaign communication data (TV ads, newspaper ads, 
manifestos) as well as interviews with party strategists is highly conducive to the study of 
personalization as a result of strategic choices made by political actors. It also allows the 
inherent differences of campaign channels in catering to personalization (e.g. TV vs. 
newspaper) to be estimated as a control. 
With this study we will be able to analyze more clearly what drives the personalization of 
election campaigns. It is not merely replacing ideology, party, and policy, but creating value 
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added by complementing, framing, and amplifying these central contents of campaign 
communication.  
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3. Data and Methods 
To effectively test the influence institutions, context, competition patterns, and party qualities, 
as hypothesized above, have on campaign personalization, I have to consider three key aspects 
in designing an insightful study: Case selection, choice of data sources, and modelling. The 
cases under investigation have to cover a reasonable amount of variance on the explanatory 
factors, as well as on the amount and type of personalization, while still being comparable. 
Within these cases, data sources have to be carefully chosen to suit the research question and 
concepts related to this question, namely being as unmediated and comparatively available as 
possible. Thirdly, the method of analysis has to enable the researcher to take variance in a 
limited number of cases on different levels of analysis (e.g. electoral system as well as relative 
party positions) into account. Furthermore, it also has to be able to cope with the fact that 
observations like branches of the same party in different elections or parties competing in the 
same election can hardly be assumed to function independently of each other. Bayesian 
regression analysis can provide these qualities, even with the medium number of cases at hand.  
The necessity for variance and comparability will be satisfied by an informed case selection 
within the countries of Canada, France, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland, which will be 
described and justified in the following section. The choice of TV advertisements, newspaper 
advertisements, party manifestos, and interviews as well as survey data sources on the grounds 
of being as unmediated as possible and their utility and suitability for the analysis will be 
discussed in the subsequent section. Finally, the method of analysis, a Bayesian regression 
approach, will be justified in the ultimate section of this chapter. 
3.1 Case Selection 
This study on personalization as a campaign strategy will be conducted in the framework of the 
“Making Electoral Democracy Work” (MEDW) project (Blais, 2010), a data collection effort 
to unveil parties’ and voters’ strategic behavior under different institutional rules, competition 
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patterns, and their combinations and interplay. This project’s main goal is in line with my 
research project, trying to disentangle and evaluate the relative explanatory power of 
institutional, partisan, and contextual explanatory factors of campaign personalization. Also, 
the choice of cases and data sources by MEDW is appropriate to investigate personalization as 
a campaign strategy, as we will see in the following. 
The data collection efforts of MEDW are centered around the relevant6 parties or party 
branches, competing in regions, for votes for representation on different levels of government, 
so also for the national or European level. This party (1) * region (2) * election (3) setup will 
also constitute the main unit of analysis for this project explaining personalization strategies. 
Therefore, for example, the German Social Democratic Party (1) competing in Bavaria (2) for 
votes to the European Parliament, the national Bundestag, and the regional Landtag (3) 
represents three cases in this analysis. Also data collection was based on regions wherever 
possible. Surveys and media analyses were carried out specifically suited to their regional 
environment. One regional and one national newspaper were coded for the media analysis and 
surveys were carried out in regions, not nationally. Programmatic differentiations between 
parties were measured regionally wherever possible. Also district sizes and interviews with 
campaign managers were recorded at this level of analysis. Comparing these units as cases has 
multiple advantages: It allows analyses of the effects of institutions, modernization, and party 
qualities separately, namely separating for example the between-country variance of media 
systems from the intra-country variance of electoral systems on different levels of government, 
party competition patterns in different regions (produced e.g. presence or absence of regionalist 
parties) and population qualities (e.g. media consumption or perceived complexity of politics). 
                                               
6 Party branches are relevant if they are currently represented in the legislature or came close to winning 
representation (= parties that needed to increase their vote share by less than one percentage point or less than one 
third of their vote). If there are new parties that appear likely to influence the outcome of the election, they are 
included as well. 
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This regional differentiation also is necessary to account for variance in campaign strategies 
and party competition patterns within countries, which tend to get blurred and lumped together 
in single-level cross-country analyses. Especially when facing decentralized models of party 
organization such as in Canada or Switzerland, when including regional parties and their 
strongholds like in Spain, Canada, or Germany, or sociodemographic and ideological 
differences between regions, the party*region*election approach promises differentiated 
insight compared to the inevitable packaging of institutions, modernization, and party 
competition patterns when comparing national elections only. Last but not least, it also 
conveniently increases the number of cases holding the requirement for country-specific 
expertise constant. Instead of for example a national analysis of six relevant German parties 
competing for national votes in a mixed system (6 cases), we can cover up to 6 parties * 3 levels 
of government * 2 regions (36 cases) in Germany alone, allowing a more thorough quantitative 
analysis. The partly nested and partly crossed data structure resulting from this approach to data 
collection obviously is a price to pay in this endeavor. Parties competing in the same regional 
electoral arena as well as branches of the same party can and should not be treated as 
independent from each other. But advances in statistical modelling have appropriate answers to 
dealing with this data structure, which is very common in comparative political analysis. The 
expected clustering of these cases will be tackled with appropriate Bayesian estimation 
techniques, as will be outlined at the end of this chapter. 
The data for MEDW has been collected on two to three levels of government (national, regional, 
and European, where applicable) in five countries (Canada, France, Germany, Spain, 
Switzerland), concentrating on two regions each (see Table 3.1). Data collection started in 2011 
and to this date has covered 15 elections and over 150 party branches competing in it. 
Like my analysis, MEDW concentrated its efforts mainly on legislative elections. Without a 
doubt, including executive elections would add valuable variance in personalization within 
country cases, but because of executives’ typically low variance in district size (mostly one), 
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number of candidates competing (mostly two viable candidates) and disproportionately high 
media attention, differentiation between explanatory factors will be aggravated and 
comparability reduced. Nevertheless, I will take executive elections’ influence on parallel 
legislative elections into account and control for executive spillovers, like presidential coattails, 
especially when explaining leadership personalization.  
Table 3.1 Elections covered by MEDW  
 Canada France Germany Spain Switzerland 
EU - 
2014 
European 
Parliament 
(7+7) 
2014 
European 
Parliament 
(8+8) 
2014 
European 
Parliament 
(10+10) 
- 
national - 
2012 
national 
parliament in 
IDF (10) and 
PACA (10) 
2013 
national 
parliament in 
LS (8) and 
BY (8) 
2011 
national 
parliament in 
CAT (6) and 
MAD (6) 
2011 
national 
parliament  
(2 chambers)  
in ZH (7+8) 
and LU 
(5+8)  
regional 
2011/12 
regional 
parliaments 
in ON (3)  
and QC (6) 
- 
2013 
regional 
parliament in 
LS (6) and 
BY (7) 
2012 
regional 
parliament in 
CAT (7) 
2011 
regional 
parliament in 
ZH (9) and 
LU (7) 
Notes: Number of parties in parentheses; ON=Province of Ontario, QC= Province of Quebec, IDF=Region Île-
de-France, PACA= Region Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, LS=Land Lower Saxony, BY=Land Bavaria, 
CAT=Autonomous Community of Catalonia, MAD=Autonomous Community of Madrid, ZH=Canton of Zurich, 
LU=Canton of Lucerne 
 
The main explanatory variable of interest for MEDW is the electoral system (see Table 3.2). 
Case selection was therefore predominantly driven by the intention to cover a wide variety of 
electoral systems while still ensuring comparability in other domains. This led to the choice of 
Canada as a representative of first-past-the-post, France with its two-round runoff system, 
Germany mixing single-member district (SMD) elements with an overall proportional 
representation (PR) system, Spain with multimember districts (MMDs) and closed lists, and 
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Switzerland with PR in MMDs and open lists for the lower chamber as well as two-round 
majoritarian elections for the members of the upper chamber. Including the European PR 
elections in national districts and regional elections mimicking, but not always completely 
corresponding to the respective national ones adds further valuable variance to the pool of 
electoral systems investigated here in several institutional dimensions. First of all, district sizes 
from 1 (Canada, France) to 96 (Germany EU) are covered in this sample, including a mix of 
both SMDs and MMDs (Germany national). Second, lists are open (Switzerland, Bavaria) or 
closed. Third, proportional representation (Spain, Switzerland lower chamber, Germany) or 
majoritarian rules (Canada, France, Switzerland upper chamber) are applied within this sample 
as well as direct and indirect elections of the executive. Even within countries, the electoral 
systems can differ between levels of government (e.g. PR with national districts European 
elections vs. Germany’s mixed system, France’s runoff system and Spain’s small to medium 
sized MMDs), covering even more variance on the institutional explanatory factors within the 
same-country case. We therefore can test the effects of electoral systems theorized above not 
only across countries, but also include institutional variance and simultaneously control for 
comparable levels of modernization and mediatization within countries.  
Between countries, the levels of mediatization, a component of modernization theorized to drive 
campaign personalization, can also be expected to show variance. The sample covers all three 
types of media systems found in the Western world by Hallin and Mancini (2004): the Polarized 
Pluralist model (France, Spain), the Democratic Corporatist model (Germany, Switzerland), 
and the Liberal model (Canada). Although scholars expect these models to converge in the 
process of globalization, the persistent links between media and political system supports the 
expectation of variance in mediatization of election campaigns leading to different amounts of 
campaign personalization. 
  
52 
 
Table 3.2 Qualities of electoral systems under investigation 
 
electoral 
system family 
district 
sizes 
average 
district size 
elector
al tiers 
open/ 
closed 
lists 
executive 
election 
Canada 
regional  
(ON, QC) 
plurality 1 1 1 closed indirect 
France EU PR 3-15 9.25 1 closed indirect 
France 
national 
two-round 
runoff 
1 1 1 closed direct 
Germany EU PR 96 96 1 closed indirect 
Germany 
national 
mixed- 
member PR 
1 (tier 1) 
2-64 (tier 2) 
1 (tier 1) 
18.7 (tier 2) 
2 closed indirect 
Germany 
regional (LS) 
mixed- 
member PR 
1 (tier 1) 
60 (tier 2) 
1 (tier 1) 
60 (tier 2) 
2 closed indirect 
Germany 
regional (BY) 
mixed- 
member PR 
1 (tier 1) 
8-30 (tier 2) 
1 (tier 1) 
12.9 (tier 2) 
2 open indirect 
Spain EU PR 54 54 1 closed indirect 
Spain 
national 
(lower house) 
PR 1-36 6.7 1 closed indirect 
Spain 
regional 
(CAT) 
PR 15-85 33.8 1 closed indirect 
Switzerland 
national 
(lower 
chamber) 
PR 1-34 4.3 1 open indirect 
Switzerland 
national 
(upper 
chamber) 
two-round 
majoritarian 
1-2 1.8 1 open indirect 
Switzerland 
regional (LU) 
PR 7-30 20 1 open direct 
Switzerland 
regional (ZH) 
biproportional 
apportionment 
4-17 10 2 open direct 
 
Also, the institutional setups of the respective political systems at large cover theoretically 
interesting variation. Centralized (France), decentralized (Spain), and federally organized 
(Germany, Canada, Switzerland) countries are included as well as systems with directly elected 
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executives (France, Swiss cantons) and parliamentary governments. Also, the patterns of party 
competition vary between as well as within the countries under investigation here. 
So the case selection does cover variance on the main explanatory variables, but why are 
elections in these selected countries comparable? First of all, they have all been stable 
democracies for a considerable amount of time and with a democratic history that made the 
establishment of cleavage-based politics possible. The cleavage patterns formed in the late 19th 
and early 20th century shape the established party systems until today and mobilization of 
societal groups had enough time (besides fascist and occupational interruptions in Germany, 
Spain, and France) to produce stable patterns of programmatic linkage for representation 
purposes. Since the late 1970s (Spain), the late 1940s (Germany, France), or even before 
(Canada, Switzerland), these countries enjoyed a democratic, peaceful, and prosperous history. 
They all are also members of the OECD since the 1960s, integrated in globalized patterns of 
trade and economic competition. So a comparable amount of overall economic modernity and 
development as well as established patterns of party competition can safely be assumed. But 
when looking at alternatives to programmatic party–voter linkage, for example charismatic 
linkage most prone to personalization, the parties in the countries under investigation can also 
be expected to vary in strategies. Although democratic rule has been stable for more than 100 
years in Canada and Switzerland, it has been interrupted at different times throughout France’s, 
Germany’s, and Spain’s history. Also, populist parties have been successful to different extents 
in those countries. Their success ranges from government participation in Switzerland, 
considerable legislative representation in France, and small but growing success in Germany 
and Spain to virtual non-existence in Canada. Of further importance when considering 
alternatives to programmatic linkage is the fact that these countries have been hit to different 
extents by the economic crisis starting in 2008, contributing to different levels of political and 
economic uncertainty, in which parties tend to abandon programmatic linkages in favor of other 
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strategies (Lupu & Riedl, 2013). Also this variance can be expected to contribute to different 
levels of personalization in election campaigns. 
In the institutional domain, these five countries are comparable insofar as political decisions 
are taken in multilevel government frameworks, in which the national political arena is not the 
sole place of political decision-making (federalism in Canada, Germany, and Switzerland; 
regional autonomy in Spain; European Union membership for Germany, France, and Spain). 
This is not only a commonality these systems share, but also a convenient asset when it comes 
to comparing the impact of party competition patterns within countries. In multilevel systems, 
especially with powerful autonomous regions, the party competition patterns differ between the 
national arena and the regions as well as between the respective regions, while still being held 
under the same national political-economic contexts. For example regional strongholds of a 
national party compared with a region where regionalist or ethnic parties successfully compete 
in the political arena add valuable variance to parties’ relative position in the competition. Also, 
these multilevel settings contribute, besides the increasing complexity of the social world in 
general, to a level of uncertainty in which parties can be expected to offer personalization as a 
heuristic for electoral decision-making. For example, the rather technical issues decided on the 
European level as well as a perceived democratic deficit and a low level of information inflict 
high information costs on voters in European elections, which can be lowered by parties not 
only offering ideologically sound policy packages, but also by using personalization as a 
heuristic or a help to medially enhance their appeal to voters. 
Thus the party sections under investigation here, although they are all facing comparable 
Western established democratic framework conditions, can be expected to show differences in 
the proportion of personalization used to convey their appeal for voters. How these proportions 
are measured and how their explanation will be modeled is described in the next sections. 
3.2 Data Sources and Operationalizations 
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Personalization as a campaign strategy has been defined here as an intentional and conscious 
choice made by party actors for electoral gains, influenced by institutional and context factors, 
patterns of party competition, and candidacy qualities. This has several implications for the 
selection of data suitable for this project. On the one hand, the phenomenon personalization that 
will be explained here has to be measured not on the recipients’ side (e.g. with voter surveys), 
nor on the mediators’ level (e.g. by analyzing media coverage), but directly at the source of 
campaign communication. So the data has to be as unmediated as possible as well as 
comparable. The data collected in the MEDW framework satisfies these requirements: 
Newspaper ads, TV ads, manifestos, and interviews with campaign managers were collected 
and coded as described in this section. To keep national and/or regional interpretations of 
certain aspects of campaign communication to a minimum, the project group applied the same 
coding scheme (MEDW, 2011) throughout all the elections in the five countries under 
investigation, creating a rich and in this form unique dataset of parties’ strategic behavior in 
campaigns. Coding the general appearance of an ad, as done in the Wisconsin ad project 
(Goldstein & Rivlin, 2007), was combined with measuring the ad’s content on different 
dimensions, with the help of an extended coding scheme following the quasi-sentence approach 
of the Comparative Manifesto Project (Werner et al., 2011). 
The institutional, partisan, and mediatization-related explanatory factors listed in this section 
are also measured for each and every election (on the contextual level) as well as party in 
election (the main level of analysis) using official documents and voter surveys. In the 
following, I will introduce and describe the types of data and operationalizations used for this 
study in detail.  
3.2.1 Operationalizing types of personalization 
To measure personalization in campaign communication, it is essential to rely on data sources 
that are as unmediated as possible. In this project, data collection concentrated on two outlets: 
56 
 
newspaper ads and TV ads7. Unlike the completely unmediated party manifestos, both types of 
ads covered here actually appear in the media. But since they are placed in paid space or airtime 
provided freely by broadcasting corporations, they are not subject to an editorial process by the 
respective media outlet. Selecting, biasing, or changing – in short: Editorial influence on the 
level of personalization as found in media coverage of politics – are not an issue here. So for 
this project, personalization will be measured in these comparable and widely available outlets 
of political advertising. 
For every election covered by MEDW, all political ads in two leading broadsheet papers, one 
with national and one with regional circulation, were collected during the 90 days prior to the 
election in question. In a first step, the advertisements were coded according to their general 
characteristics (see: Goldstein & Rivlin, 2007; MEDW, 2011), including page, position, size, 
but also appearance of candidates’ pictures, names, symbols, and other general and content-
oriented variables. In a second step, the text of the ads was divided into quasi-sentences (qs) 
following the approach of the Comparative Manifesto Project (Werner et al., 2011: 5–7) and 
then assigned a code for the actor speaking the quasi-sentence, the object to whom or which the 
sentence is directed, policy as well as strategic content, and also traits of actors and objects 
mentioned. If a newspaper ad appeared more than once during the campaign, it was included 
multiple times in the dataset. 
Similarly for the TV advertisements, all political spots broadcast during the 90 days before 
election day were collected and coded in the same two-step process as described above for the 
newspaper ads, focusing on general characteristics and quasi-sentences. The weighting of the 
different spots according to number of appearances was not as easy as with the newspaper 
advertisements, because few broadcasting stations in the countries and regions under 
                                               
7 Party manifestos were also considered for analysis, but since less than 5% of the statements made in those 
documents were made by or attributed to candidates or other persons, the variance between parties was too small 
to expect meaningful results from analyzing them comparatively. 
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investigation kept track and/or wanted to report the intensity of broadcasting a certain TV ad to 
the MEDW researchers. But since political TV advertising is typically highly regulated, costly 
for parties, and pre-produced before the campaign, it is fair to assume that the readily available 
TV spots are broadcast in more or less equal numbers of times throughout the campaign.  
Table 3.3 Overview of dependent variables and operationalizations 
variable operationalization level of measurement 
general individualization 
framing 
candidate’s name or picture 
in ad / all ads 
party branch in election 
general individualization 
content 
candidate actor or object of 
qs / all qs 
party branch in election 
leadership 
individualization framing 
leader’s name or picture in 
ad / all ads 
party branch in election 
leadership 
individualization content 
leader actor or object of qs / 
all qs 
party branch in election 
general privatization 
framing 
candidate pictured in private 
in ad / all ads 
party branch in election 
general privatization 
content 
candidate trait mentioned in 
qs / all qs 
party branch in election 
leadership privatization 
framing 
leader pictured in private in 
ad / all ads 
party branch in election 
leadership privatization 
content 
leader trait mentioned in qs / 
all qs 
party branch in election 
 
With the aforementioned data from newspaper ads and TV spots, the amount of personalization 
in the campaign can be measured comparatively. But as stated in the theoretical argument, 
personalization comes in different forms and shapes, which creates the need for differentiation 
to grasp the varying effects of context and party qualities on the dimensions of personalization. 
Even when concentrating on the deliberately planned communication by party strategists, 
individualization of political communication concentrating on candidates in general and/or 
leaders, and privatization concentrating on the qualities of politicians instead of policy or 
ideology, have to be distinguished (van Aelst et al., 2012). MEDW’s in-depth coding of 
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campaign advertisements allows personalization and its dimensions to be adequately and 
separately measured. 
The amount of personalization as individualization will be operationalized in two ways, first as 
the proportion of ads generally showing the picture and/or the name of a candidate compared 
to the entirety of a party branch’s campaign communication through a specific media type (TV 
or press). This separation of media types is necessary to control for TV’s inherent suitability 
for personalization (Farrell, 1996: 173–175; Karvonen, 2010: 86) and the different proportions 
of TV and newspaper ads in different campaigns resulting from parties’ differing 
communication repertoires. To measure individualization concentrated on leadership, the 
proportion of ads including appearance of leaders’ pictures and names will be computed, since 
different explanatory factors are hypothesized to have different effects of varying strength on 
the leader-oriented, concentrated subtype of individualization compared to general 
individualization.  
Second, in addition to the general appearance of the ads, the content of ads and manifestos will 
also be investigated to assess the amount of personalization in a more fine-grained way as well 
as more thoroughly investigating its relationship with policy proposals: replacement or strategic 
promotion. Based on quasi-sentence coding, individualization will be measured as the 
proportion of quasi-sentences in campaign communication delivered by a candidate or with a 
candidate as the object compared to all quasi-sentences.  
The same data sources are also coded to measure privatization. An ad’s general appearance will 
be coded as privatized-personalized if the central character featured is a candidate or leader in 
a private surrounding, for example pursuing a hobby or with family. The proportion of these 
ads compared to all ads will then be the first measure of the level of privatization per party 
campaign, again differentiated by media type. On the quasi-sentence level, every quasi-sentence 
mentioning candidate traits will be counted as privatized (again differentiating total and leaders) 
and the proportion of privatized quasi-sentences used as the second measure indicating the 
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amount of privatization of a party’s election campaign. An overview of the measures of 
personalization and its dimensions is given in Table 3.3.  
3.2.2 Explanatory factors and controls 
Following the operationalization of the explanandum “personalization”, I will now turn to 
describing and justifying the operationalization of the explanatory factors mediatization, 
complexity, the electoral and political system, and parties’ strategic position in the electoral 
competition as well as party qualities and incumbency. I will start with the context factors 
theorized to affect all parties facing them equally and continue with the party specific factors 
theorized to explain variance within electoral contexts. 
Since personalization is theorized to be part of a more complex phenomenon, namely 
modernization, I will be investigating the influence of two prominent aspects, mediatization 
and complexity, also associated with modernization on the use of personalization in election 
campaigning. As theorized above, mediatization of a campaign should lead to more 
personalization. I will conceptualize and measure mediatization on two levels of analysis, 
namely systemic mediatization by countries and mediatization experienced differently by 
voters in every election under investigation, relying on two different data sources: I will look 
at the media system models of the countries under investigation and the weighted average of 
survey responses from the online surveys of MEDW paralleling the party strategies data 
collection.  
On the national macro-level, I will compare the media systems of the countries under 
investigation following the typology of Hallin and Mancini (2004). Their analysis of media 
systems suggests a more active and independent role of media in Liberal systems like Canada 
compared to Democratic Corporatist systems of central Europe, here Germany and Switzerland, 
which in turn exceed the level of media independence of the Polarized Pluralist model found in 
France and Spain. The more mediatized a campaign (e.g. shaped by the media as an active 
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player in the political communication game), the more personalized it can be expected to be 
conducted. On the recipients’ side, the weighted mean of survey respondents’ reported source 
of campaign information will be used as a proxy for mediatization of the campaign environment 
in general. I will pool the answers to survey items “Using a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
no attention at all and 10 means a lot of attention, how much attention did you pay to news 
about the election in the following media:” for TV, newspaper, radio, and Internet, thereby 
operationalizing campaign mediatization on the recipients’ side.  
These surveys will also be used to operationalize complexity. Complexity of the political 
system and process, assumed to increase with modernization, evokes a need for heuristics, 
which can then be provided by personalization. The weighted average of survey respondents’ 
agreement to the statement “Politics nowadays is so complicated that people like me have no 
chance of understanding what is going on” on a 0-10 scale will serve as the measure of 
complexity in a given electoral arena.  
Also, the institutional framework of elections is expected to influence the level of 
personalization chosen by party strategists in a campaign. Therefore, according to Shugart and 
his colleagues (2005), electoral formulas can be arrayed by the usefulness they promise for 
Personal Vote-Earning Attributes (PVEA). The variable “electoral system”, taking a log-
modulus transformation (John & Draper, 1980) of the value of district magnitude M for open-
list systems and M*(-1) for closed-list systems, will be used to operationalize this concept 
motivating party strategists to adopt a more personalized campaign. Where Shugart et al. (2005) 
used a linear measure, which gives a lot of weight to large districts, here this log-modulus 
transformation is used to model the expected decreasing importance of a one-seat magnitude 
change in a large district (e.g. from 30 to 31) compared to a small district (e.g. 1 to 2) for the 
relevance of PVEA for voter choice. 
Besides the institutional arrangements immediately related to the electoral process, the general 
institutional environment of a political system has also been theorized to influence levels of 
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campaign personalization. In this study, I will especially concentrate on the level of 
presidentialization of a given electoral arena. Although I am not considering executive elections 
in this study, executive prerogatives, institutions, and elections have spillover effects on parallel 
or timely close legislative elections (Poguntke & Webb, 2005). Party strategists facing 
presidentialized incentive structures and parallel election campaigns for executive offices can 
be expected to personalize campaign communication to a greater extent and also to make use 
of the public and media visibility of their executive candidates beyond the campaign for 
executive elections. Executive leaders (if directly elected, then most often, but not always, in a 
single-member constituency-wide district) are not only evaluated by their policy proposals, but 
also by their integrity, leadership qualities, and other non-ideological qualities. They are elected 
to represent and act on behalf of the whole population instead of a faction and they do not have 
a sufficient number of colleagues to balance out individual weaknesses as parliamentary groups 
could do. For the sake of comparability, this present research endeavor only deals with 
legislative elections, but the influence of the institutional power of executives cannot be 
ignored. I conceptualized the influence of the executive’s institutional properties on 
personalization of legislative campaigns via three mechanisms. 
First, campaigns for legislatures determining the indirect elections of strong executives, like the 
German Chancellorship or the Canadian Prime Minister’s office, are expected to produce quasi-
presidential patterns also in legislative campaign communication. This will be operationalized 
by a dummy taking the value of 1 for strong national executives in Germany, Canada, and 
Spain, and 0 for regional and European executives (or quasi-executives in the case of the 
European Commission) as well as for the comparatively weak executives resulting from indirect 
elections in Switzerland and France. The second spillover effect is based on parallel direct 
executive elections. French presidential elections and Swiss regional executive elections are 
held parallel or in close proximity to the legislative elections analyzed here. I will operationalize 
the direct influence of executive elections with a dummy taking a value of 1 for parties 
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competing in these systems with parallel direct executive elections and 0 for the others. The 
establishment of TV debates of top candidates is the third facet of presidentialization covered 
here. Also the establishment of this institution should lead to more concentrated personalization. 
This will be operationalized as a dummy variable whether a debate was held or not for the 
constituencies under investigation and in the local language (e.g. for the 2014 European 
elections Juncker and Schulz held debates in German and French (=1), but not in Spanish (=0)). 
In total, these three dummies for strong executive, directly elected executive, and debate will 
be added into a presidentialization index ranging from 0 to 3. The components of this index are 
reasonably intercorrelated (Cronbach’s Alpha: .66) and highly correlated with the index itself 
(direct election: .58, debate: .82, strong executive: .88). 
Institutional and context factors are supposed to have the same influence on all party branches 
competing in the same electoral arena. Though to be able to explain differences in levels of 
personalization between party branches in the same arena, we have to further consider these 
parties’ qualities influencing their propensity to personalize, which will follow in the remainder 
of this section. 
In this study, I deliberately take advantage of the possibility to test hypotheses on the party level 
located below (or crossed with) the context variance affecting all parties in the same political 
arena equally. To explain variance between parties in elections held under the same rules, I 
hypothesize effects of a party’s linkage strategy on the usefulness of personalization, as well as 
their ability to deliver personalized campaign content.  
The first party quality (or here: action) to consider is directly related to the institutional factor 
discussed in the last chapter: Running an executive candidate. For parties running an executive 
candidate, the effects of institutional presidentialization should be even stronger than for parties 
which cannot take advantage of this setting. Therefore, I will include a dummy with the value 
of 1 for parties which explicitly run candidates in parallel executive elections (France, Swiss 
cantons) or showcase a designated candidate for an (quasi-)executive position (Spain, Canada, 
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Germany, Switzerland national, EU) in parliamentary elections. This dummy will then be 
interacted with the level of presidentialization to be able to assess these candidates’ additional 
boost for personalization. 
Considering linkage, parties with centrist policy positions are expected to rely more on 
personalization. Parties with unclear policy linkage appeal have to invoke alternative linkage 
strategies including personalization to appeal to voters. Assuming a Downsian pattern of 
programmatic party competition for the median voter (Downs, 1957) and in line with the cartel 
party hypothesis (Katz & Mair, 1995), the center of the political space is crowded by the 
majority of parties, which leads to difficulties in distinguishing their programmatic offers as 
clear alternatives by the voter. This pattern is also visible in the elections under investigation 
here. Therefore, centrality of a party’s policy position will be indicating unclear policy linkage 
in this analysis.  
It will be operationalized by the party’s programmatic distance from the weighted mean left-
right position of all relevant parties8 in an election, where the weight corresponds to the parties’ 
respective electoral performance. The policy positions of the parties are derived from election 
manifestos via the Comparative Manifesto Project’s manual coding technique (Werner et al., 
2011), which assigns policy codes to quasi-sentences in election manifestos and calculates a 
unidimensional left-right party position from it9. The reasons I rely on this method of estimating 
party positions are threefold: They are available for all elections and parties under investigation, 
they provide positional estimates in a predefined space, yet they are adaptable to election- or 
country-specific idiosyncrasies, and they allow a fine-grained investigation of the question 
                                               
8 Parties are relevant if they are currently represented in the legislature or came close to winning representation – 
parties that needed to increase their vote share by less than one percentage point or less than one third of their vote. 
If there are new parties that appear likely to influence the outcome of the election, they are included as well. 
9 The Spanish manifestos for the 2014 European Parliamentary Election have been estimated using the Wordscores 
technique (Laver et al., 2003) with stemming and the positions of the parties in the 2009 European Parliament 
Elections as reference. These 2009 positions were created by the Euromanifesto research project (Braun et al., 
2010) relying on a hand-coding procedure based on the CMP’s technique. 
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whether parties replace or complement policy appeals with personalization. The MEDW 
research group applied the CMP coding scheme to all parties competing in the elections under 
investigation here. National (in part provided by the CMP research group), regional, and 
European manifestos were all coded manually by individuals familiar with the political context 
in which the manifestos were created, providing comparable data over all three levels of 
government. Although some alternative coding procedures for European (Braun et al., 2010), 
European and national (Bakker et al., 2015), and regional (Alonso et al., 2013) policy positions 
of parties exist or are in the making, they do vary considerably in coding schemes and time 
scope, so the MEDW data is to date the only readily available dataset of party positions across 
all three levels of government. Besides some problems of the interpretive hand coding applied 
in the CMP framework (see Mikhaylov et al., 2012), its advantages in validity (Pennings, 2011), 
that is interpreting rhetorical and stylistic vs. substantial differences, as well as the similarity in 
length and structure required for alternative automated content analysis are supposed to 
outweigh shortcomings of the CMP approach here. And since this project is based on cross-
sectional data, the advantages of computational analyses like Wordscores (Laver et al., 2003) 
or Wordfish (Slapin & Proksch, 2008) cannot assert their alleged superiority in producing time-
series data. Furthermore, an additional strand of criticism stems from CMP’s alleged problems 
of producing internationally comparable party positions with a pre-set central point. This 
shortcoming, however, is mitigated by the fact that the positional data here is not used to 
compare party positions between countries and elections, but relative to each other when 
competing in the same electoral arena, a task for which CMP data is clearly fit to perform 
(Meyer, 2013: 36–37). Furthermore, the computation of party positions from the raw CMP 
codes here have also been evaluated as reasonable fits by experts for the countries in this study 
for left-right comparisons (France: Petry & Pennings, 2006; Canada: Cochrane, 2010; Spain, 
when leaving aside the regional autonomy issue, as CMP does: Alonso et al., 2015) or adapted, 
following Linhart and Shikano (2009) as well as Franzmann and Kaiser (2006) (Germany) and 
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the author’s own expertise (Switzerland). Nevertheless, some scholars also argue that 
unidimensional policy spaces like the one assumed and computed by CMP unduly collapse a 
wide set of issues on one single dimension, thereby overly simplifying the political space of 
party competition (Kitschelt, 1994; Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2008). These approaches 
group “new politics” issues which are not directly related to questions of economic activity, 
redistribution, or states vs. markets in a second dimension, gaining importance as the public’s 
and therefore parties’ policy agendas change away from classical left-right issues to new 
questions of identity, morality, or civil liberties. Green-Pedersen (2007) also identifies these 
changing patterns of issue competition, but also their non-stability over time and countries. 
Although issue agendas change between elections and arenas, positional competition remains 
relatively stable when looking at aggregated data from manifestos (van der Brug, 2001). 
Furthermore, the left-right heuristic is the most commonly used way for voters to place parties 
in competition to each other, including the surveys of MEDW used here, and therefore will 
serve as the framework for comparing parties’ campaign efforts. Moreover, in the cases under 
investigation here, the problem of aggregating issues to unidimensional policy positions is 
further mitigated by the fact that all elections in question were the first ones in or after the global 
economic downturn after the crisis of 2008/2009, where economic issues and the historically 
and to a more limited extent still (Green-Pedersen, 2007) dominant axis of party competition 
were especially salient and pushed other dimensions of party competition to the back. After 
reviewing these arguments, the theoretical and practical advantages in validity and availability 
of the MEDW and CMP data justify their use for this project. 
Besides personalization’s usefulness in mitigating the problems of an unclear programmatic 
appeal directly, alternative linkage strategies can also benefit from personalization and therefore 
boost it in parties’ campaign communication. The most relevant alternative strategy to 
programmatic linkage a party can employ to appeal to voters which can be expected to increase 
the amount of personalization in an election campaign is charismatic linkage via populism. 
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Populism will be operationalized by a dummy variable, assigning a value of 0 to all parties but 
the ones relying on a populist strategy in the arenas under investigation (=1): The Front National 
in France, the Schweizerische Volkspartei in Switzerland, the Alternative für Deutschland in 
Germany, and Podemos in Spain have been identified by scholars of party populism (Kriesi & 
Pappas, 2015; Arzheimer, 2015; Gómez-Reino & Llamazares, 2015) as relying on both an 
antagonistic notion of “the pure people” versus “the elite” and claiming to be the only political 
force to embody and execute an a-priori volonté générale, most likely combined with a strategic 
use of a personalistic and charismatic leadership to achieve their political goals, and therefore 
will be coded as populist here.  
Besides the hypothesized influence of parties’ ideological standings and linkage strategies, 
variables measuring the ability and willingness of a party to personalize campaign content are 
also in order, namely incumbency (Hopmann et al., 2011), modernity, and professionalization 
of party organization (Holtz-Bacha, 2002: 28) as well as spillover effects of participating in 
executive elections (Kriesi, 2012: 831). 
Since it is tightly linked to the institutional framework, the operationalization of executive 
spillover effects has already been covered above, so we will turn to incumbency and adaption 
to modern media-driven campaigning via professionalization here. First of all, incumbent 
candidates have certain advantages when compared to new challengers. They receive a 
disproportionate amount of media coverage, voters are already aware of the incumbents’ 
political existence, so they can evaluate them by a track record not available for the newcomers, 
and they are experienced with the rules of the campaigning game. Therefore I expect rational 
incumbents who are running for reelection to build their campaigns on these personal 
advantages and therefore cultivate a more personalized strategy. Also their parties will be more 
prone to use their publicity by personalizing the campaign. Incumbency will be operationalized 
as executive incumbency, whether the party under investigation was in control of the chief 
executive’s office and/or its leadership held government offices before the campaign. In the 
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case of Swiss elections for the Council of States, the sitting members’ parties will be coded as 
incumbents. 
Also, when explaining a choice for a certain strategy, in this case personalization of election 
campaigns, one has not only to take willingness into account, but also ability. What makes a 
party able to apply a personalization strategy? As mentioned before, personalization is part of 
a modernization development including factors like professionalization, mediatization, and also 
negative campaigning (Mancini & Swanson, 1996). This set of strategic behavior is highly 
correlated with the parties’ resources, a key reinforcing factor (Gibson & Römmele, 2001). 
Better-funded parties can rely on more paid media space to convey their message and can also 
pay for production of higher-quality content, making the conveying of a favorable image of 
persons easier. Therefore the funds of the party, where available, will be included as an 
independent variable, operationalized as the campaign budget in standardized currency units 
per ten eligible voters. Also, the more professionalized parties are, the more personalized the 
campaign can be expected to be. Public relations specialists and paid communication agencies, 
logically linked to sufficient funds but operationalized separately, enable parties to further reap 
the benefits of a media-oriented, personalized campaign strategy. Staff professionalization will 
be operationalized as the number of full-time equivalents working for the party per one million 
eligible voters. Data for both financial means and staff professionalization were collected in 
interviews with parties’ campaign managers, because reporting requirements of party finances 
vary widely between the electoral arenas under investigation and even when a financial report 
is available, it does not normally show separate budgets for campaigns. I am aware of the 
possibility that party managers may understate their financial resources at hand, both 
intentionally for strategic reasons as well as unintentionally for lack of knowledge about for 
example their subsections’ and affiliated committee’s funds, but these biases should be 
relatively constant for all parties in the same arena and therefore even self-declarations should 
give a reasonable insight into the distribution of resources between parties. To operationalize 
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professionalization comparatively, the two indicators for financial and staff resources are 
combined in an additive index of professionalization. 
Table 3.4 Overview of independent variables and operationalizations 
variable operationalization level of measurement 
mediatization 
mean election-related media consumption  
of survey respondents 
election 
complexity 
mean survey response  
“politics is complicated” 
election 
electoral formula’s 
utility for PVEA 
sign(x)*ln(|x|+1)  
for x=magnitude * 1 for open lists  
and x=magnitude * (-1) for closed lists 
election 
presidentialization  
strong executive + directly elected 
executive + debate held in local language 
election 
executive competition running a candidate for executive  
party branch in 
election 
programmatic 
centrism 
|party position -  
weighted average party position| * -0.1 
party branch in 
election 
populism expert judgement 
party branch in 
election 
party 
professionalization 
campaign budget / 10 voters +  
full-time-equivalent party employees / 1 
mill. voters 
party branch in 
election 
incumbency party in sitting government 
party branch in 
election 
Finally, to account for differences in levels of government, country-specific idiosyncrasies, and 
the hierarchical structure of the data, control dummies for countries and levels of government 
will be added to the models. Country dummies will also help in identifying macro-patterns of 
mediatization.  
An overview of the independent variables is given in Table 3.4. Taking all these explanatory 
approaches into account, but only covering fewer than 150 cases, exacerbates standard 
frequentist statistical analysis. To alleviate bias in the estimation and comparison of different 
explanatory factors, a Bayesian analytical framework is in order and will be laid out in the 
following section. 
3.3 Methods 
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The rich comparative data described above is the result of deliberate country and data source 
sampling on the side of the MEDW investigators. It allows the covering of variance in a variety 
of context-level as well as party-level variables. But this sampling of a limited number of 
interesting country cases in conjunction with the in-depth data collection of so many variables 
poses a problem to classical frequentist statistical inference. On the one hand, the number of 
cases, even when analyzing parties*elections, is relatively small, too small in fact for 
conventional statistical inference. Furthermore, the cases are also embedded in a complex 
hierarchical data structure. Parties competing in the same electoral arena cannot be expected to 
act independently of one another, and neither would it be wise to assume that sections of the 
same party competing in different regions or on different levels of government do not influence 
each other’s action repertoire, party strategy, and also use of personalization. On the other hand, 
the deliberate, non-random sampling of the country cases and parties presented above, as well 
as the attempt at full coverage of the most important media sources (deliberately selected by 
informed country experts), is far from random and therefore does not satisfy the assumptions 
of frequentist statistical analysis. Therefore, these deliberate decisions made by the researchers 
during the data collection process have to be taken into account when modeling the data-
generating process to allow generalizable and valid conclusions to be made beyond the cases 
engaged here.  
Fortunately, Bayesian estimation techniques can handle all the data properties mentioned above 
which exacerbate analyses with standard regression techniques: Deliberate sampling, a medium 
number of cases, and nesting. Because of the non-random sampling of a medium-sized number 
of cases and observations here, a frequentist estimation strategy will most likely yield biased 
estimates for coefficients as well as confidence intervals. Bayesian regression techniques, 
however, do not rely on the assumption that data points for analysis are randomly sampled from 
the population of which to make inferences (Gill, 2008: 62). Therefore they are better suited to 
deal with the present set of deliberately and intentionally sampled data. 
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Furthermore, Bayesian regression techniques are also better equipped to handle small to 
medium sample sizes in combination with a large number of variables. Although the Bayesian 
posterior results derived from these samples are more sensitive to deliberate input of the 
researcher via a prior distribution, a careful choice of a uniform or uninformative prior can 
alleviate this problem (Gill, 2008: 65). Bayesian analysis does not run out of degrees of freedom 
and also does not assume independence between independent variables. Rather the opposite: A 
variety of interrelated independent variables helps Bayesian estimation to overcome problems 
of non-random sampling and missing data. When enough interrelated variables find their way 
into the model, assuming ignorability of data-generating processes as well as the missing data 
patterns can be justified (Gelman et al., 2004: 204–206). The eclectic framework of this 
research project, covering all theoretically relevant explanatory factors of personalization as a 
campaign strategy, provides the condition for assuming ignorability here. 
In a frequentist framework, this problem would even be aggravated by the nested data structure 
with fewer than 10 cases per nesting (Stegmueller, 2013). A Bayesian approach, however, can 
deal with this combined problem of few cases in a cross-classified data structure. Estimating a 
regression model with the help of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques based on 
simulation via Gibb’s sampling instead of for example an iterative frequentist approach to 
fitting a complex model, which can hardly be expected to converge, produces interpretable 
results also for a medium number of cases and can nevertheless cope with cross-classified data 
structure (Browne et al., 2001). 
3.3.1 On Missing Data 
Furthermore, the Bayesian regression approach employed here can also account for missing 
data, which helps the analysis of this dataset in particular. On the side of the explanandum, not 
all parties have made visible campaign efforts on all channels under investigation. On the side 
of the explanantia, not all interviewed party strategists were willing to answer the questions in 
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the interview, most notably to disclose their spending, so that this uncertainty also has to be 
taken into account. This missing information admittedly contributes to higher uncertainty when 
estimating means of effects of different independent variables, but does not bias the results 
when modeled adequately. In addition, having many predictors, as is the case here, alleviates 
the problem of missing data further. So working with the present empirical data should not yield 
biased results, but only more uncertain ones, making the finding of substantial effects even 
more credible. Also, the number of cases will not be artificially and systematically diminished 
by listwise deletion, a feature common in frequentist ML computation techniques. 
Observational studies of party behavior are more often than not constrained by data availability, 
as is the study conducted here. Campaign regulations like the Swiss ban on political TV 
advertising can institutionally limit the number of communication activities available to 
campaigners. And even if a wide range of communication channels are available theoretically, 
not all parties invest equally in all available forms of communication. Some channels are 
ignored because they are too costly (e.g. the production of TV spots), some are neglected 
intentionally for strategic reasons, for example when a party with young urban target groups 
concentrates its efforts on social media instead of traditional print or TV outlets. Thirdly, the 
data collection process can also face obstacles: Some campaign strategists are not able (or 
willing) to give out certain strategic information about their campaigns or outright refuse to be 
interviewed, leaving certain variables like campaign budgets or the amount of hired support 
incomplete. 
This combination of institutional and behavioral factors leads to a non-ignorable amount of 
missing data in the investigation of personalization as a campaign strategy. Systematic patterns 
of missingness (conventionally named “missing not at random” or MNAR following Little 
(1988)) like bans on certain media outlets (here: TV ban for political advertising in Switzerland) 
or party-system-wide non-investment in certain forms of communication (here: absence of print 
advertising in France and Canada) are hard to account for, which has to lead to the exclusion of 
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these cases from the analysis, if one does not want to impose very strong assumptions on the 
mechanism of data missingness. But during recent years, the analysis of missing observational 
as well as experimental data due to random mechanisms of missingness, and even if the 
missingness is only related to measured covariates, conventionally called “missing completely 
at random” (MCAR) or “missing at random” (MAR) respectively (Little, 1988), has profited 
considerably from techniques that alleviate problems of bias and uncertainty in those patterns. 
While MCAR is hard to find empirically, Bayesian statistics and multiple imputation techniques 
have made advances that found entry in a variety of new procedures and software packages 
dealing with the problems of data missing at random and take their consequences seriously (van 
Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011; Su et al., 2011; Honaker & King, 2010). These 
techniques’ main objective is to alleviate bias in estimation produced by the traditional default 
approaches of listwise deletion of incomplete cases or mean imputation (which can 
considerably harm the validity and reliability of data analysis), while taking the uncertainty 
induced by estimating a non-observed value of a variable seriously (Yucel, 2011).  
To cope with the challenges posed by the missing information in the present datasets, I employ 
the statistical software package “mice” (van Buuren & Groothuis-Oudshoorn, 2011) for R. The 
chained-equation technique applied by mice is especially useful for coping with datasets that 
contain variables with different rates of missing information. Fortunately, the two datasets (TV 
advertising and newspaper advertising) as well as the combined dataset contain theoretically 
and empirically linked fully measured covariates, which provide a strong enough base on which 
multiple imputation via chained equations can be reasonably carried out. With the help of the 
chained equation process, values for missing observations are imputed variable by variable, 
starting with the lowest proportion of missing information (in this case no missing information 
for 23 of 44 variables, followed by 6 variables with <10% and 15 variables with >25% missing 
information) and informing the latter variables with the information gathered before. This 
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procedure is repeated 20 times10, producing 20 multiple datasets, which are analyzed separately 
afterwards. The results of these parallel analyses are then pooled, taking the uncertainty of the 
imputed dataset into account by deriving a pooled variance from within effects variance (the 
average variance around the point estimate of every single analysis) as well as between-variance 
(variance between the different point estimates) (Rubin, 2004). The pooled analyses therefore 
take the fundamental uncertainty of the imputed data adequately into account. 
3.3.2 Estimation  
Estimation will be conducted using the MCMC technique with a Gibb’s sampler and 
noninformative priors. One advantage of Bayesian estimation techniques is the possibility to 
include information about previous research in the estimation process via priors. However, 
since the research to date about the personalization thesis is at best mixed, I will resort to 
noninformative priors. The previous research output at hand is not tested thoroughly enough 
and has not produced unequivocal support for either modernization or institutionalist 
hypotheses for explaining campaign personalization to justify an intervention as severe as an 
informative prior constitutes. In the following chapters, the hypotheses derived in chapter 2 will 
be put to the test analyzing the aforementioned data in a Bayesian MCMC regression 
framework. Results will be reported as mean posterior beta regression coefficients, credible 
intervals not including zero greater than 90%, 95% and 99% will be indicated. 
The variables and operationalizations presented above do not only point towards the necessity 
for a multivariate analysis, they also inform the choice for an adequate modelling strategy. First 
and foremost, the values of the dependent variables found here are proportions of campaign 
communication and therefore logically bound between 0 and 1, which calls for a modelling 
                                               
10 Here, the number of imputations m=20 is chosen because 20 imputations ensure a tolerable loss of power (<1%) 
for rates of missing information up to 30% (Graham et al., 2007). The datasets here show rates of 13% (TV) and 
16% (newspaper) and therefore are well below the critical threshold which would call for more imputations. 
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strategy suitable for dealing with those properties. Second, the observations, regardless of 
subgrouping (see chapters 5 to 8), show either a highly skewed or virtually univariate 
distribution, both far away from an approximately normal distribution required for OLS or other 
types of linear regression modelling. These two properties, logical bound and non-normal 
distribution, combined can best be modeled with a beta regression (Branscum et al., 2007) with 
fixed shape parameters α and β=1-α and a logistic link function.  
Also, the hierarchical data structure has to be accounted for. In fact, there are four grouping 
factors imaginable to influence clustering of levels of personalization: country, level of 
government, electoral arena, and party. Actors in the same countries which are relatively closed 
systems of political competition and communication can be expected to have developed certain 
established and practiced standards in political communication also affecting the level of 
personalization. Second, low-salience European political communication can be expected to 
differ from its national counterpart, which can also be expected to differ from regional political 
communication systematically, both due to the mechanism of established practices described 
above, but also because regional politics are perceived as closer to the people. Third, branches 
of different parties face the same set of mediatization, electoral system, etc. when competing in 
the same electoral arena, leading to clustering on this level. Fourth, branches of the same party 
most likely influence each other’s strategic repertoire not only between regions, but also 
between levels. In the present data structure, we therefore have to take a variety of crossed and 
hierarchical structuring into account. How I balanced estimation efficiency and accuracy when 
facing a small number of cases will therefore be outlined in the next paragraph. 
Several strategies for coping with the properties of this small dataset with the aforementioned 
hierarchical and cross-cutting nesting have been tried and tested. Crossed-level modelling with 
electoral arenas and parties as grouping variables comes to mind first when thinking about the 
most appropriate way to model the hierarchical dependencies of the data with predictors on the 
election as well as the party or party-in-election level. But even in the Bayesian framework, 
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which is equipped with a higher ability to estimate complex models with a small number of 
cases, the grouping of <150 cases in >10 electoral arenas in the present data structure posed a 
too severe convergence problem. The results obtained from Bayesian mixed effects two-level 
models (both with electoral arenas or countries and levels of government as grouping variables, 
as well as models with random effects for electoral arenas) were highly unstable and very 
sensitive to MCMC starting values. When trying to account for hierarchically and empirically 
induced multicollinearity via a Dirichlet process prior and a variable selection prior (Curtis & 
Ghosh, 2011), the results became even more unstable and therefore unfit to draw robust and/or 
generalizable conclusions from them. Design effects were also tested as a remedy, but unduly 
inflated the standard errors. Therefore, I had to discard the results of these estimations and look 
for an alternative estimation strategy (Huang, 2014).  
The analyses presented in the following chapters are based on a compromise between statistical 
accuracy and practical feasibility when facing a small n: Bayesian beta-regression models with 
a logistic link function and fixed effects for both countries and levels of government. As we 
will see in the descriptive overviews of the dependent variable, the mean level of 
personalization by party in arena differs considerably between countries as well as between 
European, national, and regional elections. The fixed effects allow accounting for national and 
government-level-specific idiosyncrasies not measured by the variables in the models and 
therefore safeguard against omitted variable bias on these levels, including decentralization or 
salience. At the same time, these fixed effects of country and government level alleviate the 
problems of clustering of parties in electoral arenas without rendering the variance of the 
predictors within and between the electoral arenas unusable. All predictor variables are in fact 
measured on the two lowest levels – party and electoral arena – so including fixed effects for 
the higher-order groupings of country and level of government does not interfere with these 
variables’ predictive power.  
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To take additional advantage of the Bayesian estimation framework, I will run two analyses to 
explain each type of personalization defined above. First, I will look at the complete cases for 
which all necessary data is provided. In a second step, I will compare the results from these 
complete-case analyses with results from an analysis of datasets completed by multiple 
imputations. With those, I can assess whether the results of the complete case analysis are not 
only coincidental products of listwise deletion. 
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4. Patterns of Personalization 
Personalization in politics and election campaigns has been conceptualized on two different 
dimensions. First, a distinction is made between the general appearance or advertising of people 
vs. institutions or parties labeled general personalization, and the concentration on the leading 
personnel of a party, labeled concentrated or leadership personalization. In the following 
chapters, I will analyze these two facets of campaign personalization separately. Although 
leadership personalization is a subset of general personalization, it is necessary to differentiate 
these concepts, not least to differentiate between direct effects of leadership races on general 
personalization levels, and the potential coattail- or halo-effects of these races also affecting the 
personalization of non-leadership campaigns. Do legislative campaigns in presidentialized 
systems, for example, show high personalization because of the chief executive candidates’ 
dominance, or does the “winner take all”-principle of these systems also influence lower-rank 
candidacies’ personalization strategy? To answer these questions, Chapter 5 and 7 will deal 
with general personalization, chapters 6 and 8 with leadership personalization. 
A second conceptual dimension of personalization differentiates between the focus on persons 
in general, called individualization, and a concentration on their private traits, called 
privatization. This differentiation is in order, because the mechanisms of complexity reduction, 
media suitability and comparative advantage should theoretically influence these different types 
to varying extents. For example: Although probably not absent in explaining individualization, 
media-related explanatory factors should play a larger role in explaining privatization due to 
modern media’s human-interest focus in campaign coverage. Electoral systems however can be 
expected to contribute more to explaining individualization, because they shape competition 
patterns and the need for unique selling point enhancement by personalization, which can be 
provided by individualization alone. For a comprehensive investigation, I will also analyze 
these two facets of personalization separately in the following chapters, dealing with general 
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and leadership individualization in chapters 5 and 6 respectively, and with privatization in 
chapters 7 and 8. In the remainder of this chapter, I will present the mean levels of the types of 
personalization discussed above by countries and levels of government to get a first intuition of 
their variance and to justify the subsequent analyses. 
4.1 Patterns of Individualization 
First of all, I will look at the most unspecific form of political personalization: general 
individualization. When do parties rely on picturing or mentioning political personnel in 
campaign communication in general? As theorized above, they should do so, if they expect 
gains in their unique selling point, their ads’ media suitability and their heuristic appeal from 
personalization. This can be achieved via two techniques, which I will investigate separately. 
The first technique, individualizing the general appearance of an ad called “individualized 
framing” of campaign communication is measured by the proportion of campaign ads picturing 
or explicitly mentioning a political person as the main protagonist. This rather superficial 
technique is complemented by a second, more fine-grained one called “content 
individualization”. The content of an advertisement can be individualized by attributing it to a 
person. This is captured here in the quasi-sentence based measurement, where individualization 
is operationalized as the proportion of statements in campaign communication linked to a 
person (actor or object of a quasi-sentence). To control for TV’s theoretically higher inherent 
suitability for personalization, I will investigate the personalization of content and framing 
separately for newspaper and TV advertisements. 
Differences in individualization levels between TV and newspaper advertisement are depicted 
in Figure 4.1. In general we can observe that individualization is a widespread quality of 
political advertising. More than half of campaign communication, up to >70% in newspaper 
advertising content, is individualized. We therefore can conclude that we do not deal with a 
trivial or negligible phenomenon. Individualization obviously is a practicable and promising 
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way of obtaining citizen support for the majority of parties under investigation here. However, 
contrary to the expectation that TV is the medium most suitable for personalized campaign 
communication, we see lower levels of individualization both in TV framing as well as content 
when comparing it to the respective levels in newspaper advertising. These differences are 
visible both in general individualization as well as in leadership individualization. Another 
difference between TV and newspaper individualization is visible in comparing framing and 
content of the respective outlets. Both general individualization and the proportion of leadership 
individualization are higher in TV framing than in TV content. In newspapers, we see the 
opposite. This observation is more in line with the theoretical notion of TV communication 
being more superficial and therefore suitable for personalized framing as image generator than 
newspaper advertising.  
 
Figure 4.1 Mean levels of campaign individualization in TV and newspaper advertising 
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This aggregation of all party campaign communication gives a first insight into the patterns of 
personalization, but as we are interested in variation beyond framing and content or media 
outlets, we disaggregate the data in Figure 4.1 for a country comparison in Figure 4.211.  
At a first glance the high levels of mean general individualization in Canadian and French TV 
advertisement are most apparent. The mean Canadian and French party communication on TV 
shows individualization in around 90% of the ads and around 80% of the campaign content. 
Spain and Germany in comparison show lower levels of general individualization, but higher 
proportions of leadership individualization both in TV framing and content. The most obvious 
potential explanatory difference between Canada/France and Germany/Spain is the electoral 
system. The former countries’ majoritarian systems with single-member districts can be 
expected to produce higher levels of individualization than the PR-systems of the latter.  
However, the high proportions of leadership individualization in Germany and Spain are not as 
easy to explain institutionally. Both countries’ chief executives on the national and regional 
level indeed concentrate a high amount of power in their offices, but this also holds true for the 
Premiers of Ontario and Quebec. This gives room for additional explanatory value to be 
expected from non-institutional factors like mediatization (Canada’s has a liberal media system 
with a higher expected personalization, compared to France’s and Spain’s polarized-pluralist 
and Germany’s democratic-corporatist systems) and party competition and qualities. The 
individualization in newspaper advertisements shows another pattern. Here, Spain leads the 
board with an astoundingly high level of individualization, exclusively concentrated on 
leadership (averaging over regional, national and European elections!). The German newspaper 
pattern resembles the respective low TV-values, and the Swiss mean newspaper framing and 
content individualization levels take a middle ground, nearly evenly distributed between leaders 
                                               
11 In Switzerland, political TV advertisement is banned. Therefore, TV data is only available for France, Germany, 
Spain and Canada. Newspaper data is only available for Germany, Spain and Switzerland, because the French and 
Canadian party sections under investigation made no campaign effort in newspapers. 
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and other political persons. Whether those differences are due to country-specific idiosyncrasies 
or can be explained systematically will be the question to answer in chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 4.2 Mean levels of campaign individualization in TV and newspaper advertising by 
country 
Splitting the sample across levels of government also shows variation in mean individualization 
levels. Theoretically, three arguments can be made when explaining personalization differences 
between levels of government: First, one could expect the proportion of personalized campaign 
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communication to be higher, the “closer” the political arena is to the voters. In regional politics, 
where interpersonal contact and personal acquaintance with candidates is more likely than in 
national or even European politics, personalization based on face recognition heuristics or 
acquaintance should be more promising for attracting voter support than on the more distant 
levels of government. On the other hand, a reverse argument can be made about mediatization. 
If one sees personalization first and foremost as a facet of modernization and mediatization of 
political communication, then a higher level of media personalization should be expected with 
greater distance of an electoral arena to the voter. The further away the level of government 
from the voters, the more they have to rely on media(tized) information when making up their 
mind about their electoral choice, and therefore parties and candidates should invest more 
resources in personalization as a campaign strategy supported by the media instead of for 
example canvassing or rallies in European and national elections, than in regional elections. 
The establishment of Europe-wide top candidates by the EP’s parliamentary groups in 2014 can 
be seen as an indicator for that notion. 
Finally, one can also make a salience argument related to the literature on second-order 
elections (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). There, European, and to some extent also regional, elections 
(Burkhart, 2005) have been conceptualized as subordinate to national elections, which shows 
in lower salience, lower participation rates, and a tendency to base the electoral choice not 
(only) on European and regional topics at hand, but also taking those elections as quasi-
referenda or signals of disapproval with the national government. Taking this argument a step 
further, one could therefore also expect the national elections to be most personalized, because 
political celebrities were more willing to engage in elections that matter and in which they can 
ensure to be evaluated on the level of government at hand and not based on the performance of 
their party in unrelated arenas or potentially unpopular party comrades. 
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Figure 4.3 Mean levels of campaign individualization in TV and newspaper advertising by 
levels of government 
The empirical patterns shown in Figure 4.3, however, are too diverse to unequivocally 
corroborate any one of the arguments presented above. The individualized framing in TV 
advertising shows a pattern that can be attributed to the “closeness to the people”-argument, a 
steady increase of mean levels of individualization both general and leadership, from a 
mediocre European value to over 80% in regional elections. The generally individualized TV 
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content rather shows a second-order pattern, with the highest mean value for national elections, 
followed by regional and European campaigns. The individualized leadership content level 
resembles the steady increase from European to regional seen in TV framing. Finally, the 
newspaper framing as well as content means of general individualized campaigns point towards 
the mediatization argument. The proportion of individualized campaign framing and content in 
newspapers continuously decreases with closeness to the people, supporting the view that 
higher (forced) reliance on mediatized communication by voters and parties also leads to higher 
levels of individualization. However, the inverse second-order pattern of leadership 
individualization in newspapers, with the lowest mean levels of framing and content at the 
national level, cannot be explained by any of the three suggested arguments above.  
4.2 Patterns of Privatization 
The second variety of personalization, privatization, understood here as presenting politicians 
in a private, non-political environment or addresses their personal traits in advertising content 
can be observed remarkably less in political advertising than individualization covered above. 
Although the average party section in an election covered here indeed uses privatized framing 
in still more than 50% of TV advertising, a value close to the average proportion of 
individualization, however only 20% of the average party section’s TV advertising content is 
privatized, e.g. advertises politician’s personal skills, trustworthiness or friendliness. This is in 
stark contrast to over 50% individualized content on average in parties’ TV advertising 
campaigns. The contrast is even stronger when looking at newspapers: Less than 10% of the 
average party section’s newspaper advertisements are framed in a privatized fashion, for 
example showing a politician pursuing a hobby, with family, or in nature, outside of parliament 
or government buildings. If politicians are depicted at all (and they are in >60% of average 
parties’ newspaper advertisements, see Figure 4.1), they are either featured as politicians or, 
even more commonly, in front of a neutral background or photo screen. The newspaper 
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advertising’s content on average deals with politician’s traits in roughly 40% of cases, which is 
not as much as the 70% individualization in the same venue, but way above the newspaper ad’s 
privatized framing’s proportion of below 10%. Also, contrary to the expectation, privatization 
does not seem to be generally concentrated on leadership. Where individualization shows a 
proportion of leadership-concentration of roughly two thirds of the whole amount of general 
individualization, leadership-concentrated privatization only accounts for less than half of all 
privatization regardless of medium. Again, comparing TV and newspaper’s privatization 
patterns suggests that privatization is more suitable for TV framing than TV content, probably 
due to the wider and less sophisticated target audience, whereas newspaper framing seems to 
be more neutral and in return newspaper content more prone to privatization.  
 
Figure 4.4 Mean levels of campaign privatization in TV and newspaper advertising  
Figure 4.5 shows the patterns of privatization per country. Again, we see stark differences in 
TV privatization. Canada shows the lowest average level of privatization both depicting 
leadership and other candidates. France and Germany take a middle ground with above 50% of 
TV campaign communication framed as privatized-personalized, and in Spain over three 
quarters of TV advertising is privatized. Modernization theorists, who would attribute these 
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national differences to media systems, cannot see their theses supported by this picture, because 
Canada’s liberal media system should produce a much higher proportion of privatization than 
the other countries. There have to be other factors at work. Privatized content of political TV 
advertisement is very uncommon in the sample observed here. Only Germany shows over one 
fifth of content dealing with politicians’ traits and, as in the overall picture of Figure 4.4, all 
countries show less privatized content concentrated on leadership than on other candidates. 
Privatized framing also is very rare in newspaper advertising. German parties do not at all 
employ this communication strategy and Spanish parties limit it to party leadership. In 
Switzerland, general as well as leadership privatization framing is also very rarely used in 
newspaper advertising. Privatized content however is relatively popular in Switzerland. More 
than half of the average Swiss party’s campaign communication shows privatized content in 
newspaper ads, compared to below one third in Germany and none in Spain.  
Looking at the overall patterns depicted in Figure 4.5, one finds partial evidence for TV’s higher 
suitability especially for privatized human-interest advertising. The levels of privatized framing 
are consistently higher on TV than in newspapers, also in the two country cases directly 
comparable because of data availability in both media outlets, Germany and Spain. Also the 
privatized image generating process via superficial and visual framing seems to work better on 
TV, a medium especially associated with pictures, than privatizing content. However, the Swiss 
case does only partially support this notion. One could argue, that because of the ban of political 
TV advertising in Switzerland, privatization should there be expressed in the substitute 
newspaper advertisings, but this only holds for content. Even when subscribing to the “better 
suitability of TV because of picture dominance”-argument, the very low Swiss amount of 
personalized framing in newspaper advertising cannot be easily explained by this country 
comparison alone. 
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Figure 4.5 Mean levels of campaign privatization in TV and newspaper advertising by 
country  
As in the patterns of individualization differentiated between levels of government in Figure 
4.3, also privatization in Figure 4.6 shows no clear tendency consistent with one of the three 
expectations listed above. Closeness to the people, mediatization or a second-order approach 
are in fact all supported by one of the patterns depicting privatization. The privatized framing 
pattern on TV seems to support the mediatization approach. A decrease from a very high 
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proportion (>80%) in European elections, followed by a medium level (just above 50%) in 
national elections and under 40% in regional elections is consistent with the expectation, that 
privatization should be more visible, the more voters have to rely on mediatized information 
about candidates. The less support candidates can gather by interpersonal contact (European < 
national < regional), the more personalization via media is expected by the mediatization 
argument. However, the privatization of TV advertising content shows a reverse pattern, 
supporting the notion of “closeness to the people” leading to more personalization. If 
personalization’s utility is attributed to its capability of activating existing interpersonal ties of 
candidates and voters, privatization in TV ads’ content showing the expected increase from 
European elections which do not provide the potential for interpersonal ties, followed by only 
a slight increase to the national level and the highest value on the regional level is the logical 
consequence. The second-order argument, where salience and perceived importance of national 
elections vis-à-vis European and regional ones should lead to national advertisement having the 
highest proportion of privatization. This pattern can be observed for privatized newspaper 
content, where national ads lead the board followed by regional and European communication 
efforts. The privatized framing patterns in newspaper advertisement are not expected by any of 
these approaches. The national level shows the lowest average proportion of privatized 
newspaper content followed by exclusively non-leadership privatization in regional and 
exclusively leadership centered privatization in European elections. 
All in all we can again conclude that macroscopic inspection of the levels of privatization does 
not show an overarching pattern to be easily explained by macroscopic theories of national or 
government level differences. 
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Figure 4.6 Mean levels of campaign privatization in TV and newspaper advertising by levels 
of government 
4.3 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I presented the aggregate levels of personalized framing and content of TV and 
newspaper advertising. Although differences are evident between media outlets, countries, 
levels of government as well as framing and content, hardly any systematic general tendencies 
are visible throughout the given levels of personalization. Neither have country cases such as 
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Canada with a liberal media system, nor France with a presidential institutional architecture, 
both paired with small district magnitudes, shown systematically higher levels of 
personalization than the other country cases in the sample. Only Switzerland’s open list systems 
with medium sized district magnitudes has shown consistently higher levels of personalization 
than Germany and higher levels of non-leadership personalization than Spain. Comparing 
patterns of personalization between levels of government were generally inconclusive. No 
systematic approach discussed above, mediatization, closeness to the voters or second-order 
arguments could be traced consistently in the respective figures.  
So in general, these split sample means comparisons can only be a first approximation to an 
analysis of personalization in election campaigns. Since the subgroups by country as well as by 
level of government are far from balanced (see Table 3.1 in chapter 3), single or groups of 
influential cases, which are not evenly distributed, could also be responsible for the patterns 
here or cover systematic variation between groups of cases. Nevertheless, the clear differences 
between groups in nearly all respective dimensions under scrutiny has shown the necessity to 
analyze the patterns of campaign personalization in a multivariate way, taking the country- and 
levels of government-groupings seriously. How the within-group distributions look and how to 
explain them will be the aim of the next chapters. 
  
91 
 
5. Explaining General Individualization  
The patterns of personalization depicted in the last chapter point towards the verdict that a 
simple cross-national or cross-level comparison of personalization does not yield systematic 
variation that can be attributed to national or level-specific factors alone. So I have to assess the 
influence of election-level and partisan explanatory factors on personalization by a more 
differentiated approach. It will be differentiated by types of personalization, covering general 
individualization in this chapter, leadership individualization in chapter 6, general privatization 
in chapter 7, and leadership privatization in chapter 8. These tests will all follow a common 
structure. First, I will take a look at the distribution of the different types of personalization 
beyond the overview presented in chapter 4 and justify the following analysis of Bayesian beta 
regression coefficients. After that, I will perform a complete case analysis of all party sections 
under investigation which produced measurable data for the independent and dependent 
variables in question. Third, I will check the robustness of the findings of the complete-case 
analysis with the help of multiply imputed data for all relevant parties running in the elections 
under investigation and conclude on the basis of these analyses if the hypotheses developed in 
chapter 2 can be held up. 
5.1 Distributions of General Individualization 
Looking at the distribution of individualization levels within our sample depicted in Figure 5.1, 
we observe that a differentiation of explanations is in order. Personalization in the form of 
general individualization is by no means a strategy employed by all parties. However, the vast 
majority of parties either personalize (nearly) all or (nearly) none of their campaign content, be 
it via TV or newspaper advertising. When looking at TV advertising, the mean level of general 
individualization is close to two thirds for framing and just above half for content. With TV 
being a visual medium, TV spots being scarce, and the measurement of framing a cruder one 
than the differentiated counting of quasi-sentences for personalized content, this difference is 
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not surprising. Showing or mentioning a political person in an ad is already enough to classify 
its framing as 100% personalized, whereas quasi-sentences by off-voices and not directly stated 
by candidates do already technically drop the proportion of content personalization, even if a 
candidate is the main character of an ad.  
 
Figure 5.1 Distributions of general individualization in TV and newspaper advertising 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
In newspapers, the figures do not look substantially different with regards to distribution, but 
the mean values show higher levels in both framing and content (both exceed two thirds), and 
the content levels are even higher than the framing levels. This could be due to the large 
influence of Swiss cases in the sample. Being not allowed to advertise on TV, Swiss political 
parties resort to extensive newspaper advertising campaigns, including personalized framing 
and content. And in general, since the entry hurdles for newspaper advertisements are generally 
lower than for TV both in terms of prices and regulation, the party leaderships and strategy 
planners have less control over the content of newspaper advertisements and individual 
candidates can use their own campaign budget to promote their candidacy independently from 
the party leadership, concentrating attention on their own personae. The distributions of 
generally individualized campaign framing and content, however, resemble the pattern found 
in TV framing. A large majority of party sections under investigation individualize either 
(nearly) all or (nearly) none of their campaign communication. Consequently, as shown in 
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chapter 4, a differentiated view of campaign individualization level distribution by countries is 
in order. 
When comparing the mean levels of individualization in TV campaign advertising between 
countries in Figure 5.2, we can observe considerable variation. While Canada and France show 
mean individualization levels of roughly 90% in campaign framing and 80% in campaign 
content, Spain with 70% in framing and below 60% in content as well as Germany with framing 
and content just around 40% clearly show lower levels. Although from this overview we cannot 
see directly if these differences are due to institutional factors, media systems, or patterns of 
party competition, the widespread distribution of party cases still clearly show the necessity for 
multivariate analysis considering and unraveling these countries’ “packages” of determinants 
for personalization as well as controlling for incidental idiosyncrasies. Whether for example 
Canada’s and France’s small average district magnitude of 1 is the driving factor, or these 
countries’ media systems, or their high degree of presidentialization, or other country-specific 
idiosyncrasies, has to and will be tested in the following sections of this chapter.  
The distribution of individualization in TV advertisement campaigns within countries shows a 
similar concentration of cases at the extremes as observed in the pooled distributions in Figure 
5.1. When looking at the variation in general individualization within the countries under 
investigation, the majority of campaigns either fully or never individualize their TV campaign 
communication framing. The distribution of TV campaign content is not as extreme, but, with 
the exception of Spain, fully or never individualized campaign communication content 
dominates the scene. Nevertheless, we can see systematic differences when looking more 
closely at the distribution of general individualization within countries, which are most visible 
in the relative number of party cases which fully or not at all individualize their campaign 
communication: In France and Canada individualizing most TV advertisement framing and 
content is the strategy of choice for a majority or plurality of parties, respectively. In these 
countries, as seen in the means analysis, general individualization looks like the regular way to 
94 
 
go in an election campaign, which has been established as a part of parties’ shared standard 
strategic repertoire with only minor deviance. This is not the case for Spain and Germany. Spain 
shows different patterns for framing, where a majority of parties which frame (nearly) all of 
their TV campaign communication in an individualized way face roughly one third not 
individualizing their TV ads’ framing at all. This differentiation in individualization in Spain is 
even more evenly distributed when it comes to content. About one quarter of party branches 
individualize (nearly) all of their campaign communication content, another quarter 
individualizes none, another quarter personalizes roughly two thirds of the content, and another 
quarter is spread out over 30 to 90% individualization. Therefore we can tell that general 
individualization is not as systematically rooted in Spain as in France or Canada. The German 
distribution looks even less in favor of campaign individualization. However, it also shows the 
familiar split with the vast majority of parties going with an “all or nothing” approach to 
individualization. Germany though is the only country in which the “nothing” group 
outnumbers the “all” group, both in framing and in content, but the middle grounds are similarly 
deserted as in the other countries. As with Spain, the German parties are obviously motivated 
by factors other than the ones tied to their national context to use individualized campaigning 
or not.  
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Figure 5.2 Distributions of general individualization in TV advertising; framing and content 
by countries 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
Similar patterns can be observed in the distributions of individualization of newspaper 
advertisements in Figure 5.3. Stark differences between country means (>90% in Spain, 75% 
in Switzerland, and just over 40% in German framing and <60% in German content) as well as 
wide distributions of individualization levels within countries also support the view that 
country-specific as well as electoral and partisan factors have to be considered simultaneously 
for explaining levels of personalization. Comparing TV and newspaper advertisements in Spain 
shows remarkable differences, whereas the data for Germany are similarly distributed. 
However, the Spanish newspaper distributions are based on merely 8 cases and therefore have 
to be taken with caution. A more comprehensive picture will be available in the later analysis 
of multiply imputed data.  
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Figure 5.3 Distributions of general individualization in newspaper advertising; framing and 
content by countries 
Note: means as dashed lines 
The level of personalization not only varies between countries. Different levels of government 
– the European, the national, and the regional – can also be expected to elicit varying degrees 
of individualization. The differences in mean individualization have been theoretically 
attributed to three potential explanations (see chapter 4): A need for mediatization, leading to 
an increase in personalization the more distant an electoral arena from the voter; closeness to 
the people, expecting increasing personalization with decreasing distance of voter to arena; and 
a second-order argument expecting higher personalization with higher importance and salience 
of the national vote vs. the European or regional vote.  
When looking at the means, we do not find unequivocal support for either of these arguments. 
At most the figures support the second-order argument with the national individualization levels 
always at the top or only closely trailing the highest mean value (here: regional). When looking 
at the distributions within groups, we see the familiar pattern: A vast majority of parties 
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individualize their campaign communication either fully or not at all. The only notable 
exceptions are the content of TV advertising and the framing of newspaper advertising in 
regional elections, which both show an approximately uniform distribution. From this we can 
conclude that the level of government, as well as the national context, indeed has an influence 
on the mean level of individualization in campaign communication, but does not predetermine 
the individual parties’ campaign strategy chosen in these respective types of arenas. In the 
following, I will systematically analyze the factors differentiating parties within countries and 
levels of government and test the hypotheses derived in chapter 2 employing the Bayesian beta 
regression approach with fixed effects described in chapter 3.  
 
Figure 5.4 Distributions of general individualization in TV advertising; framing and content 
by levels of government 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
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Figure 5.5 Distributions of general individualization in newspaper advertising; framing and 
content by levels of government 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
5.2 Complete Case Analysis of General Individualization 
Earlier in this thesis, I theorized three mechanisms for explaining personalization in campaign 
communication: media suitability, heuristics, and adding to the unique selling point of a 
candidacy. Although these three mechanisms can be expected to influence all types of 
personalization, I still expect differences in explanatory power with respect to different 
dimensions of personalization. General individualization, which is the main explanandum 
covered in this chapter, is a rather superficial and crude measure of personalization. It is 
operationalized merely as a presence or absence of political personae in advertising’s framing 
or content and does not include a qualification like privatization does. Hence, I expect the more 
mechanical motivations for personalization, which are the need for heuristics and enhancement 
of the unique selling point, to play a larger role in explaining variance in individualization. The 
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media-related factors should not be as decisive as institutions or party competition patterns. 
This notion will in part be confirmed by the analyses in the remainder of this chapter.  
The distributions of individualization within countries and levels of government observed in 
the previous section indicate that multivariate analysis of personalization is in order. For reasons 
of data scarcity, I will pursue this endeavor in two steps. First, I will analyze campaign 
communication of the parties, which produced observable data on all relevant explanatory and 
independent variables. This should give us a first intuition of the predictive power of the 
variables and concepts theorized above to influence personalization. In a second step in section 
5.3, I will test the robustness of these findings with the help of multiple imputation analyses. 
In Table 5.1, I present the results of the complete case analysis of 143 party sections’ amount 
of individualization in their campaign strategy. The simultaneous influence of all theorized 
election-level and party-level variables on general individualization of TV and newspaper 
advertising’s framing and content are tested here in a Bayesian beta regression framework. To 
prevent omitted variable bias and to control for national, government-level or media-specific 
idiosyncrasies, appropriate control variables have been added. The results have been obtained 
by MCMC analyses of 5 chains, each with 10,000 iterations, with the first 1000 iterations 
discarded as burn-in. The coefficients presented are the mean posterior estimates of each 
parameter with standard deviations in parentheses. The parameters of this logit-linked 
regression are logged odds ratios, which complicates the immediate interpretation, since the 
influence of each variable depends on values of the others. To ease interpretation, I centered 
the continuous predictors at their means; the non-centered dummy variables varying between 0 
and 1 are indicated with a (d). 
What is immediately visible from a comparison of columns 1 and 2 of regression Table 5.1 is 
the fact that in the pooled analyses, the set of significant explanatory variables for general 
individualization in advertising does not differ much between framing and content. Both are 
explained best by an interplay of election-level and party-level factors. Complexity (election-
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level) and the interaction of institutional presidentialization (election-level) with running an 
executive candidate (party-level) show the only significant coefficients.  
Complexity shows the strongest influence on general individualization in the pooled complete 
case analysis. The coefficients are large and highly significant, so I will have a closer look to 
get at their substantive contribution to explaining general individualization. Since raw logistic 
coefficients elude a direct interpretation, I transform them to odds ratios by raising e to their 
power. The result is the average increase or decrease in odds ratios of the dependent variable, 
here personalization, to occur regardless of the other coefficient’s values. Predicted 
probabilities have to be derived in a further step setting all included predictive factors to fixed 
values. The empirical values of complexity range from 2.05 to 2.66 with a mean value of 2.41. 
Since this variable has been centered and consequently now is limited to bounds much narrower 
than -1/+1, interpreting the effect of a .1 increase gives us more valid information about the 
actual influence of complexity. Therefore, I raise e to the power of only one tenth of 
complexity’s coefficient to derive the estimated effect of a .1 increase in mean reported 
complexity by the voters in the corresponding online surveys. Setting all other variables at their 
means and the dummy variables to zero consequently indicates that a .1 increase in mean 
reported complexity by voters (= 10% of the surveyed voters change their level of agreement 
on the question “Politics nowadays is so complicated that people like me have no chance of 
understanding what is going on.” by only one point upwards on a 0 to 10 scale) in Canadian 
national elections (the reference category) results in a change in propensity of a party to apply 
general individualization in their advertising’s framing by 12 percentage points from 30% to 
42% (19 percentage points from 24% to 43% for content). Although this increase is calculated 
on the base of a hypothetical Canadian national election with mean values of all other 
continuous explanatory variables and all dummy variables set to zero, and although the effect 
has a logarithmic scale leading to a diminishing effect at the extremes, and although it is 
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dependent on other predictors’ values12, this is far from a trivial change. If voters perceive 
politics as complex, party strategists are apparently ready to offer general individualization as 
a heuristic to guide voters through the decision making process of whom to vote for. When 
looking at separate analyses of TV and newspaper advertising we see that this effect is mainly 
driven by newspaper advertisements, but also positive, even if not significant, for TV 
advertisement (see Appendix, Table A.1). 
The level of presidentialization interacted with running an executive candidate also shows a 
stable pattern of influence on general individualization in the pooled complete case analysis. 
Although neither the direct election-level effect of presidentialization, measured as an additive 
index of direct executive elections, institutionally strong executives and televised debates, nor 
the party-level effect of running an executive candidate are significant by themselves, their 
composite effect taking into account the interaction between them is a significant predictor of 
general individualization. Running an executive candidate in a highly presidentialized system 
(with a strong, directly elected executive whose contenders face off in a televised debate) on 
average increases a party’s propensity to individualize campaign framing from 10% to 26%. In 
less presidentialized systems, where only one of the facets of presidentialization is present, e.g. 
in Swiss cantons with a directly elected but weak executive without televised debates, the effect 
of running an executive candidate on general individualization is diminished to a mere increase 
of one percentage point. Individualization of campaign content is affected in a comparable way 
by the interaction of presidentialization and the presence of an executive candidate. A 30 
percentage point increase in probability of individualizing advertising content for a party 
running an executive candidate in a presidentialized system versus a party choosing not to do 
so shrinks to a 7 percentage point difference in less presidentialized systems. These patterns are 
                                               
12 e.g. in Spanish TV advertising for European elections (the only two significant effects of control variables) 
change in general individualization by a .1 increase of complexity would be diminished to 11 (framing) and 5 
(content) percentage points, respectively. 
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mainly driven by TV cases. When looking at TV content’s individualization separated from 
newspaper ads (Appendix, Table A.1), presidentialization even shows an additional significant 
positive effect complementing its interaction with running an executive candidate, as expected 
in hypotheses 4 and 5.2. For individualized TV framing, higher levels of presidentialization do 
not result in a significant increase in individualization levels beyond its interaction with running 
an executive candidate.  
For individualization in newspaper advertisements, however, the influence of 
presidentialization is completely turned on its head. Both framing and content show a similar 
decrease in odds for a 1-point increase of the presidentialization index as its positive effect on 
TV framing. At first sight, this is highly counterintuitive. But when looking closely and taking 
into account the large positive effects of the country dummies for Germany and Spain, we can 
see that this effect is largely an inter-level effect produced by Swiss cases. And when we also 
include the positive effect of regional elections, the negative presidentialization effect nearly 
vanishes. Since the presidentialization index does not vary a lot within countries and the country 
differences get canceled out by the adoption of fixed effects, we have to check the imputation 
analysis later to see if we have a credible anomaly here or if we are dealing with a statistical 
artifact (the multiple imputation analyses in Table 5.1, columns 3 and 4 look like the latter). 
The same goes, however, for the independent effect of presidentialization when looking at 
France, the only case with a directly elected executive in the TV content sample. However, the 
additional effect of European elections also has to be taken into account there. 
Beyond the three factors discussed above, which are complexity, presidentialization and 
running an executive candidate, no systematic influence of other variables on the degree of 
individualization is visible in the complete case analysis. As expected, mediatization of the 
electoral arena does not seem to play a role in consistently explaining general individualization. 
None of the mediatization predictors show an effect with a credible interval of at least 90%. 
Even if we attributed country differences exclusively to media systems, the Canadian reference 
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category only shows significant differences to Spain, but not to France, where we would also 
theoretically expect a negative coefficient due to its polarized-pluralist media system. 
Germany’s democratic corporatist system also does not differ substantially from Canada, when 
taking alternative explanations into account. Also newspaper advertising’s insignificant 
differences to TV advertising are not what media scholars would expect. Therefore, the 
mediatization hypothesis 1 does not find support when analyzing general individualization here. 
The electoral system, the institutional predictor theorized to influence personalization besides 
presidentialization also does not show support for its hypothesized influence on personalization 
as individualization. The electoral system’s suitability for personal vote earning attributes 
(PVEA) is not a significant predictor for individualization in the complete cases analyzed here. 
Hypothesis 3 therefore also finds no support in the analysis of general individualization.  
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Table 5.1 Complete case and multiple imputation analyses of general individualization 
 CC framing 
(1) 
CC content 
(2) 
MI framing  
(3) 
MI content  
(4) 
beta 0 -0.84 
(1.00) 
-1.16 
(1.02) 
-0.56 
(0.87) 
-1.12 
(0.83) 
mediatization -0.07 
(0.32) 
0.26 
(0.34) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
0.41 
(0.27) 
complexity 5.26** 
(2.65) 
8.94*** 
(2.71) 
3.51* 
(1.92) 
7.10*** 
(2.03) 
elec. system -0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
presidentialization -0.46 
(0.41) 
0.30 
(0.41) 
-0.03 
(0.33) 
0.53* 
(0.32) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.59* 
(0.30) 
 
0.48* 
(0.29) 
 
0.44* 
(0.27) 
 
0.36 
(0.28) 
 
executive candidate 
(d) 
 
-0.60 
(0.60) 
 
-0.14 
(0.58) 
 
-0.67 
(0.51) 
 
-0.28 
(0.53) 
centrism 0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
populism (d) -0.67 
(0.41) 
-0.51 
(0.41) 
-0.71** 
(0.32) 
-0.70** 
(0.32) 
professionalization  -0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
incumbency (d) 0.05 
(0.30) 
-0.11 
(0.30) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
-0.03 
(0.27) 
 
France (d) 
 
1.05 
(0.87) 
 
-1.15 
(0.90) 
 
1.05 
(0.98) 
 
-0.89 
(0.95) 
Germany (d) 0.72 
(0.77) 
0.06 
(0.76) 
-0.03 
(0.75) 
-0.35 
(0.71) 
Germany * newspaper 
(d) 
-0.55 
(1.16) 
-0.26 
(1.18) 
-0.59 
(1.02) 
-0.66 
(0.98) 
Spain (d) 3.24** 
(1.57) 
4.12** 
(1.61) 
2.17* 
(1.31) 
3.37*** 
(1.30) 
Spain * newspaper (d) 0.60 
(1.22) 
0.45 
(1.18) 
-0.47 
(1.02) 
-0.70 
(0.97) 
newspaper (d) 0.35 
(1.10) 
1.29 
(1.09) 
0.63 
(0.96) 
1.36 
(0.92) 
European (d) -1.74** 
(0.88) 
-0.62 
(0.88) 
-0.35 
(0.65) 
0.51 
(0.64) 
Regional (d) 0.54 
(0.40) 
-0.44 
(0.41) 
0.65** 
(0.30) 
-0.24 
(0.34) 
N 143 143 254 254 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, ** c.i. > 95%, *** c.i. > 99% 
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After reviewing the explanatory power of election-level variables, we will now turn to the party-
level predictors for general individualization. As we have seen in the analysis of the 
presidentialization hypotheses 4 and 5.2 above, the running of an executive candidate has no 
significant extra effect on parties’ level of individualization besides its contribution to the 
interaction effect with the presidentialization of the political system as a whole. Hypothesis 5.1 
therefore also has to be rejected for general individualization. The results of the pooled analysis 
also do not indicate systematic influence of the competing parties’ position in the electoral 
competition on general individualization. However, when disaggregating the analysis by media 
outlets, we see positive effects of ideological centrism at least for TV advertising, which is, at 
least for individualized framing, confirmed later in the pooled multiple imputation analysis. The 
closer a party to the weighted mean position in the electoral arena, the more individualization 
we see in TV advertising framing and content (Appendix, Table A.1). A decrease in ideological 
distance to the party system’s center by 10 points13, when setting the centered predictor and the 
dichotomous control variables to zero, increases the propensity of parties to individualize their 
TV advertising’s framing by over 5 percentage points (4 for content). For TV advertising, this 
supports the underlying argument of the centrism hypothesis 6 that centrist parties, to increase 
their unique selling point, do indeed rely on personalization to make themselves distinguishable 
from alternatives in the crowded ideological center of party competition.  
However, the picture is not as rosy for newspaper individualization. Centrism in party 
competition does not show any effect on individualized framing and even a negative effect on 
individualized content. Although the effect is small (as are the positive effects for TV), it has a 
credible interval greater than 90%, which makes it unwise to ignore, especially when we take 
the low number of cases upon which this analysis is based into account. It also leads to the 
                                               
13 The underlying political space based on the CMP calculations stretches from -100 to +100. So depending on the 
location of the center, parties can accumulate up to 100+ |center| distance points. Empirically, however, we deal 
with a range of 0.4 to 66.2 (divided by 10 for model clarity) with a median of 15.5 and a mean of 19.3. 
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nonsignificant findings for centrism in the pooled analyses. The centrism hypothesis 6 therefore 
only finds tentative support. 
Populism does not show the theoretically expected effect on individualization. This might be 
due to the fact that this analysis’ explanandum is the combined individualization of leaders and 
other candidates and populism’s main motivation for personalization should be advertising a 
leader figure as the embodiment of the people’s will, but since leadership individualization 
constitutes roughly two thirds of general individualization (as seen in Figure 4.1), its 
independent influence might not be as strong as expected, therefore leading to the rejection of 
the populism hypothesis 7 for general individualization. In addition, high professionalization, 
as found in most of the tightly organized populist parties under investigation here, might not be 
easy to disentangle from being populist per se. When looking at newspaper content, populism 
is even related to a (weakly significant, but still with a credible interval greater than 90%) 
negative effect on individualization. This relationship also holds in the analysis of completed 
imputation data, which will be seen in the remainder of this chapter. 
The independent effect of professionalization on individualization in this complete case 
analysis unfortunately can only be tested indirectly via the vote share auxiliary variable. Its 
small and nonsignificant influence does rather serve a control function than a thorough test of 
the professionalization hypothesis 8. 
Finally, we look at the effect of incumbency. Having renowned candidates with an executive 
track record at one’s disposal for campaign communication and advertising is theoretically 
conducive to personalization. The empirical pattern, however, does not confirm this notion and 
for newspaper framing even shows a negative effect of incumbency on general personalization. 
So the complete case analysis does not lend support for hypothesis 9 expecting incumbency to 
be a predictor for personalization. 
In general, the party-level predictors show less conclusive picture as the election-level 
predictors did. Where centrism shows the expected predictive power for individualization in 
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TV advertising and supports the unique selling point argument, individualization in newspaper 
advertising is predicted by decreases in centrism and the absence of populism and incumbency. 
However, these results, although based on all available data for the elections under 
investigation, might not be showing the whole picture. Missing data led to the exclusion of one 
third of the relevant party cases for TV and more than half of the cases for newspaper 
advertising. To check if these patterns have produced statistical artifacts in the complete case 
analysis, we will now turn to the robustness check via imputed data. 
5.3 Imputation Analysis of General Individualization 
To check if the results found in the complete case analysis above are robust or due to listwise 
deletion patterns, I ran the same beta regression analyses, but on 20 imputed datasets, where 
the missing values leading to deletion of cases were imputed by the “mice” algorithm. The 
results of said regression analyses were then pooled using Rubin’s rule (2004) to account for 
intra- and inter-imputation variance and therefore can be expected to provide a rather 
conservative robustness test. If they were based on the same number of cases, the standard 
deviations produced by this process would exceed their counterparts from the complete-case 
analysis, because they are also reflecting the uncertainty due to the multiple imputations, not 
only of the Bayesian beta modelling with a medium number of cases. However, since the 
imputation process allows me to include formerly deleted cases (254 imputed vs. 143 complete 
cases), the results empirically show comparable standard deviations, but effects are based on a 
higher number of cases, making them more robust. So although we might find fewer significant 
effects here, those we find should constitute a valid underpinning for confirming or rejecting 
hypotheses. 
When comparing explanatory factors for general individualization in advertising framing in 
columns 1 and 3, we see congruent patterns: Complexity is still by far the most influential 
predictor for general individualization, although its effect sizes drop and the credible interval 
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in advertising framing is reduced from 99% to 90%. Also, the interaction effect of 
presidentialization with running an executive candidate is significantly positive and similar in 
size to the one found in the complete case analysis of advertising framing. Its effect on 
advertising content, however, is still positive, but not within a credible interval of over 90% 
anymore. For advertising content, an independent positive effect of presidentialization replaces 
the significant interaction effect of the complete case analysis. Nevertheless, in combination 
and interacted with running a presidential candidate, the model still predicts a mean 16 
percentage point increase in probability of a party running a candidate in a highly 
presidentialized system vs. parties not running a candidate, compared to a mere 2 percentage 
points difference between parties running and not running an executive candidate in a lowly 
presidentialized system. This bolsters the claim of Hypothesis 5.2 that the direct and spillover 
effects of presidentialization are most visible for parties running executive candidates when 
explaining individualization in campaign communication.  
Also, ideological centrism’s positive effect on personalization is confirmed by the multiple 
imputation analysis. Even beyond the results of the complete case analysis, advertising framing 
by centrist parties is significantly more individualized when taking all relevant parties into 
account. The effect is still mainly driven by the TV cases (see Appendix, Table A.2), but 
indicates a need for centrist parties to distinguish themselves from their abundant ideological 
competition in the center of the ideological space.  
The other robust explanatory pattern for TV advertising framing and content is a surprisingly 
negative significant effect of populism on individualization. Although not significant in the 
complete case analysis, the multiple imputations uncover a negative relationship of populism 
with individualization. The theoretical expectations were opposite, but especially expecting a 
leader focus of populist individualization. So whether this is the result of concentrating 
advertising on leaders paired with a subpar level of individualization of campaign advertising 
featuring non-leaders, dropping the overall level of individualization, or if the empirical data 
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indeed rejects the populism, hypothesis 7 will be determined in the next chapter where I 
concentrate on leadership individualization.  
When looking at the explanatory power of institutions besides presidentialization, at 
mediatization, and at party-level variables for individualization advertising framing and 
content, the results are rather sobering. None of these predictors show substantial support for 
the theorized positive effects that go beyond chance and some are even negative. If this is due 
to a substantive lack of explanatory power of the factors analyzed here or if the pooling of 
leadership and non-leadership individualization covers up separate explanations will be 
answered in the following chapter.  
5.4 Discussion 
General individualization is the most overarching and least specific type of personalization. 
Operationalized as depicting or mentioning any politician, be it a leader or a backbencher, in 
an ad or as a speaker or object of a quasi-sentence, this concept represents a rather 
undifferentiated approach to personalization. This led me to the expectation that especially 
institutional and competition-related factors should increase this type of personalization, whose 
utility as addition to the unique selling point of a party and as heuristic does not depend on 
certain qualities, as media suitability does. And this expectation tends to be confirmed: 
Mediatization did not play any role in explaining levels of individualization and neither did 
professionalization or incumbency. The apparent absence of robust government-level and 
country-specific idiosyncrasies (with the exception of a positive effect for Spain) supports the 
notion that the variables chosen to explain the parties’ choice for individualization here cover 
the theoretically and empirically relevant variance. 
The positive influence of complexity, of the presence of executive candidates in 
presidentialized systems, and the tentative positive influence of ideological centrism point 
towards the theoretically expected pattern that general individualization is mainly driven by 
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parties’ need to distinguish themselves via personalization adding to their unique selling point 
as well as offering candidates as carriers of decision heuristics. Populism, however, showed a 
robust negative effect on general individualization, which was not expected by theory. 
Populists’ neglect of or outright opposition to programmatic linkage and representation actually 
should boost their reliance on personalization. But the charismatic linkage populism offers as 
an alternative often concentrates on leaders. The question if this inherent concentration is 
responsible for populisms counterintuitive negative influence here will be answered in the next 
chapter, where I will cover patterns and determinants of leadership individualization.  
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6. Explaining Leadership Individualization 
After reviewing patterns of and explanations for general individualization in election 
campaigns, I will now turn to a theoretically and empirically highly relevant subset of this type 
of personalization: Individualization concentrated on party leadership. A large share of 
personalization’s appeal is derived from its suitability for coverage in a mediatized environment 
concentrating on leading figureheads as embodiments of their parties, or as antagonists for 
political office. But political leaders have not only gained influence by their media-fueled 
celebrity status; institutional factors of the presidentialization of politics, e.g. strengthening of 
the (chief) executive in multilevel governance, also makes using top candidates as figureheads 
attractive for political mobilization via campaign communication. However, as we have seen in 
Chapter 4, the proportion of individualized campaign communication that is concentrated on 
party leaders varies from country to country as well as between levels of government. 
Accounting for roughly two thirds of individualized campaign communication on average, 
there are stark differences between for example Canada’s (one quarter) and Germany’s (five 
sixths) relative proportion of leadership individualization in TV advertising content, which calls 
for a differentiated approach for explaining its patterns. For this purpose, I will again first 
present the distributions of leadership individualization per country and level of government 
for a first disaggregated insight into the appearance of leadership individualization and to justify 
the use of beta regression analysis. In the following, I will conduct said analysis for the complete 
cases available to identify the predictors of leadership individualization and compare them to 
the theoretical expectations from the hypotheses in chapter 2, and then test the robustness of 
those findings with a multiple imputation analysis of all relevant parties. As indicated above, I 
expect especially the media- and leadership-related factors like presidentialization and the 
presence of executive candidates, as well as populism, to be the main contributors to the 
explanation of leadership individualization in campaign communication. 
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6.1 Distributions of Leadership Individualization  
As seen for general individualization in chapter 5.1, Figure 6.1 also shows that leadership 
individualization is not a strategy employed by all parties under investigation here. In fact, we 
see a vast majority of parties either applying leadership individualizing to (nearly) all or (nearly) 
none of their campaign communication. This divide is especially visible in TV framing and TV 
content, to a lesser extent but still notable for newspaper advertising. Since leadership 
individualization is a subset of general individualization, the mean values in both media outlets 
as well as in framing and content are logically lower than their counterparts in general 
individualization. However, the mean level of leadership individualization does not vary as 
much between media outlets and framing or content (from over 35% to just below 50%). 
Differences between TV and newspaper advertising are twofold: TV advertising shows a 
slightly higher proportion of “all or nothing” leadership individualization strategies compared 
to newspapers and, while the mean level of leadership individualized framing is practically 
equal for TV and newspapers, the mean proportion of newspapers’ leadership individualized 
content is higher than on TV. If these differences are due to the fact that TV advertising includes 
French and Canadian cases with a low average level of leadership personalization, whereas the 
newspaper subsample contains the more average Swiss cases, will be visible in the next section. 
Taking the observations so far together we can conclude that we are apparently dealing with a 
relevant and widely, but unequally, used strategy in election campaign communication.  
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Figure 6.1 Distributions of leadership individualization in TV and newspaper advertising 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
 
Figure 6.2 Distributions of leadership individualization in TV advertising; framing and 
content by countries 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
When disaggregating the distributions of leadership individualization in TV advertising by 
countries in Figure 6.2, we see a quite diverse picture. Spanish and French parties show the 
highest level of individualized leadership framing, which might indicate a higher propensity of 
polarized pluralist media systems for leadership individualization, but the wide range of the 
distributions (all or nothing in Spain, more uniform in France) within these countries casts doubt 
on an overarching systemic influence on all parties competing in these media systems. The “all 
or nothing” pattern is also visible in German framing, but with more than twice the number of 
parties opting for “nothing” than for “all”. Similarly, the majority of Canadian parties under 
investigation here opt for no leadership individualization in TV advertising framing, which 
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scholars of media systems would expect to be much higher in Canada’s liberal media 
environment.  
In addition to differences in mean levels by countries, leadership individualization in TV 
advertising content is also distributed more evenly over the whole range of proportions than 
framing. The Canadian parties’ TV advertising shows a nearly uniform distribution of 
leadership individualization proportions ranging from zero to up to 90%, resulting in a mean 
value of just below 50%. Interestingly, this value is higher than the mean content proportions 
of TV leadership individualization in all other countries under investigation as well as Canada’s 
mean proportion of leadership individualization in framing. So we can conclude that Canadian 
TV advertising mentions leaders more often in content than depicting them as the central 
character of an ad. This is due to the popularity of celebrity endorsements in Canadian politics, 
a feature also popular in Swiss newspaper ads, but not as visibly creating differences in framing 
and content (see nearly equal means for Swiss framing and content in Figure 6.3). Spanish and 
German TV advertising’s content, like framing, shows the “all or nothing” pattern of leadership 
individualization, only to a lesser extent, most probably due to the more fine-grained content 
measure of quasi-sentences compared to the overall framing of an ad. This pattern hints at the 
crucial role of candidates for chief executive office in these countries. The candidates for the 
German Chancellorship and the Spanish Prime Ministerial office as well as regional prime 
ministerial candidates in these countries are regularly focal points in their parties’ campaigns. 
Parties running these candidates which usually are the leading parties of the two strongest 
camps can be expected to concentrate their advertising strategy on the leaders, whereas other 
parties, which do not have an equally exposed figurehead, tend not to do so. In addition, the 
leadership in Germany and Spain only has to share attention with a rather impersonal mass of 
party rank and file elected by party lists in PR systems. In Canadian and French single-member 
district contests however, even backbenchers have the incentive to cultivate a personal vote via 
individualization and therefore decrease the share of limelight devoted to leadership alone. All 
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this can explain the all-or-nothing divide in Spain and Germany versus Canada and France as 
well as the higher proportion of “nothing” in Germany, where up to five parties are viable 
alternatives to the chancellor parties SPD and CDU/CSU, than in Spain, where only IU, 
Podemos and occasional regional parties have been viable alternatives to PSOE and PP in the 
timeframe of this investigation. Which of the factors discussed in this section is most important 
for explaining leadership individualization will be determined by the multivariate statistical 
analysis later in this chapter. 
Looking at the distribution of leadership individualization in newspaper advertising framing 
and content, we also see the PM pattern in Spain and Germany. In the Spanish cases, the 
concentration on leadership is especially high, because only the leading parties with prime 
ministerial candidates made any advertising efforts in newspapers. In Germany, the comparison 
of TV and newspapers shows similar commonalities between the media outlets as in Spain, if 
we take into account that German parties without executive candidates do not completely 
neglect newspaper advertising. In Switzerland, leadership individualization is a widespread 
facet of campaign strategy, but by no means is it employed by all parties. No systematic 
concentration of cases can be seen in the Swiss cases of Figure 6.3. If this is due to different 
competitive environments in different regions, or the fact that some parties do not have control 
over all their newspaper advertising in Switzerland’s open-list PR system, or variance in other 
party-related explanatory factors (for example presence or absence of executive candidates) 
will be analyzed in the next section by means of beta regression analysis of complete and 
imputed cases. 
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Figure 6.3 Distributions of leadership individualization in newspaper advertising; framing 
and content by countries 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
Comparing leadership individualization by levels of government in Figures 6.4 and 6.5 does 
not offer a conclusive picture. Although also here we can observe that the majority of parties 
individualize their campaign communication fully or not at all, which holds true for TV as well 
as newspaper advertising, we do not know yet on which grounds or explanatory factors this 
pattern is based. When comparing the mean levels of leadership individualization in TV 
advertising’s framing and content we see that regional and national elections show hardly 
different levels (and patterns), whereas the mean level of individualized leadership framing of 
EU campaign communication clearly trails the other two. This does correspond to the original 
second-order argument of the higher salience of national than European elections. European 
second-order elections are conceptualized as less important, less salient, and, consequently, less 
attractive for leaders to be featured in. This could be one reason for the clearly visible drop in 
leadership individualization between the national and regional arenas and the European 
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competition in the TV spots analyzed here. However, the regional election campaigns under 
investigation here show roughly the same levels of individualized leadership framing and 
content as the national one, which does not lend itself to conclude systematic salience 
differences leading to leadership individualization differences between those two lower levels 
here, and even more prominent, the patterns of newspaper advertising leadership 
personalization show a reversed order. Here the European average campaigns’ levels of 
leadership individualization (around two thirds for framing and even more for content) are 
highest compared to the regional and national level (all between 40 and 50%).  
 
Figure 6.4 Distributions of leadership individualization in TV advertising; framing and 
content by levels of government 
Note: Means as dashed lines  
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So leadership individualization can safely be concluded to be not systematically influenced by 
levels of government across media outlets. Nevertheless, we see differences that have to be 
controlled for in the multivariate analysis of complete cases and multiply imputed datasets in 
the next sections. 
 
Figure 6.5 Distributions of leadership individualization in newspaper advertising; framing 
and content by levels of government 
Note: Means as dashed lines  
6.2 Complete Case Analysis of Leadership Individualization  
Leadership individualization has a strong theoretical link to mediatization, presidentialization, 
and populism. These three explanatory factors can be expected to contribute most to a party 
strategist’s motivation to concentrate attention on party leadership instead of party ideology, 
program and image on the one hand, and rank-and-file candidates on the other. The complete 
case analyses presented in the first two columns of Table 6.1 partly confirm this expectation. 
As in the previous chapter, regarding the differences in distributions justifies the following 
multivariate analysis of leadership individualization’s usage by parties in different electoral 
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arenas. A total of 143 observed cases have been analyzed using Bayesian beta regression with 
a logit link, 5 chains with 10,000 iterations each, of which the first 1,000 have been discarded 
as burn-in, are the basis for the reported posterior means of the predictor’s effects as logged 
odds ratios. As in the general individualization analysis, control dummies have been included 
to account for country- and media- specific idiosyncrasies, as well as for systematic differences 
between levels of government not covered by the modeled covariates. To account for different 
mechanisms influencing advertising’s framing and content, these two aspects have been 
analyzed separately with differing outcomes, as we will see in the following.  
The strongest significant predictor of leadership individualization framing is the interaction 
term of presidentialization with the running of a candidate explicitly for executive office. Given 
all other predictors are at their means and the dummies set to zero14, if a party runs a candidate 
in a fully presidentialized system (in this case the three requirements “strong executive”, 
“directly elected executive”, and “debate” are met), then the probability of this party applying 
leadership individualization framing is over 20%, whereas parties without executive candidates 
only show a probability of under 5%. For a medium level of presidentialization (=2), this 
difference changes to just over 16% with an executive candidate versus under 8% without, and 
for low levels of presidentialization (for example in elections for the European Parliament), the 
difference between running a candidate and not is within 1 percentage point. This observation 
confirms that presidentialization per se is not the main driver behind leadership 
individualization, but that a party needs to run an executive candidate to make use of the 
institutional arrangement favorable for personalization. However, contrary to the theoretical 
expectation, neither populism nor mediatization have an effect on individualized leadership 
framing stronger than within the range expected by mere chance in this joint consideration of 
                                               
14 i.e. for parties competing in hypothetical national Canadian elections. The changes in probability reported here 
obviously also depend on the values of the other variables, but since none of the control variables have a significant 
impact, the reported probabilities give a reasonable approximation of the effects for all cases. 
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newspaper and TV advertising. Also, when looking at the other theoretically less influential but 
still relevant predictors of personalization, neither the election-level variables like complexity 
or the electoral system nor the party-level variables ideological centrism, party 
professionalization, and incumbency empirically contribute to explaining variance in 
individualized leadership framing.  
When disaggregating the analysis of leadership individualization and looking at TV and 
newspapers separately (see Appendix, Table A.3), we get a more detailed picture of what 
constitutes the explanatory patterns of this complete case analysis of advertising framing. For 
TV, the conducive effect of executive candidates in presidentialized systems on leadership 
individualization of framing is as clearly visible as in the pooled analysis. In addition to that, a 
positive influence of ideological centrism can also be made out, indicating an explanatory role 
of leaders as carriers of the unique selling point of a candidacy on TV. If this is due only to a 
deliberate enhancement of the party’s communication strategy by leaders’ face recognition 
value or if this is mainly achieved by marketing their private traits will be clarified in the 
analysis of leadership privatization in chapter 8. Newspaper ads’ level of leadership 
individualization in framing however is determined to a larger extent by factors related to 
heuristics, and party professionalization. In this media outlet, presidentialization even seems to 
have a negative effect on leadership individualization. Higher proportions of leadership 
individualization in newspaper advertising’s framing are attributed mainly to the voters’ notion 
of complexity of politics, and a positive effect of party professionalization. Populism, which 
has been theorized as a main driving force behind concentration on leadership, neither shows 
an effect here nor on TV. The electoral system’s theoretical suitability for personalization as 
well as ideological centrism and incumbency of a party even show significant negative effects 
on leadership individualization in newspaper advertising’s framing. But since the differences 
between countries and levels of government are much more pronounced in newspaper 
advertising than on TV, the combination of a limited number of cases on which this subsample 
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analysis is based (58) and strong country- and level-specific idiosyncrasies leads me to treat the 
newspaper framing results with caution. Nevertheless we cannot disregard them and their 
contribution to the, beside the stable influence of executive candidates in presidentialized 
systems, rather inconclusive bigger picture of leadership individualization in advertising 
framing.  
The complete case analysis of advertising content shows a slightly different pattern than 
framing. The positive influence of executive candidates in highly presidentialized systems 
which we also found for framing is complemented by explanatory power of complexity and 
party professionalization. The theoretically expected positive influence of executive candidates 
in presidentialized systems is as visible in the respective interaction effect as in advertising 
framing. Its composite effect is even larger than for framing and on a higher overall level: A 
party’s probability to use leadership individualization in their campaign is 56% vs. 27% for 
fully presidentialized systems, 30% vs. 18% for countries with for example a strong but 
indirectly elected executive with debates, and again only within 2 percentage points for low 
levels of presidentialization.  
In addition to this effect, professionalization and especially complexity also play a major role 
here. Party professionalization’s independent effect on leadership individualization in 
advertising content seems small, but is indeed statistically and substantially significant. An 
increase of professionalization by one unit, for example the availability of one more fully 
employed party secretary per one million voters or an increase in campaign budget by one 
currency unit per 10 voters, leads to an increase of the probability of a party using leadership 
individualization in their advertising’s content from 7% to 12%.  
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Table 6.1 Complete case and multiple imputation analyses of leadership individualization 
 CC framing 
(1) 
CC content 
(2) 
MI framing  
(3) 
MI content  
(4) 
beta 0 -1.34 
(1.12) 
-2.53** 
(1.07) 
-1.07 
(0.86) 
-1.72* 
(0.90) 
mediatization 0.01 
(0.35) 
0.33 
(0.34) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
0.27 
(0.27) 
complexity 2.55 
(2.90) 
6.00** 
(2.80) 
1.23 
(1.96) 
3.33 
(2.06) 
elec. system -0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
presidentialization -0.56 
(0.44) 
0.52 
(0.42) 
-0.38 
(0.33) 
0.45 
(0.33) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.86*** 
(0.31) 
 
0.55* 
(0.29) 
 
0.70*** 
(0.25) 
 
0.40 
(0.26) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-0.89 
(0.60) 
 
-0.45 
(0.57) 
 
-0.53 
(0.49) 
 
-0.05 
(0.51) 
centrism 0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
populism (d) -0.24 
(0.42) 
-0.07 
(0.45) 
-0.20 
(0.32) 
-0.24 
(0.33) 
professionalization  0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
incumbency (d) 0.08 
(0.31) 
-0.19 
(0.30) 
0.03 
(0.27) 
-0.05 
(0.26) 
 
France (d) 
 
0.73 
(0.90) 
 
-1.36 
(0.91) 
 
0.43 
(0.93) 
 
-1.41 
(0.95) 
Germany (d) 0.93 
(0.81) 
0.98 
(0.79) 
0.49 
(0.73) 
0.27 
(0.75) 
Germany * newspaper 
(d) 
-0.45 
(1.20) 
-1.81 
(1.17) 
-0.16 
(0.97) 
-1.21 
(1.01) 
Spain (d) 2.53 
(1.76) 
3.87** 
(1.68) 
1.85 
(1.31) 
2.43* 
(1.39) 
Spain * newspaper (d) 0.87 
(1.27) 
-0.47 
(1.17) 
0.11 
(1.00) 
-0.85 
(0.99) 
newspaper (d) 0.28 
(1.16) 
2.45** 
(1.08) 
0.19 
(0.95) 
1.65* 
(0.96) 
European (d) -1.16 
(0.91) 
0.44 
(0.88) 
-0.64 
(0.60) 
0.57 
(0.60) 
Regional (d) 0.46 
(0.43) 
0.16 
(0.42) 
0.32 
(0.30) 
-0.01 
(0.34) 
N 143 143 254 254 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, ** c.i. > 95%, *** c.i. > 99% 
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The effect of complexity is even more prominent. Complexity was measured as the mean 
agreement to the question “Politics nowadays is so complicated that people like me have no 
chance of understanding what is going on.” on an 11-point scale. So if only 10% of the surveyed 
population change their perception by one point towards agreeing more to this statement, the 
probability of a party strategist offering leadership individualization as a heuristic for these 
voters overwhelmed by the complexity of politics changes from 7% to 13%, which is by no 
means negligible.  
In addition, the control variables for Spain and newspaper ads versus the reference category 
account for inter-election variance not covered by the explanatory factors theorized above. 
Interestingly, they do not conform to theoretical macro-expectations about differences between 
countries and media outlets. Spain’s polarized pluralist media system is not expected to produce 
more personalized advertising content than the liberal media system of Canada (the reference 
category) and even if one were to attribute its high mean levels of leadership individualization 
to the dominant role that the prime minister plays in Spanish politics, this should be covered by 
the institutional explanatory factors of presidentialization or being mirrored, which it is not, by 
Germany’s “Kanzlerdemokratie”, where the chancellor or regional prime minister as head of 
the executive enjoys a similarly elevated position. But when taking into account that Spanish 
governments typically consist of only one party in comparison to German Chancellors being 
typically supported by a government coalition, this additional level of leadership 
individualization does not come as too much of a surprise anymore.  
Also, newspaper advertising unexpectedly shows significantly more leadership 
individualization than TV advertising. This finding is counterintuitive in the sense that TV 
advertising has been theorized to be more conducive to concentration on political leaders in a 
horse-race context as well as that TV advertising’s production is much more costly and 
therefore centralized than newspaper advertising. And even if one attributed this effect to 
influential Swiss newspaper cases in the sample, it is still unclear why Switzerland’s egalitarian 
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and consensual system should produce a higher level of concentration on leadership than 
Canada, France, or Germany. However, the Swiss newspaper advertisements covered here 
provide two distinct features systematically raising leadership individualization: They are 
heavy with endorsements of party leaders for their lower-ranked party comrades and, more 
importantly, many advertisements mention leadership candidates for parallel upper-chamber 
(national) or executive (regional) contests without featuring them prominently. Therefore we 
see this difference in media outlets in advertising content, but not in framing. 
When looking at leadership individualization of TV and newspaper advertising content 
separately (Appendix, Table A.3), we can see that the aggregate picture in column 2 of Table 
6.1 is not only due to the higher number of TV cases in the analysis. Although the positive 
effect of executive candidates in presidentialized systems can mainly be explained by its 
prevalence in TV advertising, the overall significant influence of complexity and 
professionalization mainly has to be attributed to the newspaper cases. Even when controlling 
for the inherently higher levels of leadership individualization in newspaper advertising 
content, the systematic influence of these cases here constitutes the main driving force behind 
the effects of complexity and professionalization in the pooled analysis.  
The complete case analyses previously presented only partly corroborate the expectation that 
leadership individualization should mainly be driven by mediatization, presidentialization, and 
populism. Although parties which present candidates for executive office in presidentialized 
systems generally tend to individualize their campaign communication concentrated on 
leadership more, mediatization and populism do not play an outstanding independent role, in 
fact no significant role at all, in the pooled analysis aimed at explaining leadership 
individualization. Therefore, the mediatization hypothesis and especially the populism 
hypothesis have to be dismissed for explaining leadership individualization. The candidate 
qualification of the presidentialization hypothesis, corroborated by the significant interaction 
effect of presidentialization and executive candidacies, can be upheld for leadership 
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individualization in general, whereas the complexity hypothesis, as well as the 
professionalization hypothesis, only finds support in the analysis of advertising content. The 
non-influence of the electoral system’s suitability for personalization does not come as too 
much of a surprise in the analysis of leadership individualization. When concentrating on the 
elevated leadership candidates, who are in most of the surveyed cases indirectly elected (with 
the exception of France and the Swiss cantons), and whose electoral success is not directly 
related to their unique selling point versus their party comrades, this factor can be expected not 
to play a major role, leading to no support for the electoral system hypothesis. Incumbency, 
however, should actually give a boost to leadership individualization. But the differences 
between known and unknown leader candidates prior to the campaign is apparently diminished 
in its course or dealt with by party strategists in advance. The recognition advantage incumbents 
have, with which party strategists are theoretically expected to work to their advantage, might 
even lead to more leadership individualization by unknown opposition candidates, who have to 
catch up on popularity with established candidates, cancelling out incumbency’s systematic 
influence and therefore generating no support for the incumbency hypothesis. Leadership 
individualization as a remedy for centrist parties’ lack of a programmatic unique selling point 
easily distinguishable from their opponents is only visible in TV framing. Countered by an 
unexpected negative effect of incumbency in newspaper advertisements, there is no overall 
support for this theoretical expectation from the centrism hypothesis.  
So the analysis of individualization concentrated exclusively on leadership has shown similar 
patterns as the analysis of general individualization in chapter 5. Especially the interaction 
effect of presidentialization and executive candidates, as well as complexity’s influence 
conducive to individualized content, is rather congruent. But parties’ leadership personnel are 
not the only group covered by individualization in their campaign strategy, as we have seen in 
section 4.1. Although only one quarter to one third of advertising’s individualized framing and 
content, depending on the media outlet, covers non-leadership candidates, their appearance 
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should also be systematically related to explanatory factors covered by the presented analytic 
framework. The main problem, however, when looking at individualization tailored to non-
leaders is the heterogeneity of this group. It includes parties’ backbencher candidates down the 
ballot as well as sitting and potential ministers from the second row of a party and also highly 
motivated and well-funded individual candidates with a need to convince not only the electorate 
as a whole that their party is the best choice, but also that they personally are a better choice 
than their party comrades on the same list. Facing different challenges and opportunities of 
individualization, these three types of political non-leaders and their respective public relations 
advisors are therefore motivated by different mechanisms when deciding whether or not the 
candidate should appear personally on TV or newspaper advertising.  
When party backbenchers personally appear on campaign advertising, this inclusion is most 
likely beyond their control. Their appearance is rather the result of their incidental 
mediagenicity paired with party leadership needing an advertisement character to make the ad 
more media-suitable, or offer a personalized heuristic to convey the party’s appeal to voters less 
willing to invest cognitive resources in getting information on party programs and ideologies. 
For this group of backbenchers, one can expect the electoral arena’s mediatization and 
complexity, as well as a party’s professionalization and centrality, to contribute most to the 
explanation. 
Variance in individualization featuring the second group of non-leaders, party celebrities not 
quite in the first row, for example sitting ministers, can be explained by a different set of 
motivating factors. Party strategists who have these types of non-leaders at their disposal can 
make the best use of their qualities by eliciting recognition in the minds of voters. This is 
especially easy for incumbents, who have a higher base recognition level and are more often 
covered in the media than opposition candidates. Their biggest asset, face recognition, provides 
heuristics in a complex environment for the voters, but also additional information to 
complement or compensate for a lack of ideological concept specificity of centrist parties, 
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enhancing their unique selling point. Consequently, I expect these three variables complexity, 
centrism, and incumbency to also have an effect on the individualization of non-leadership-
centered political communication. 
Highly motivated individual candidates who are well-funded but not party leaders can make the 
most of personalization when they use it to define themselves as alternatives to their internal 
party competitors. With the party’s strategy planners taking care of advertising the party brand, 
these candidates can concentrate their own funds mainly on their own respective person and on 
cultivating a personal vote. Therefore, I also expect the suitability of the electoral formula for 
personal vote-earning attributes to have a significant influence on the level of non-leadership 
individualization. 
The empirical results in Table 6.2 are indeed indicative of a juxtaposition of factors responsible 
for non-leadership individualization competing for explanatory power instead of one 
overarching explanation as found in the presence of executive candidates in presidentialized 
systems for leadership. None of the factors tested in the pooled models significantly contribute 
to a systematic explanation of non-leadership individualization of advertising framing, and only 
programmatic centrism shows a significant effect on individualization levels in advertising 
content. So taking the pooled analyses’ results displayed in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.2 for 
themselves, we could conclude that the centrism effect predicted either by the influence of vice-
leaders or of backbenchers in the pool of non-leaders is the only, or the strongest, one when it 
comes to explaining non-leadership individualization. However, analyzing TV and newspaper 
advertising separately gives a more differentiated picture (see Appendix, Table A.5). Whereas 
the TV analyses do not shed any more light on the explanatory patterns for non-leadership 
individualization, besides a negative effect of populism, the newspaper analyses show a lot 
more, as will be discussed in the next paragraph.  
The insignificant effect of populism on individualized non-leadership framing can mean two 
things, which have to do with two defining features of populism. At first glance, it could mean 
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that personalization as a way of making media complicity with populism’s representatives 
easier, which is one strategic feature of populism, does, against expectations, just not justify the 
inclusion of non-leadership individualization by populist-party strategists and therefore refutes 
one of the expectations made on the grounds of the first group of candidates defined above, 
mediagenic backbenchers. However, if we take a step back and look at the network of 
intertwined strategic and ideological factors defining populism this could also mean, and I am 
more inclined to believe so, that individualization in populist parties is exclusively reserved for 
the leader figure. And this is not farfetched: The figurehead of a populist party as the 
embodiment of the common will or “the people” does not need (and often also does not 
encourage) other candidates presented in a personalized way beside him or her. Populists’ level 
of non-leadership individualization can therefore rightly be expected to not be affected due to 
its hierarchical concentration on one leader figure. Especially in the highly centralized media 
outlet that is TV, where advertising production is expensive and highly regulated, and where 
party leadership plays a much more decisive role than in newspaper ads, this non- effect of 
populism on non-leadership individualization is not as surprising any more. In general, we also 
do not see effects attributed to backbenchers or individual candidates in the analysis of TV 
advertising’s framing or content, which also has to do with the fact that TV advertising 
production is and has to be highly centralized in parties. 
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Table 6.2 Complete case and multiple imputation analyses of non-leadership 
individualization 
 CC framing 
(1) 
CC content 
(2) 
MI framing  
(3) 
MI content  
(4) 
beta 0 -0.63 
(1.00) 
-0.81 
(0.88) 
-0.83 
(0.80) 
-1.34* 
(0.80) 
mediatization 0.13 
(0.33) 
0.21 
(0.31) 
0.17 
(0.26) 
0.20 
(0.24) 
complexity 2.82 
(2.56) 
2.59 
(2.31) 
2.47 
(1.70) 
2.50 
(1.72) 
elec. system 0.03 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
presidentialization 0.08 
(0.40) 
-0.26 
(0.36) 
0.31 
(0.31) 
0.04 
(0.33) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
-0.34 
(0.29) 
 
-0.13 
(0.28) 
 
-0.19 
(0.23) 
 
0.01 
(0.26) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
0.21 
(0.56) 
 
-0.11 
(0.52) 
 
-0.39 
(0.42) 
 
-0.71 
(0.43) 
centrism 0.04 
(0.07) 
0.11* 
(0.07) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.09* 
(0.06) 
populism (d) -0.20 
(0.39) 
-0.17 
(0.41) 
-0.34 
(0.30) 
-0.17 
(0.32) 
professionalization  -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
incumbency (d) 0.15 
(0.29) 
0.31 
(0.26) 
0.11 
(0.25) 
0.20 
(0.26) 
 
France (d) 
 
0.11 
(0.87) 
 
0.70 
(0.81) 
 
0.21 
(0.88) 
 
0.14 
(1.62) 
Germany (d) -0.96 
(0.77) 
-1.04 
(0.71) 
-0.96 
(0.71) 
-0.40 
(0.73) 
Germany * newspaper 
(d) 
0.29 
(1.13) 
1.07 
(0.99) 
-0.07 
(0.92) 
0.09 
(0.93) 
Spain (d) 0.20 
(1.55) 
0.25 
(1.39) 
0.09 
(1.20) 
0.85 
(1.35) 
Spain * newspaper (d) -0.04 
(1.19) 
0.33 
(1.05) 
-0.22 
(0.94) 
-0.16 
(0.92) 
newspaper (d) -0.19 
(1.06) 
-0.78 
(0.92) 
0.35 
(0.89) 
0.23 
(0.87) 
European (d) -0.27 
(0.85) 
-0.57 
(0.77) 
0.53 
(0.58) 
0.23 
(0.65) 
Regional (d) -0.01 
(0.40) 
-0.34 
(0.37) 
0.20 
(0.30) 
-0.13 
(0.28) 
N 143 143 254 254 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, ** c.i. > 95%, *** c.i. > 99% 
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However, the newspaper analysis of non-leadership individualization in advertising framing 
shows a more complex picture. Here the explanatory factors associated with individual well-
funded candidates are significantly influencing the level of non-leadership individualization. 
The electoral system’s suitability for cultivating a personal vote has a significant positive effect, 
as does centrism and incumbency both for advertising’s framing and content. That we can 
observe these three effects directly linked to individual candidates in newspaper advertising is 
hardly surprising. Newspaper advertising, which is less regulated, as well as less costly to 
produce and to place, is a very fitting channel for cultivating a personal vote via 
individualization of campaign framing and content and independently of central party funds. In 
electoral systems highly conducive to cultivating a personal vote, i.e. with large district 
magnitudes and open lists, candidates do not only have to convince voters of their party’s fitness 
for office, but they also have to make clear that they as individuals are a better fit than their 
party comrades on the same list. So here individualization works primarily as adding to the 
unique selling point of a candidate, but the party probably does not mind if their appeal is 
broadened by these candidates. This argument is supported and mirrored in the positive 
independent effect of a party’s ideological centrism. Also, individualization works as a heuristic 
here, because the personal vote-earning attributes are not only useful as unique selling points, 
but also as heuristic shortcuts for voters facing a complex electoral system with open lists and 
large district magnitudes (Shugart et al., 2005). And the positive effect of incumbency, 
indicating that parties of the sitting government as a whole or their candidates individually 
individualize content more often than opposition parties, completes this picture. Non-leadership 
individualization in newspaper advertising is apparently driven mainly by individual candidates 
wanting to increase their party’s as well as their own chances of representation in the legislature. 
When reviewing the hypothesized effects on leadership as well as non-leadership 
individualization discussed above, we see two different patterns. Leadership individualization, 
as expected, is most consistently explained by the interplay of running executive candidates in 
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a highly presidentialized system, corroborating the interaction hypothesis of these factors. Not 
surprisingly, an institutional framework conducive to concentration on leadership figures 
(presidentialization) is best used by rational party strategists who have the appropriate resources 
(executive candidates) to do so. In this domain of leadership individualization, a rational cost–
benefit analysis by campaign planners shows that institutional personalization precedes all other 
forms of personalization, as theorized by Rahat and Sheafer (2007). This cost–benefit logic is 
further supported by party professionalization’s positive effect on leadership individualization 
in campaign content. In addition, the positive effect of complexity on leadership 
individualization content shows its utility as a heuristic. Other theorized influential factors, 
mediatization and incumbency in particularly, but also centrism and populism do not 
systematically contribute to explaining levels of leadership individualization. 
To explain individualization concentrated on non-leadership candidates, we had to dig deeper 
than the pooled analysis presented in Table 6.2. Where the pooled analysis showed nearly no 
systematic evidence for the hypothesized influence of the variables theorized for this 
investigation, the separate analysis of newspaper advertising at least partly supported the notion 
that especially well-funded individual candidates, with the approval of their parties, can and do 
rely on individualization as a campaign strategy. These candidates running in electoral systems 
where the expected utility of cultivating a personal vote via PVEA is high are likely to increase 
their party’s overall level of non-leadership individualization, supporting the electoral-system 
hypothesis. In addition, centrist parties also use these candidates to enhance their unique selling 
point, supporting the centrism hypothesis and their face-recognition value as incumbents, 
supporting the incumbency hypothesis. Not surprisingly presidentialization, executive 
candidates, and populism, the explanatory factors highly linked to leadership, did not show a 
systematic effect on the level of non-leadership professionalization. And the party’s 
professionalization resources are also apparently concentrated more on leadership than 
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backbenchers, lending no support to the professionalization hypothesis in explaining non-
leadership individualization. 
Whether these insights are robust or due to the complete cases under investigation here 
representing a skewed sample of all relevant parties in the competition will be tested by the 
robustness check via multiple imputations in the next section. 
6.3 Imputation Analysis of Leadership Individualization 
To test if the findings of the complete case analysis presented in the previous subchapter are 
robust to including all relevant parties and their qualities competing in the electoral arenas under 
investigation, I conducted additional Bayesian beta regression analyses of 20 imputed datasets. 
These datasets, filling observational gaps in variables that led to the exclusion of cases in the 
previous analyses via listwise deletion, were obtained by the mice algorithm and the analyses’ 
results pooled under Rubin’s rule. As stated in section 5.3, this rather conservative test sheds 
more light on the claims made by the complete case analysis due to its inclusion of uncertainty 
not only within imputations, but also between the aggregated results derived from it. 
Looking at the results for advertisement framing in column 3 of Table 6.1, presenting the 
simultaneous systematic impact of explanatory factors theorized to be influencing campaign 
individualization, we can observe that the interaction effect of institutional presidentialization 
with the presence of executive candidates is not an artifact produced by listwise deletion. The 
composite effect of the interaction with its corresponding main effects is even stronger than in 
the complete case analysis. On the other hand, this effect is not visible in column 4, where the 
level of individualized content is analyzed. We can therefore conclude that leadership 
individualization is only robustly explained in advertising framing by this interaction, but not 
in content. Furthermore, as in the complete case analysis, we can attribute this finding mainly 
to its prevalence in TV advertising (Appendix, Table A.3). The positive effect of a centrist 
ideological party position also visible in the separate imputation analysis of TV advertising 
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framing does not find its way into the pooled analysis and neither does the positive effect of 
professionalization found in the imputation analysis of newspaper advertising’s framing. 
The multiple imputation results for leadership individualization in advertising content is even 
more sobering. Only the systematically higher level of this type of personalization in newspaper 
advertising and in Spain can be verified in the analysis in column 4 of Table 6.1. Neither the 
counterintuitive negative effects of ideological centrism and populism from a separate 
newspaper analysis, nor the hardly significant positive influence of professionalization in this 
subsample (Appendix, Table A.3) can be traced in the pooled analysis of multiply imputed 
complete datasets. The positive presidentialization or centrism effects on TV advertising’s 
levels of leadership individualization also do not come up in the pooled analysis. Only the 
systematically higher rates of leadership individualization in newspaper advertising and in 
Spain are robust.  
The pooled analysis of non-leadership individualization of advertising framing presented in 
column 3 of Table 6.2 is as sparsely rewarding as the complete case analysis. No significant 
systematic influence of any tested variable can be made out. Also when looking at the separate 
imputation analyses of advertising framing in TV and newspapers, the picture stays 
inconclusive. TV individualization featuring non-leaders is only weakly significantly 
influenced positively by populism (which is counterintuitive when thinking about populism’s 
concentration on leadership); all other predictors’ influence does not show a credible interval 
of over 90%. Separate imputation analysis of newspaper advertising’s framing also does not 
show any significant associations of the tested explanatory factors with non-leadership 
individualization. When looking at the content in column 4, we find a positive influence of a 
party’s centrist position on non-leadership individualization as seen in the pooled complete case 
analysis of column 2. We can therefore conclude that this effect is robust. As for the complete 
case analysis, we can get more insight from disaggregating this pooled analysis into TV and 
newspaper advertisings. Where non-leadership individualization in TV advertising content only 
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shows highly counterintuitive negative associations with complexity and centrism (and for the 
Spanish cases), newspaper advertising’s separate imputation analysis confirms the positive 
influence of centrism and incumbency found in the complete case analysis, but also adds a 
counterintuitive positive effect of populism to it. 
6.4 Discussion  
Explaining the level of leadership individualization is apparently not as complex as it was 
theorized. It follows a relatively clear resource- and opportunity-based approach: Parties which 
run executive candidates in a presidentialized system feature their leaders more prominently in 
advertising framing as well as content. In addition, advertisement content’s level of leadership 
individualization is also influenced by political complexity, a factor varying between electoral 
arenas, and party professionalization, varying within electoral arenas, at least when taking the 
complete case analyses into account. All these factors can be attributed to a very rational 
explanation of personalization. If a party has the prerequisites (executive candidates and/or 
funds and staff) and the arena is conducive to leadership personalization (presidentialized 
and/or perceived as complex), parties significantly more often employ a personalization 
strategy tailored to their leaders. Also visible from these patterns is the fact that not only features 
of the electoral arena explain variance in leadership professionalization, but single parties’ 
resources and characteristics also have to be taken into account. The interaction of two factors 
from one level each, providing enhancement of the unique selling point, a complexity reduction 
and probably also media suitability, actually provides the strongest, most consistent explanation 
for leadership individualization. 
Non-leadership individualization, however, is not as clearly related to one set of explanatory 
factors as leadership personalization. This group of persons who personally appear in campaign 
advertising is highly heterogeneous and consists of mediagenic backbenchers, second-row party 
VIPs, and well-funded individual candidates, all motivated by different aspects to appear in 
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personalized campaigning. Where mediagenic backbenchers and second-row party VIPs are 
mostly featured as figureheads of their party’s advertising strategy to make the party’s appeal 
more suitable for media coverage, reduce ideological complexity, and contribute to its unique 
selling point, self-contributing individual candidates are more motivated by cultivating a 
personal vote due to electoral system effects and reaping benefits of their incumbency status 
where applicable. This heterogeneity does not lend itself to an overarching explanatory pattern 
as for the rather homogenous group of leaders. The pooled complete case analysis as well as 
the pooled imputation robustness checks are rather inconclusive and indicate a juxtaposition of 
factors simultaneously influencing non-leadership individualization. Nevertheless, these 
factors’ independent impact can at least be identified in a separate analysis of newspaper 
advertising’s content, where party leadership and strategy planners do not have full control. 
There, a positive systemic influence of the electoral systems’ suitability to cultivate a personal 
vote, as well as incumbency and ideological centrism of a party, could be identified to 
contribute to a greater degree of individualization in a party’s communication strategy. Here 
we see the influence of both party leadership, motivated by the arena’s perceived complexity 
and their own ideological centrism, as well as individual candidates motivated by the electoral 
system and incumbency status. 
So where we can see a clear profile of resources and opportunities leading to leadership 
individualization, which indicates strong centralized campaign strategy planning, the more 
diverse motivations affecting individualization featuring non-leaders show a multifaceted and 
harder-to-grasp pattern of explanations for individualization.  
Whether these patterns of individualization described and analyzed in the last two chapters are 
also visible for a more qualified approach to personalization, namely for privatization of 
campaign communication, will be analyzed in the next chapters.  
7. Explaining General Privatization  
136 
 
This chapter and the next will be dedicated to the analysis of privatization of political 
communication. Privatization, as opposed to individualization, has a quality component to it. 
Campaign communication is privatized if political personae are not only mentioned or depicted, 
but their appearance is framed in a setting outside their political function as an office-holder or 
candidate. Content of political communication is defined as privatized if it is dealing with their 
personal traits instead of or in addition to their political positions and programs. This dimension 
of personalization in politics is theoretically most strongly related to mediatization. Especially 
commercialized media with a focus on news value, generated inter alia by emotionalization and 
personalization, can be expected to devote more coverage and attention to campaign 
communication attached to a politician as a private person, displaying role-near or even role-
distant traits. Campaign planners anticipate this media logic and try to take advantage of it. I 
expect campaign strategists in more mediatized environments to rely more on the privatized 
type of personalization than in other contexts. In addition, privatization can also serve as a 
heuristic for less informed or overwhelmed voters, since judging persons is a task the human 
mind is much fitter to perform than the cumbersome process of pondering over political 
ideologies and issue propositions or even calculating the expected outcome of these 
propositions for themselves or society as a whole. Also, contests which are concentrated on 
political leaders should show privatization, since the policy appeals of these candidates tend to 
converge on a hardly distinguishable middle ground in the pursuit of the median voters and 
therefore privatization should provide valuable additional information for the candidates to 
distinguish themselves from their competitors.  
Besides these more obvious predictors, the remaining explanatory factors tested for 
individualization also cannot be ruled out when approaching privatization. Party 
professionalization equips the campaign management with the necessary know-how to apply a 
privatization strategy, especially when the candidate is already known for being the incumbent. 
Populist parties should aim for presenting their figureheads as “men of the people” via 
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privatized images of their daily lives and centrist parties’ ideologies and their candidates might 
be in need of privatized personalization as additional unique selling points for their bid for 
office in the (more or less, depending also on the electoral system) crowded center of party 
competition. 
For these reasons, I will proceed with analyzing privatization as a campaign strategy in the same 
way as shown for individualization in the previous chapters. First, I will compare the descriptive 
patterns of privatization and in a second step analyze the results of a Bayesian beta regression 
of the complete cases. Then I will check the robustness of these findings with multiply imputed 
data and conclude from these results how privatization in campaign communication can be 
explained. 
7.1 Distributions of General Privatization 
Privatization is an important part of parties’ personalization strategies across countries and 
levels of government both in framing and content of campaign advertising. Personalized 
framing is more prevalent in TV than newspaper advertising. On average, parties choose to 
present political personae more often than not in privatized settings (nearly 60% on average), 
whereas nearly none of the newspaper advertising framing is privatized. This can on the one 
hand be explained by the fact that TV offers the possibility to change the scenery by cuts to 
include privatized settings more easily. Newspaper advertisements are limited in this regard. 
Parties tend to choose their corporate design or neutral backgrounds for newspaper advertising, 
which technically cannot be amended by cuts. On the other hand, moving pictures like on TV 
are more suitable to lively present candidates for example pursuing a hobby than a still depicted 
on the one-shot imagery of a newspaper ad. Regarding content, the distribution of privatization 
looks different. Where on average only 20% of TV advertising content of a party deals with 
candidates’ traits and the distribution is highly right-skewed, privatization is nearly uniformly 
distributed in newspaper advertising with an average proportion of 40%. This difference is most 
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likely due to the fact that newspaper advertising can be provided more easily than TV 
advertising by single candidates independently of their party’s support. Especially the open-list 
context of elections in Switzerland and Bavaria, where privatization can offer convenient 
unique selling points for candidates to differentiate themselves from their party comrades 
sharing the same political ideology and manifesto, provides strong incentives for privatization 
of political communication.  
 
Figure 7.1 Distributions of general privatization in TV and newspaper advertising  
Note: Means as dashed lines  
This argument is also supported by the distribution of privatization in newspaper advertising 
content by countries depicted in the bottom row of Figure 7.3. Swiss parties show the highest 
mean level of privatized content, followed by Germany (including Bavaria) and no privatized 
content in Spain. By contrast, the general observation that only a few parties choose to privatize 
their newspaper ads’ framing at all is visible throughout the countries under investigation; only 
some parties choose to do so and in Germany none of them (see Figure 7.3, top row).  
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Figure 7.2 Distributions of general privatization in TV advertising; framing and content by 
countries 
Note: Means as dashed lines  
The distribution of privatization in TV advertising’s framing shows a familiar “all or nothing” 
pattern. The majority of parties in Spain, Germany, and France choose to privatize all or none 
of their TV ads’ framing. Whether this is due to the high concentration of privatization on 
leadership candidates only useful for parties presenting candidates for executive positions in 
the presidentialized systems of these countries, combined with only weak incentives for 
Canadian parties to present other candidates exclusively (as seen in Canadian leadership 
personalization patterns in the last chapter), will be tested in the multivariate analysis below. 
The mean proportion of privatized content in TV advertising does not vary much between the 
countries under investigation. Germany’s mean proportion of 30% is followed by 20% for 
Canada and slightly over 10% for France and under 10% for Spain. Thus, privatizing TV 
advertisement content appears not to be a strategy widely spread in these countries. Only 
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German parties seem to consistently expect electoral gains from privatizing TV advertising’s 
content.  
From these country-specific patterns we cannot infer a systematic influence of media systems 
or other nation-wide factors on the use of general privatization. But does this also hold true for 
comparing levels of government? 
 
Figure 7.3 Distributions of general privatization in newspaper advertising; framing and 
content by countries 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
The distribution patterns of privatization in framing and content of TV advertising separated by 
levels of government presented in Figures 7.4 and 7.5 are inconclusive. Where the European 
level shows a clear tendency for privatization of TV content, followed by a near 50-50 split in 
national elections and a slight prevalence of non-privatization in regional elections, the order is 
turned on its head when looking at content, although with a much smaller range. The number 
of parties privatizing less than 40% of their TV advertising content increases from regional to 
national to European elections, leading to mean proportions of privatized TV content just above 
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30% (regional), just below 20% (national), and just over 10% (European), respectively. Parties 
in European elections seem to rely on privatized face recognition of popular, likable politicians 
in the quest for mobilization in these low-salience contests, but not on presenting their traits. In 
regional elections’ TV advertising, this pattern is reversed with more parties opting for (nearly) 
no privatization than for full privatization of advertising framing, but the (unimodal but wide) 
range of privatization proportions in regional TV advertising content shows a more 
differentiated picture. The national level takes a middle ground in both framing and content of 
advertising. Whether this national pattern represents a standard procedure of privatization 
visible throughout the party families and countries will be shown with the help of the statistical 
analyses below; at the moment, the descriptive picture does not allow systematic conclusions.  
 
Figure 7.4 Distributions of general privatization in TV advertising; framing and content by 
levels of government 
Note: Means as dashed lines  
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Figure 7.5 Distributions of general privatization in newspaper advertising; framing and 
content by levels of government 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
The inspection of newspaper advertising in Figure 7.5 does not even show clear mean 
differences in privatized framing between levels of government. An overwhelming majority of 
parties nearly or entirely do not privatizing their advertisement framing in regional and national 
campaigns leads to average privatization levels below 10%. The European level with 20% is 
slightly higher, but is also based on a much smaller number of observations and therefore has 
to be interpreted carefully. This necessity of caution with the interpretation of the framing 
patterns is also encouraged by the fact that the order of levels for privatized newspaper content 
compared to framing is again turned on its head as for TV advertising. With regard to content, 
the national level shows the highest average amount of privatization, followed by regional and 
last European campaign strategies. Interestingly, the distributions of content’s privatization 
proportions are much more uniform than the framing patterns would have one to expect. We 
can therefore conclude that although privatizing the framing of a whole newspaper ad is highly 
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uncommon on all levels of government, the parties competing on these levels do not at all 
refrain from complementing or spicing up their newspaper ads’ content by presenting 
candidates’ traits. Which factors are the most prevalent in explaining the individual party 
strategies’ amount of privatization will be derived from the following beta regression analyses. 
As in the previous chapters, I will look at the complete cases first and then test the robustness 
of these findings by applying the same model to a set of multiply imputed datasets. 
7.2 Complete Case Analysis of General Privatization 
Privatization as one facet of parties’ personalization strategy in election campaigning is not as 
prevalent as individualization. Nevertheless, we see considerable variation between and within 
electoral contexts and therefore have to conduct a multivariate regression analysis for this type 
of personalization as well. As for the other types of personalization analyzed until now, 
Bayesian beta regression promises the most insight into explaining the patterns of privatization 
described above. Therefore, I conducted a two-step analysis similar to the ones employed in the 
previous chapters (5 chains, 10,000 iterations of which 1,000 are burn-in both for the complete 
cases as well as the 20 multiple imputations, which are aggregated afterwards, including 
controls for countries, levels of government, and media outlet) to assess the explanatory power 
of the predictors theoretically expected to motivate personalization on behalf of party 
strategists. All tested predictors can theoretically be expected to contribute to privatization as a 
campaign strategy; there are hardly any factors which can be expected to theoretically 
contribute only marginally to privatization. When reviewing the main drivers of 
personalization, modernization, party competition, and institutions, we notice that all these 
concepts are related to privatization. However, the mediatization of political communication 
should be one of the main explanatory factors behind privatization. Disproportionate coverage 
of human interest stories with news value for an ever more commercializing media environment 
should motivate parties and their spin doctors to try and reap gains from this specific type of 
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personalization. Furthermore, the perceived complexity of politics should also generate a need 
for privatization as a heuristic for voters. The human mind is much better equipped to judge 
people than complex ideological or policy propositions and therefore responds positively to 
privatized information in election campaign communication, which should be anticipated by 
parties in the planning of their campaigns. Closely linked to this notion is the argument that 
privatization in a presidentialized system, where leading candidates compete for a median voter 
to secure their power, but are hardly distinguishable ideologically in this process, should resort 
to privatization, especially if they are also a member of or associated with a centrist party. 
Technically, a party also needs the material to start a privatized campaign. Incumbent parties 
offering candidates with a head start in recognition value as well as professionalized parties 
capable of managing a privatized campaign can be expected to systematically privatize their 
campaign to a larger extent than parties lacking these resources. And last but not least, populist 
candidates also benefit from projecting an image of themselves as “men (and women) of the 
people”. How many of these theoretically sound links between modernization, institutions, and 
party qualities however play out in the empirical investigation will be seen in the following 
analyses. 
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Table 7.1 Complete case and multiple imputation analyses of general privatization 
 CC framing 
(1) 
CC content 
(2) 
MI framing  
(3) 
MI content  
(4) 
beta 0 0.70 
(1.00) 
-1.57 
(0.94) 
-0.11 
(0.87) 
-1.43* 
(0.81) 
mediatization -0.12 
(0.35) 
0.32 
(0.28) 
-0.10 
(0.28) 
0.35 
(0.25) 
complexity -4.60* 
(2.61) 
1.92 
(2.52) 
-2.16 
(1.96) 
-0.16 
(2.00) 
elec. system 0.10 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
presidentialization -0.33 
(0.43) 
-1.08*** 
(0.37) 
-0.28 
(0.36) 
-0.27 
(0.32) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.56* 
(0.31) 
 
0.04 
(0.26) 
 
0.48* 
(0.25) 
 
-0.05 
(0.25) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-0.89 
(0.60) 
 
0.55 
(0.52) 
 
-0.88* 
(0.49) 
 
-0.11 
(0.44) 
centrism -0.04 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
populism (d) -0.02 
(0.42) 
0.32 
(0.41) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.36 
(0.36) 
professionalization  0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
incumbency (d) -0.15 
(0.30) 
-0.22 
(0.27) 
-0.33 
(0.25) 
0.14 
(0.27) 
 
France (d) 
 
-0.04 
(0.90) 
 
1.38* 
(0.78) 
 
-0.12 
(1.09) 
 
1.89* 
(1.12) 
Germany (d) -0.20 
(0.75) 
1.72** 
(0.70) 
0.70 
(0.76) 
0.98 
(0.75) 
Germany * newspaper 
(d) 
0.14 
(1.15) 
-0.86 
(0.98) 
-0.37 
(1.00) 
-1.22 
(0.95) 
Spain (d) -1.72 
(1.56) 
-0.37 
(1.48) 
-0.03 
(1.34) 
-1.18 
(1.28) 
Spain * newspaper (d) 0.42 
(1.23) 
-0.55 
(1.02) 
-0.14 
(1.05) 
-0.87 
(0.92) 
newspaper (d) -1.52 
(1.09) 
0.25 
(0.93) 
-0.78 
(0.98) 
0.79 
(0.90) 
European (d) 1.07 
(0.91) 
-1.45* 
(0.79) 
0.66 
(0.67) 
0.52 
(0.64) 
Regional (d) -0.15 
(0.42) 
-0.01 
(0.34) 
-0.13 
(0.32) 
0.16 
(0.32) 
N 143 143 254 254 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, ** c.i. > 95%, *** c.i. > 99% 
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Interestingly enough, we don’t find confirmation for any of the theoretical arguments presented 
above in the complete case analysis of general privatization as a campaign strategy. When 
looking at the results of the analysis in column 1 of Table 7.1, we must concede that the only 
strong significant effect, the one associated with complexity, points in the opposite direction of 
what we expected. Holding all other variables constant, a .1 increase in perceived complexity 
by the electorate results in a .46 decrease in the logged odds ratio of a party competing in this 
electorate’s arena to privatize the framing of their TV advertisements. This means if only 10% 
of the population increase their agreement with the statement that politics is so complicated that 
people like them do not know what is going on by one point on a 0 to 10 scale, the probability 
of a party privatizing its campaign’s content in this arena drops on average from 67% to 56%, 
a decrease of 11 percentage points. Of course this abstract notion is dependent on a lot of 
assumptions of neither party competition nor levels of mediatization or other contextual factors 
changing, but it illustrates the severity of this effect going against its theoretically postulated 
impact on privatization in TV advertising framing.  
The second significant effect, the interaction between presidentialization and running an 
executive candidate, points in the predicted direction. However, its composite effect taking the 
main effects of presidentialization and running an executive candidate into account does not 
lend unequivocal support to the interaction hypothesis 5.2. When calculating the composite 
effect of the interaction and its constitutive main effects, the change in probability of general 
privatization in TV advertising framing from not presenting a candidate in a system defined as 
fully presidentialized here (directly elected executive, strong executive, debate) versus doing 
so elicits a change from a 43% to a 62% probability of privatization, holding all other variables 
constant. However, this effect quickly shrinks to a difference between 57% (with candidate) 
and 51% (without candidate) for averagely presidentialized systems and is even inverted for 
systems with only one component of presidentialization (51% vs. 59%).  
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All the other predictors tested for influence on general privatization in campaign advertising 
framing prove not to contribute systematically to its explanation. Also, the separate analyses of 
TV and newspaper advertising do not show additional effects of the variables under 
investigation here (Appendix, Table A.7). The separate TV analysis shows no effects at all 
covering a credible interval over 90%, whereas the separate newspaper analysis shows negative 
influence of complexity as well as executive candidates, which are only partly countered by its 
positive interaction with presidentialization, and a strong influence of country-specific 
idiosyncrasies for Germany and Spain, as well as the European level. 
Also in advertising content, the predictor variables do not influence the levels of general 
privatization as expected (see Table 7.1, column 2). The only significant effect is a negative 
influence of presidentialization on general privatization. Its main effect predicts a mean drop in 
the probability of using privatization from 7% (only one component of presidentialization 
present) to under 1% (fully presidentialized). This drop is even aggravated (11% to 1.5%) when 
looking at the composite effect of presidentialization interacted with parties running an 
executive candidate. Part of the explanation for this pattern might lie in the significant 
confounding effects of country dummies for France and Germany, as well as European 
elections, all indicating the presence of idiosyncrasies (for example specific candidates 
especially respected, cherished or popular with the people) not covered by the theoretical 
predictor variables in the model. Disaggregating the analysis into separate analyses for TV and 
newspapers (Appendix, Table A.7) sheds a little more light on the underlying relations of the 
pooled analysis. While the TV analysis does not show any significant associations of predictors 
with the levels of general privatization, the negative effect of presidentialization and European 
elections is mainly due to its strong negative effect on newspaper content privatization. The 
positive influence of running an executive candidate and having a centrist ideological position 
on parties’ use of privatization found in newspaper advertisements is not reflected in the pooled 
model. 
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Generally speaking, the complete case analyses do not provide robust evidence for any one of 
the proposed factors having a consistent effect on general privatization. Even though the 
interaction of presidentialization with running an executive candidate systematically increases 
the level of privatization of a party’s campaign, the negative effect of presidentialization on 
privatizing newspaper advertising’s content contradicts this finding. If those rather meager 
results are a result of listwise deletion, or if they prevail after a robustness check, will be shown 
in the multiple imputation analysis in the following section.  
7.3 Imputation Analysis of General Privatization 
The results from the pooled analyses of 20 multiply imputed datasets presented in columns 3 
and 4 of Table 7.1 do not offer much additional information. In this robustness check, the 
interaction of presidentialization with running an executive candidate in combination with its 
constituent main effects predicts an increase in probability of a party privatizing its advertising 
framing from 31% (only one component of presidentialization present) to 40% (fully 
presidentialized). However, for parties not running a candidate, only an insignificant negative 
effect of presidentialization prevails. This pattern is mainly induced by the newspaper cases, 
although supported in part by TV cases as well, according to the separate analysis of these two 
media outlets (see Appendix, Table A.8). In the pooled imputation analysis of privatized 
content, no significant effect prevails. Although the unexpected negative effect of 
presidentialization is visible in a separate newspaper analysis and a negative interaction effect 
of presidentialization and executive candidates, combined with a negative main effect for 
candidates, can be found in TV analysis, they are not systematically strong enough to influence 
the pooled analysis of multiply imputed datasets. Whether this non-finding can be explained by 
counteracting influences on privatization for leadership and non-leadership candidates will be 
examined in chapter 8.  
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7.4 Discussion 
Although I theoretically expected all of the included parameters to contribute independently to 
the explanation of privatization in campaign communication, the empirical results did not show 
robust associations between operationalizations of modernization, institutions, and party 
competition. In general, the fact that privatization is a much more qualified approach to 
personalization leads to an overall lower level of its use and therefore also a reduced variance 
in its occurrence when compared to individualization. The benchmark for an ad or a quasi-
sentence to be counted as privatized does not only depend on a politician simply appearing, but 
also on an intentional addition of privatized context or information to it. Although we do not 
see systematic evidence for it in the pooled general analysis, we have indications from previous 
research (Holtz-Bacha, 2002; Gibson & Römmele, 2009) that fulfilling these additional 
information demands might be too challenging for parties not equipped with the necessary staff 
or funding. We will find indications for this notion in the analysis of leadership privatization in 
the next chapter. However, the variance in levels of general privatization visible between and 
within electoral arenas could not be systematically attributed to a robust set of predictors. Case-
specific idiosyncrasies like the suitability of a candidate for privatization (interesting career or 
hobbies, good looks, a presentable family, etc.), which could not be covered by or subsumed 
under incumbency, might have a much larger influence than systematic variation of the 
institutional and media environment parties face, as well as their qualities like 
professionalization, or their respective position in the ideological competition. What we can 
derive from the results in this chapter is the notion that executive candidates, who are most of 
the time part of the leadership of a party, can and do influence at least parts of privatization in 
campaign communication. Whether this special subset of candidates elicits different demands 
and readiness of their respective parties to work more with privatization will be the guiding 
question of the next chapter. 
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8. Explaining Leadership Privatization 
In the age of celebrity politics, party or political movement leaders are a theoretically and 
empirically crucial subset of political personae, which not only attract a considerable amount 
of media attention and campaign coverage in general (see chapters 4 and 6), but also are highly 
suitable for privatization. Domestic stories or other insights into the private lives and characters 
of the rich and famous are much more attractive for voters and the media than a backbenchers’ 
character, hobby, or private life (unless it has generated a veritable scandal) and therefore, also 
in campaign strategies, privatization concentrated on leadership makes up for a large proportion 
of privatization in general. Privatization aims to make the leadership candidates more 
approachable and likable, trying to capitalize on their favorable traits or other role-near or role-
distant attributes. This strategy should be most employed, as theoretically stated for general 
privatization above, in highly mediatized campaigns, and in contexts where people are also 
looking for a heuristic to cut short their information costs, i.e. in a political environment 
perceived as complex. It should also be employed most by professionalized parties with an 
apparatus capable of implementing a communication strategy of privatization directed at a 
professional media environment and able to assess and prevent its potential backlash. In 
addition to these explanatory factors expected to influence privatization in general (see previous 
chapter), the level of institutional presidentialization and its interplay with parties running a 
candidate for an executive position, especially for incumbents, and populism should all have a 
distinct additional effect on leadership privatization. Whether and to what extent centrism and 
the electoral system’s general suitability for PVEAs also influence leadership privatization will 
also be investigated in this chapter. For the analysis of this least common type of personalization 
strategies in election campaigns, I will also first look at the empirical distributions of the mean 
levels of leadership privatization by media outlet, countries, and levels of government, followed 
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by the established analyses of complete cases and the robustness checks of its results via 
multiple imputations. 
8.1 Distributions of Leadership Privatization 
As expected, the leadership privatization strategy is the empirically least common facet of 
personalization under investigation in this project. To classify an advertisement’s framing or 
content as privatized and concentrated on leadership, it has to fulfil additional quality criteria 
in comparison with individualization, namely dealing with political personae outside their 
functions as mere office-holders or their traits, while its focus on a theoretically and empirically 
important yet small subset of politicians, namely leaders, decreases its occurrence in the 
sampled election campaigns even further. 
 
Figure 8.1 Distributions of leadership privatization in TV and newspaper advertising 
Note: Means as dashed lines  
Figure 8.1 shows that the vast majority of parties use no leadership privatization in their 
campaign advertisements at all. Especially in TV content and newspaper framing only a slight 
minority of parties seem to think that presenting their leaders’ private qualities is a promising 
strategy at all to appeal to voters, resulting in mean leadership privatization levels below 10% 
in those two categories. For TV framing and newspaper content, the picture looks a bit different. 
On average parties personalize one quarter of their appeal concentrated on leadership as a 
framing strategy in their TV spots, which is still a clear minority, but shows enough variance 
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which might be systematically explainable in the remainder of this chapter. In newspaper 
content, although only a mean 20% of content is personalized, the distribution of leadership 
personalization shows cases on several levels, which can be attributed to different choices in 
campaign strategy by parties. 
 
Figure 8.2 Distributions of leadership privatization in TV advertising; framing and content by 
countries 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
In Figure 8.2, as seen in general privatization, most cases of leadership privatization of the 
entire TV advertising framing are observed in the presidentialized proportional representation 
systems of Spain and Germany. Their institutional concentration of personalization on the party 
leadership, which it does not have to share with district candidates, produces leadership 
privatization especially concentrated on the main parties’ leading candidates for chief executive 
office. France’s and especially Canada’s party strategists very rarely use this instrument. 
Contentwise, however, only Germany sticks out with a mean proportion of over 15% mean 
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leadership privatization. All other countries’ mean proportions are below 10% and it is 
questionable whether the outliers over 10% will be systematically explainable. 
 
Figure 8.3 Distributions of leadership privatization in newspaper advertising; framing and 
content by countries 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
In newspaper advertising (see Figure 8.3), Spain shows a similar pattern as on TV: More parties 
are using no leadership privatization than full leadership privatization in framing, however 
contentwise, leadership privatization is completely absent in Spain. In German newspaper 
advertisements, no privatized framing at all is recognizable, not even by parties running chief 
executive chancellor or prime-minister candidates. The German distribution of privatized 
newspaper content is similarly right-skewed as on TV, but not as dominated by the non-
privatizing cases. Switzerland shows a new pattern. Although privatized leadership framing is 
virtually absent, Swiss newspaper advertising campaigns show the largest mean proportion of 
leadership privatization of the countries under investigation (over one quarter). Apparently, 
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Swiss campaign planners do not dare to change the newspaper advertisings’ framing away from 
a neutral, professional, or corporate design background, but are well aware of the potential gains 
of talking about their party leaders’ traits (as they also do for their other candidates). 
 
Figure 8.4 Distributions of leadership privatization in TV advertising; framing and content by 
levels of government 
Note: Means as dashed lines  
When looking at the differences of mean leadership privatization and the cases’ distributions 
between levels of government, we see hardly any systematic variation between national, 
regional, and European campaigns on TV. The levels and patterns of privatized leadership 
framing show a ratio of about 5:1 of parties not privatizing at all vs. privatizing all TV 
advertising framing (with a nearly negligible amount of “outliers” in between) for all levels of 
government. TV advertising content only shows some leadership privatization on the regional 
level (a mere mean 15%), while on the national and European level an absence of leadership 
privatization clearly dominates the scene. In addition, for both TV categories framing and 
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content, the mean proportions are so close together that we can conclude that level of 
government does not seem to have any explanatory power on its own when it comes to 
leadership privatization on TV.  
 
Figure 8.5 Distributions of leadership privatization in newspaper advertising; framing and 
content by levels of government 
Note: Means as dashed lines 
For newspaper advertising, the situation is similar. Only a small number of parties under 
investigation here use privatized leadership framing at all, leading to rather coincidental 
differences in mean levels of privatization between European, national, and regional campaigns. 
Contentwise, the levels of government do not differ a lot either. Although the regional cases’ 
distribution is slightly less right-skewed than the national and European ones, their mean values 
are all located around 20%. So we can conclude the same for newspaper advertisements that 
we have observed before in the case of TV leadership privatization: The expected systematic 
influence of levels of government on the amount of leadership personalization used by parties 
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should be very limited. Leadership privatization, even more than general privatization, can 
therefore be expected to vary by partisan factors or institutional variation between elections, 
but not by second-order or “closeness to the people” patterns, which would predict visibly 
higher mean levels in regional or national elections, respectively.  
Whether we can derive explanatory approaches to patterns of leadership privatization from the 
limited variance presented in this section and which predictors are most useful in explaining 
these patterns will be shown in the following section, again by beta regression analysis of 
complete cases and robustness checks of multiply imputed datasets. 
8.2 Complete Case Analysis of Leadership Privatization 
As in the previous analyses of the facets of personalization in campaign communication, I will 
also rely on a full model including all potential predictors of personalization and consequently 
leadership privatization. The results in Table 8.1, columns 1 and 2, again stem from a Bayesian 
beta regression model based on the 143 complete cases available, using 5 chains with 10,000 
iterations each, 1,000 of which were discarded as burn-in. As stated earlier in this chapter, and 
similarly in the chapter dealing with leadership individualization, I am expecting a strong and 
consistent influence of institutional factors strengthening the chief executive on leadership 
privatization usage as a campaign strategy, even more so for parties running executive 
candidates. Also, mediatization is expected to contribute considerably to leadership 
privatization, as should do populism and party professionalization. The empirical results, 
however, only show two of the expected effects: A positive relationship of party 
professionalization with privatization of leadership-related advertising content and a positive 
effect on privatized leadership framing for parties in presidentialized systems running a 
candidate, but which only kicks in at a high level of presidentialization. The positive significant 
interaction effect on framing for parties running executive candidates in presidentialized 
systems, which we have been observing also for individualization, does not come as a surprise. 
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Having a candidate for executive office available in a system that vests substantial amounts of 
power in said executive clearly constitutes a reason for campaign strategists to promote these 
candidates not only with their political views or as representatives of a party, but also with their 
private qualities. When we look closer at the composite effect of the interaction of 
presidentialization with executive candidate and the respective main effects, we see that the 
positive effect of running a candidate indeed depends strongly on the level of 
presidentialization. For a fully presidentialized system (and all other covariates held at their 
means and the dummies at zero), running a candidate changes the probability of leadership 
privatization in the framing of a party’s campaign communication from 23% to 39%. However, 
in a moderately presidentialized system, running a candidate only increases said probability 
from 28% to 30%, and in systems with low levels of presidentialization, running a candidate 
even has a negative effect on leadership privatization (22% with candidate, 34% without). 
Similar patterns of influence on individualized leadership framing can also be found in both 
separate analyses of TV and newspaper advertising (see Appendix, Table A.9). The effects of 
the other predictors in the separate models are inconclusive, only populism has a positive effect 
on leadership privatization framing in newspapers, but this is cancelled out by an unexpected 
negative effect of populism on framing of TV advertising. So from the most stable effect of the 
present analyses we can conclude that the presence of a candidate alone does not make party 
strategists increase the proportion of leadership privatization in their party’s communication 
strategy, but the spoils to be gained from doing so, the executive offices on the line, have to be 
sufficiently valuable. Leadership privatization obviously comes at a cost.  
Although we do not see equivalent institutional effects on leadership privatization in advertising 
content as we have done for framing (on the contrary: We even find a negative main effect of 
presidentialization, which is not substantially affected by its interaction with running an 
executive candidate), another finding also points into the direction that leadership privatization 
requires preconditions besides executive candidates that not all parties have at their disposal. 
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Party professionalization15 has a significant impact on parties’ decisions on how much to 
privatize the content of their campaign communication. From a rationalist resource perspective, 
which assumes that a well-made and effective privatization campaign is costly, large, affluent, 
and well-staffed parties can more easily shoulder the demands for successful implementation 
of such a strategy, which makes it more likely for them to choose it. With a professionalized 
apparatus of public relations staff and disposable funds, it is easier for professionalized parties 
to coordinate their communication efforts in paid space (as seen here) and earned space, which 
is essential to creating a favorable image for their party leadership. Furthermore, this 
professional environment can also more easily provide all the necessary preparation and 
training needed for the candidate himself to make most out of his public appearances. The 
professionalization effect is visible for both newspaper and TV advertising (see Appendix, 
Table A.9). However, it is more pronounced in newspapers, where it is also complemented by 
positive effects of mediatization and complexity, whereas centrism systematically decreases the 
amount of leadership privatization used in newspaper campaign communication content.  
  
                                               
15 In the complete case analyses professionalization is measured approximately by a party’s vote share, which is 
reasonably correlated (r=.58) with the sum of the campaign budget per 10 voters and the number of full-time party 
employees per 1 million voters used in the imputation analysis.  
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Table 8.1 Complete case and multiple imputation analyses of leadership privatization 
 CC framing 
(1) 
CC content 
(2) 
MI framing  
(3) 
MI content  
(4) 
beta 0 -0.33 
(1.04) 
-2.83*** 
(0.90) 
-0.33 
(0.83) 
-2.81*** 
(0.71) 
mediatization 0.03 
(0.33) 
-0.01 
(0.28) 
-0.09 
(0.25) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
complexity -2.71 
(2.72) 
1.66 
(2.30) 
-2.35 
(1.89) 
0.75 
(1.54) 
elec. system 0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
presidentialization -0.30 
(0.41) 
-0.67** 
(0.37) 
-0.34 
(0.32) 
-0.41 
(0.27) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.73** 
(0.31) 
 
0.24 
(0.25) 
 
0.54** 
(0.24) 
 
0.25 
(0.20) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-1.32** 
(0.60) 
 
-0.10 
(0.48) 
 
-0.87* 
(0.45) 
 
-0.06 
(0.38) 
centrism 0.00 
(0.07) 
-0.09 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
populism (d) -0.28 
(0.42) 
0.27 
(0.35) 
-0.28 
(0.31) 
0.13 
(0.27) 
professionalization  0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
incumbency (d) -0.09 
(0.29) 
-0.30 
(0.25) 
-0.13 
(0.24) 
-0.19 
(0.23) 
 
France (d) 
 
-0.10 
(0.87) 
 
0.72 
(0.76) 
 
0.19 
(0.83) 
 
0.03 
(1.12) 
Germany (d) -0.30 
(0.75) 
0.64 
(0.69) 
-0.35 
(0.70) 
0.57 
(0.62) 
Germany * newspaper 
(d) 
0.51 
(1.11) 
-0.32 
(0.94) 
0.95 
(0.92) 
-0.76 
(0.80) 
Spain (d) -0.82 
(1.64) 
0.03 
(1.40) 
-0.87 
(1.29) 
0.06 
(1.02) 
Spain * newspaper (d) 0.86 
(1.21) 
-0.68 
(1.03) 
0.88 
(1.01) 
-0.73 
(0.80) 
newspaper (d) -0.97 
(1.07) 
0.55 
(0.93) 
-1.09 
(0.90) 
0.78 
(0.77) 
European (d) 0.48 
(0.84) 
-0.57 
(0.73) 
0.10 
(0.56) 
-0.14 
(0.52) 
Regional (d) 0.09 
(0.42) 
0.53 
(0.32) 
-0.03 
(0.30) 
0.26 
(0.25) 
N 143 143 254 254 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, ** c.i. > 95%, *** c.i. > 99% 
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So after reviewing the complete cases’ evidence for leadership privatization we can ascertain 
that a resource-based approach also best explains parties’ choices for a privatization strategy 
concentrated on leadership, as we have seen for leadership individualization. Neither a party’s 
position in the political competition, which might require additional information or appeal to 
be communicated for the unique selling point, nor context modernization (although complexity 
and mediatization do influence newspaper content) plays the decisive role here. It is the 
interplay of presidentialized institutions with availability of an executive candidate as a 
leadership figure and carrier of privatized communication (especially for framing), and the 
financial and professional resources of a party to carry out a privatized campaign (especially 
for content), which determine levels of leadership privatization in election campaign 
communication most consistently. 
But as we have seen in chapter 4, privatization is by no means limited to party leadership. Only 
a minority of parties, mostly found in Spain or on the European level, limits their privatization 
efforts in campaign communication to trying to capitalize on a favorable image of their 
leadership alone. Also non-leadership candidates’ traits and private images promise electoral 
success for the parties and candidates able to effectively apply them. Privatized information can 
complement, amplify, or compensate for a lack of ideological appeal. And since judging people 
is easier for the human mind than judging policies, it is very suitable as a heuristic for making 
a decision about whom to vote for. Furthermore, presenting privatized information of partisans 
besides the leadership can work as a concession to the different wings or subgroups of the party, 
and this comes with a potential gain in widening its appeal to subgroups of the electorate. Also, 
presenting privatized party dissenters at the ideological fringes of a party can counter populist 
claims of cartelization and increase a party’s unique selling point without compromising its 
overall centrist policy position. And in addition to these centrally steered strategic reasons for 
non-leadership privatization, one also has to take the motivated and well-funded individual 
candidates facing an open list into account, whose motivation to cultivate a personal vote we 
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already discussed in chapter 6 when talking about non-leadership individualization. These 
candidates can and should use privatization to cultivate a personal vote, which is mainly 
motivated by party-system characteristics, namely open lists paired with large district 
magnitudes. Therefore, I expect the factors structuring and measuring party and candidate 
competition to be most prominent in explaining non-leadership privatization: Electoral systems 
with open lists, which pit party comrades against each other and increase the necessity to create 
a unique selling point via a personal vote for individual candidates, should produce more non-
leadership privatization than electoral systems based on closed lists. This effect of electoral 
systems, paired with the overall perceived complexity of politics in an arena should also 
motivate party strategists of all parties in the same situation to offer a similar amount of 
privatization as a heuristic as well as a media-friendly form of communication. To account for 
intra-party variance in non-leadership privatization, I expect centrism and party 
professionalization as well as incumbency status to play a major role. 
The empirical explanatory power of factors determining if a party also uses privatization to 
promote their legislative candidates further down the list can be read from Table 8.2. Consistent 
patterns explaining the use of privatized framing in advertising non-leadership candidates, 
however, cannot be found in the complete case analysis presented in column 1. The separate 
analyses of TV and newspaper advertising also fail to produce the expected patterns of 
explaining non-leadership privatization in advertising framing (see Appendix, Table A.11). 
This is most likely due to the high level of diversity in this non-leadership group of candidates 
subsumed into one analysis, leading to competing mechanisms for explaining the rather small 
overall variance in levels of non-leadership individualization between the party sections under 
investigation here. 
The empirical palette of candidates in this category includes selected mediagenic party soldiers 
for illustration purposes, ministers from the second row, and candidates investing a considerable 
amount of private money into promoting their individual candidacy independently of the party 
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apparatus, but not independent of its ideology and label. Where professionalization and the 
resulting elaborate public relations tactics might play the decisive role for including a 
backbencher candidate as a mere character for advertising a party’s concern for the “common 
man”, depicting private pictures of popular and well-known ministers or vice-leaders of the 
party should be motivated more by a party’s need for enhancing their unique selling point 
derived from ideological centrality. And if an individual candidate’s self-paid privatized picture 
is used to try and convey this candidate’s appeal to the voters, the electoral system with small 
districts or open lists can be expected to contribute most to the decision of that candidate to 
privatize his or her advertising’s framing16, shaping his party’s overall level of non-leadership 
privatization. However, all these effects taken for themselves do not systematically contribute 
to an explanation of non-leadership privatization in advertising framing. Also, as more and 
more of these decentralized campaign efforts of individual candidates are now moved to 
electronic and social media, the present analysis based on TV and newspaper advertising 
struggles with the establishment of systematic predictors of non-leadership privatization, even 
aggravated by facing this diverse category of non-leaders.  
  
                                               
16 The latter pattern is especially visible in Switzerland, where candidate-centered support committees play a large 
and decentralized role in campaign financing, therefore shaping a party’s overall appearance in the media’s paid 
space. 
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Table 8.2 Complete case and multiple imputation analyses of non-leadership privatization 
 CC framing 
(1) 
CC content 
(2) 
MI framing  
(3) 
MI content  
(4) 
beta 0 -0.12 
(1.08) 
-1.38 
(0.82) 
-1.19 
(0.83) 
-1.05 
(0.77) 
mediatization -0.13 
(0.33) 
0.11 
(0.27) 
0.05 
(0.26) 
0.15 
(0.23) 
complexity -2.18 
(2.77) 
-2.36 
(2.08) 
0.17 
(1.86) 
-1.94 
(1.62) 
elec. system 0.00 
(0.09) 
0.12* 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
presidentialization -0.07 
(0.41) 
-0.11 
(0.34) 
0.09 
(0.32) 
0.17 
(0.31) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
-0.13 
(0.30) 
 
-0.24 
(0.26) 
 
-0.01 
(0.26) 
 
-0.37 
(0.23) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
0.35 
(0.60) 
 
0.10 
(0.49) 
 
-0.13 
(0.51) 
 
-0.20 
(0.42) 
centrism -0.06 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
populism (d) 0.21 
(0.41) 
0.49 
(0.37) 
0.33 
(0.32) 
0.32 
(0.34) 
professionalization  -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
incumbency (d) -0.07 
(0.30) 
0.61** 
(0.25) 
-0.25 
(0.24) 
0.47* 
(0.25) 
 
France (d) 
 
0.04 
(0.87) 
 
0.19 
(0.75) 
 
-0.33 
(1.07) 
 
1.01 
(0.92) 
Germany (d) -0.31 
(0.77) 
0.04 
(0.64) 
0.68 
(0.74) 
-0.16 
(0.65) 
Germany * newspaper 
(d) 
-0.01 
(1.17) 
-0.74 
(0.93) 
-1.04 
(0.97) 
-0.37 
(0.93) 
Spain (d) -1.30 
(1.66) 
-2.11* 
(1.25) 
0.61 
(1.27) 
-2.08* 
(1.11) 
Spain * newspaper (d) -0.20 
(1.22) 
0.21 
(0.95) 
-0.78 
(0.98) 
0.11 
(0.89) 
newspaper (d) -0.75 
(1.12) 
-0.48 
(0.86) 
0.30 
(0.94) 
-0.17 
(0.86) 
European (d) 0.70 
(0.87) 
-0.16 
(0.75) 
0.77 
(0.63) 
0.74 
(0.65) 
Regional (d) -0.21 
(0.42) 
-0.09 
(0.33) 
-0.01 
(0.29) 
0.05 
(0.30) 
N 143 143 254 254 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, ** c.i. > 95%, *** c.i. > 99% 
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Yet when inspecting the complete cases’ advertising content in column 2 of Table 8.2, we 
indeed find scattered evidence for the theoretical expectations presented above. The electoral 
system’s conduciveness for personal vote-earning attributes, with which non-leaders have to 
deal immediately, unlike their indirectly or separately elected leaders, has a measurable 
independent effect on a party’s probability of having privatized campaign content tailored to 
their non-leaders. Whether this is intended by a centrally organized strategy group in the party’s 
headquarters or is a by-product of motivated and invested individual candidates cannot be 
conclusively verified from this analysis, but theoretical considerations point to the latter. Also, 
parties which are part of the sitting government tend to privatize more content ascribed to their 
non-leadership candidates than opposition parties. This pattern is even more pronounced in the 
separate analysis of newspaper advertisement’s privatized content attributed to non-leaders. 
There, we also find significant positive effects of programmatic centrism as well as populism, 
but a negative effect of party’s professionalization. So the theoretical expectations of open lists 
combined with large district magnitudes motivating non-leaders to privatize their advertising 
strategy is at least confirmed for content, as well as a larger proportion of governing parties’ 
privatized advertising content due to a larger pool of more easily recognizable candidates for 
incumbents. 
Again, when taking the explanatory patters for leadership and non-leadership privatization 
together, not all hypotheses proposed to influence personalization do find support for this facet 
of personalization. Mediatization, theoretically a strong predictor of privatization, surprisingly 
did not show an influence on leadership or on non-leadership privatization in this complete case 
analysis, and neither did complexity. The need for media appeal or heuristics leadership 
privatization could supply apparently is satisfied with its application to executive candidates in 
presidentialized systems by a professionalized party apparatus. The electoral system, by 
contrast, showed its hypothesized effect on increasing non-leadership privatization. The more 
the electoral formula requires personal vote earning attributes for a candidate to be successful, 
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the more these attributes were transported via non-leadership privatization. Ideological centrism 
as well as populism did also not contribute independently to explaining leadership or non-
leadership privatization in the pooled analysis. The effect of ideological centrism based on the 
need for an enhanced unique selling point most likely is covered up in a similar way by the 
interaction of presidentialization and running an executive candidate as mediatization’s and 
complexity’s. Populism only has the hypothesized positive effect on personalization in the 
subdomain of non-leadership privatization in newspaper content, which is not systematically 
visible in the pooled analysis. Finally, privatization of leadership and non-leadership 
incumbents shows a similar pattern as for individualization. Where no independent influence 
of incumbency can be traced for leadership privatization, non-leadership candidates expect to 
profit from their face recognition and track record known to the public and therefore privatize 
their appearance in advertising content accordingly. As for leadership individualization, the 
non-influence of incumbency on leadership privatization is not surprising insofar as opposition 
party strategists most likely in the course of a pre-campaign or via other communication efforts 
try to ensure that the potential deficit in popularity of their leadership candidates are evened out 
before the campaign starts and therefore not allow the incumbents to systematically gain from 
their respective popularity advantage.  
If the findings presented in this chapter are robust or a product of listwise deletion used for the 
complete case analysis will be checked one last time by analyzing multiple imputed datasets 
for all relevant parties. 
8.3 Imputation Analysis of Leadership Privatization 
The robustness check employed for the leadership (and non-leadership) privatization patterns 
found in the complete case analysis above follows the same procedure as in the chapters before. 
The same multivariate Bayesian beta regression analysis with 20 imputed datasets was 
conducted and aggregated to find out if the findings in the complete datasets are or are not the 
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result of listwise deletion. In general, the imputation analyses confirm the findings from the 
previous section. 
First and foremost, the composite effect of presidentialization, running an executive candidate, 
and their interaction shows a similar pattern in imputation as in complete cases. Where running 
a candidate increases the chance of privatized leadership-centered communication from 21% to 
35% in highly presidentialized systems, this increase drops to 27% to 31% for medium 
presidentialization, and for low presidentialization it is turned on its head (34% for not running 
to 27% for running) as in the complete case analysis, which leads me to the conclusion that the 
observations of the last section are robust in this regard: Leadership privatization is a strategy 
only employed when parties have a presentable candidate at hand and when the office at stake 
is important (=presidentialized) enough to invest considerable resources in this strategy. This 
interplay of election-level and party-specific predictors is also the most relevant in both separate 
imputation analyses of TV and newspaper advertising (and largely outweighs the nearly 
insignificant positive effect of the electoral system and the negative effect of populism in 
newspaper advertising framing, see Appendix, Table A.12).  
The notion of leadership privatization being a costly strategy is also confirmed by the robust 
positive effect party professionalization has on privatization of leadership-featuring advertising 
content. As seen in the complete case analyses, parties with more resources at hand tend to more 
often use displays of leaders’ traits as a campaign strategy in the content of their advertising. 
This effect is even stronger in the imputation analysis. The negative effect of presidentialization 
on advertising content is smaller than in the complete case analysis and does not show a credible 
interval greater than 90% or higher. Neither does the negative effect of ideological centrism 
visible in the separate analysis of privatized leadership content in newspaper advertising (see 
Appendix, Table A.10) influence the pooled analysis significantly. 
The imputation analysis of privatization attributed to non-leaders in columns 3 and 4 of Table 
8.2 also largely confirms the findings and non-findings of the respective complete case 
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analyses. The pooled multiple imputation analysis of privatized framing of non-leaders also 
shows no consistent associations of the tested variables with this campaign strategy. This 
pattern is also mirrored by both separate analyses of non-leadership privatization in TV and 
newspaper advertising’s framing (see Appendix, Table A.12).  
When looking for explanations for why parties privatize advertising content with non-leaders’ 
traits, only the effect of incumbency is robust. The effect of the electoral system, mainly 
attributed to individual candidates’ influence on newspaper advertising (which also cannot be 
traced any more in the separate newspaper analysis), does not provide a credible interval over 
90% in the multiple imputation analyses. Other factors like centrism and populism having a 
significant positive influence on newspaper advertising privatization of non-leaders do not 
appear in the pooled analysis of Table 8.2, column 4. But incumbency, as stated before, is still 
influential after controlling for the influence of the listwise deletion. 
8.4 Discussion  
Leadership privatization is indeed not only a subset of general privatization, but even more a 
qualified subset of leadership individualization. Similar explanatory factors influence the 
presentation of party leaders as individuals as well as in private settings or concentrated on their 
traits. As with leadership individualization, the application of leadership privatization by parties 
seems to follow a rational calculation of expenses and expected revenue in attention and 
consequently votes. If parties have an executive candidate at hand and they expect this 
candidate to win in a highly presidentialized system and consequently a highly prized office, 
they tend to present this leading candidate more often to the voters in a privatized setting. And 
if the party running these candidates is also sufficiently professionalized, i.e. has monetary 
funds and professional staff at its disposal, the content of their advertising efforts can also be 
expected to show more privatization.  
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The picture is not as clear for non-leadership candidates though. Whereas no systematic 
explanation of non-leadership framing in campaign communication can be detected, the content 
of election advertisements only shows systematically higher levels of privatization related to 
non-leaders of incumbent parties. This does not come as too much of a surprise – after all, 
incumbent parties have a much greater reservoir of well-known candidates who they can present 
in privatized settings and reap benefits from their respective recognition values.  
The absence or invisibility of other explanations for non-leadership privatization in the pooled 
analysis is mainly due to three factors. First, the production and therefore also the internal 
partisan planning of TV advertising is highly centralized. Non-leaders can seldom have an 
impact on the strategic use of privatization in this media outlet and even less hope to be the 
featured face or character. Second, even if party rank and file can influence the content of their 
party’s advertising strategy, namely by independently running a less costly and less regulated 
newspaper advertisement, the framing of these ads is still mostly under the control of the party’s 
strategy committee. Not only politically, but also from a marketing perspective, parties provide 
a corporate identity and oblige candidates who want to use this CI to also stick to a corporate 
design which seldom allows for privatized framing even of newspaper advertisements. Third, 
the group of non-leaders itself is very heterogeneous. It includes party soldiers from the 
backbenches as well as ministers or whips from the second row and well-funded individual 
candidates whose motivations for presenting privatized framing and content linked to their 
personae differ starkly. Clues for the pertinence of these three factors can be made out in the 
separate analysis of newspaper advertising’s content. There the suitability of the electoral 
systems for personal vote earning, a factor clearly related to individual candidates competing 
not only against other parties, but also against their comrades on the same list, has a significant 
positive effect. 
Relating these findings to the main drivers of personalization media suitability, contributing to 
a unique selling point, and its readiness to provide heuristics, we cannot reject either of them to 
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motivate party strategists to privatize electoral advertising. All these factors are motivating the 
use of leadership privatization by parties running executive candidates in presidentialized 
systems. Media attention is guaranteed to focus on frontrunner candidates, their characteristics 
can help in enhancing an ideologically centrist and therefore hardly distinguishable unique 
selling point, and the leading candidates can and do also work as heuristics to ease the decision 
making for or against a political force for less motivated, less informed, or cognitively less 
capable voters. In addition, the heuristic value and an enhancement of the unique selling point 
can also be achieved by privatizing non-leadership candidates’ appearance when they face an 
electoral system conducive to cultivating a personal vote. However, these favorable conditions 
can be used best by parties equipped with the necessary resources (funds, staff, incumbents), 
supporting our notion that privatization, as personalization in general, is a campaign strategy 
chosen by rational actors for expected political gains. 
So what does all this mean for the study of personalization as a campaign strategy? In the next 
chapter, I will summarize the findings of the thesis and derive their implications for the future 
study of personalization as a campaign strategy, as well as how personalization of campaign 
communication could affect the quality of democracy. 
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9. Conclusion 
What have we learned about the personalization of campaign communication? First of all, the 
personalization of politics in general and the personalization of campaign advertising framing 
and content in particular is no monolithic phenomenon. And related to that, only the effects of 
specific groups of explanatory variables theorized to increase or decrease the proportion of 
personalization in campaign communication are found influential throughout the different 
facets of personalization.  
As I have discussed in the previous chapters, personalization has to be theoretically as well as 
empirically differentiated on two dimensions. The mere mentioning or depicting of a candidate 
or other political personae labeled individualization shows different patterns than privatization, 
the more qualified featuring of politicians as private actors. And also different mechanisms are 
at work when parties choose to personalize the appearance of political personae in general, 
called general personalization, or party leaders, labelled leadership personalization. Although I 
theoretically expected independent influence on the occurrence of all subtypes of 
personalization as a campaign strategy by four distinct sets of factors, namely media suitability, 
the need for heuristics, centripetal or even cartelized party competition, and institutions, a much 
smaller subset emerged as especially powerful in explaining each subtype.  
Analyzing the variance of mean personalization levels per party in various electoral arenas has 
also shown that the level of personalization cannot be attributed only to macro- or meso-level 
context factors. Not all parties react with personalization to a mediatized campaign environment 
or a presidentialized institutional setup. Each party’s qualities on the lower level of analysis 
also have to be taken into account when explaining its use of personalization. The parties’ 
position in the ideological competition, whether they run candidates for executive office, and 
their resources also determine the use of this specific strategy in election campaigns. And 
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especially the interplay between factors on both levels, here presidentialization and running an 
executive candidate, provided the most robust insight into patterns of personalization. 
In this chapter, I will summarize the results of the analyses in the light of the four main drivers 
of personalization theorized above, namely modernization, institutions, party competition, and 
party resources, then discuss the impact of personalization on the quality of democracy, and 
present avenues for further research in technologically and socially ever faster changing 
societies.  
9.1 Explaining Personalization as a Campaign Strategy  
In this study, four subtypes of personalization (general individualization, leadership 
individualization, general privatization, leadership privatization) have been analyzed separately 
with distinct results, but there are also commonalities in explaining the occurrence of these 
types of personalization. General individualization, the most overarching type of 
personalization, is mainly advanced by parties competing in arenas where politics is perceived 
as complex by the voters. Here parties apparently use personalization to offer a heuristic 
information shortcut to the voters when they have to make the complex decision on whom to 
vote for. Candidates are presented as easily accessible commodity packages of political 
information, whose assessment and evaluation is a task the human mind is much better equipped 
to perform than analyzing complex political proposals less and less based on ideology. The 
second strongest factor explaining general individualization is an interaction effect of the 
macro-level with a party feature on the micro-level of analysis: Parties which run executive 
candidates in highly presidentialized systems individualize a larger proportion of their 
campaign communication, especially on TV. This can be counted as evidence for the rationality 
of party strategists. After an assessment of the institutional environment (presidentialization 
produces media attention on persons as well as centripetal ideological competition and it tenders 
a powerful office as the price) and their own resources (a candidate running for executive 
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office), party strategists make a rational decision to personalize their appeal in campaigns and 
reap the benefits offered by the favorable conditions. This interaction effect also 
quintessentially shows that one has to consider the interplay of the electoral arena’s framework 
with the qualities of parties competing in it when looking for predictors of personalization. 
However, the evidence of partisan qualities on the lower level of analysis independently 
influencing levels of general individualization is not as systematically visible as the macro- and 
interaction effects. The multiple imputation analysis of general individualization on the one 
hand shows a small but significant positive influence of a party’s ideological closeness to the 
center of the respective competition space on the occurrence of personalization in advertising 
framing. This is evidence for a strategic use of individualization aiming at adding to a party’s 
unique selling point in a centripetal competition. Parties competing for the median voter are 
rather hard to distinguish ideologically from one another, so their strategy to appear as a real 
alternative (especially on TV) is more and more based on personae the closer they get to the 
center of party competition. On the other hand, multiple imputation analysis also uncovers a 
theoretically unexpected negative effect of populism on general individualization. All other 
predictors theoretically expected to influence general individualization did not show 
empirically robust links to it. So the big picture of general individualization confirms the 
complexity hypothesis as well as the interaction hypothesis of presidentialization with running 
an executive candidate, and partly the centrism hypothesis. Consequentially, heuristics and a 
rational cost–benefit analysis, complemented by the willingness to make a party’s unique 
selling point more visible, are the main drivers for this form of personalization in the sample 
under investigation. These patterns are found across all countries and levels of government 
under investigation; only Spanish TV advertising shows a systematically higher proportion of 
general individualization not explained by the theorized predictors. 
Leadership individualization, the subset of individualization defined as party frontrunners’ 
mere appearance in campaign advertising, is nearly exclusively driven by the interaction of 
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presidentialization with running an executive candidate. No other predictors, be they contextual 
or partisan, have a comparably stable influence on the use of leadership individualization in 
framing or content of campaign communication. Only the complete case analysis shows 
complementary explanatory power of the complexity of the electoral arena perceived by the 
voters and the professionalization of the party apparatus. Featuring party leaders as an 
enhancement or replacement for programmatic appeal is not surprisingly structured mainly by 
the utility of this strategy offered by the institutional framework. Although heuristic 
complexity-reduction goals might also motivate parties as well as their ability to field a 
professional leadership individualized campaign, the institutional setup uniting media 
suitability arguments and prestructuring centripetal party competition is most influential in 
explaining leadership individualization. In addition, individualized content concentrated on 
leadership is more likely to occur on Spanish TV and in newspaper advertisements in general.  
Individualization featuring non-leaders shows nearly no explanatory empirical regularities. 
With the exception of parties’ centrism increasing a party’s propensity to individualize non-
leadership advertising content, no other systematic influence can be made out in the analysis. 
So for leadership individualization, we can also confirm the interaction hypothesis of 
presidentialization with running an executive candidate. The complexity hypothesis only finds 
support in the leadership framing analysis of complete cases, as does the centrism hypothesis 
for non-leadership content. 
While the analysis of general privatization in chapter 7 does not provide us with robustly 
interpretable explanatory patterns, leadership privatization analyzed in chapter 8 again can be 
mainly attributed to the presence of executive candidates in presidentialized systems for 
framing, combined with party professionalization producing an increase in leadership 
privatization of campaign content. These patterns also indicate a rather sober cost–benefit 
analysis underlying the choice for leadership privatization by parties. If there is an executive 
candidate available in a presidentialized system and the party has enough organizational and 
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financial resources at hand, it resorts to privatized content concentrated on leadership. 
Privatization of non-leaders, however, appears to be based on a more mixed logic of candidates 
increasing their own unique selling points in personalization-friendly electoral systems and 
making use of their incumbency advantage. 
So we can conclude that, against the theoretical expectations formalized in the hypotheses of 
chapter 2, there is no overarching factor fostering all facets of personalization in a similar way. 
Therefore, we can only give tentative answers to the question of which hypotheses to reject and 
which to uphold.  
After reviewing the empirical evidence for the different subgroups of personalization I can 
conclude that also this study, in accordance with its comparative predecessors (Kriesi, 2012; 
Karvonen, 2010), provides only mixed evidence for an overarching “personalization 
hypothesis” (Adam & Maier, 2010) based on modernist macro-arguments. Mediatization, 
theoretically an integral part of societal change brought forward by modernization theorists 
believed to increase the appeal and utility of personalization as a campaign strategy, shows no 
robust patterns of systematically influencing the personalization of election campaigns. Only in 
the complete case analysis of leadership privatization in newspaper advertisements can a 
significant influence be made out, which admittedly is in line with theoretical expectations of 
stronger mediatization influence on privatization concentrated on leadership than 
individualization or general personalization, but does not withstand the robustness check of 
multiple imputation analyses and therefore could also be attributed to undue bias of listwise 
deletion. Furthermore, even if one attributed the variance between countries captured by the 
control variables exclusively to their media systems, there are no indications that the parties 
competing in the liberal media system of Canada on average show more personalization than 
their counterparts in the democratic-corporatist systems of Germany and Switzerland or even 
the polarized-pluralist systems of France and Spain. Mediatization hypothesis 1 therefore has 
to be rejected on the grounds of the results obtained in this study. Complexity is the second 
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facet of modernization theorized to foster political personalization in general and campaign 
personalization in particular. Although the increasing complexity of societal processes 
attributed to modernization, as well as these processes’ organization, of which politics and 
election campaigns are an integral part, has its role in predicting personalized campaign 
communication, it is not decisive for every subtype of personalization in the media outlets under 
investigation. We only find tentative evidence for complexity hypothesis 2 in the analyses of 
individualization, but not for privatization.  
Advocates of the modernization and mediatization thesis might argue that the cross-sectional 
design of this study is a shortcoming when analyzing modernization effects, putting too high 
requirements on their detection and because a comparison of the different cases over time is not 
possible. This shortcoming, however, is alleviated by using disaggregated measurements for 
mediatization and complexity, the theoretically influential facets of macro-modernity, instead 
of approximating it by time. Measuring variance in mediatization and perceived complexity 
directly, instead of using time as an auxiliary variable, as has been done in most other studies, 
should produce effects theoretically more sound than time alone. And although it can be 
discussed if the measurement of mediatization employed here can’t be replaced by another 
operationalization, the fact that we do not find any robust independent mediatization effects in 
any of the empirical analyses probably speaks more about the inaccuracy of the mediatization 
hypothesis than this study’s design.  
Unlike modernization, institutional arrangements turned out to be the class of variables most 
influential in explaining personalization in this study. This is in line with Rahat and Sheafer’s 
(2007) insight that the adoption of electoral institutions conducive to personalization, like direct 
executive elections, primaries, debates, and open lists, temporally precede all other forms of 
personalization, namely in campaign and voter behavior. After naively reviewing the empirical 
evidence of this study one might add that they also theoretically precede and empirically 
supersede the other explanations for personalization. However, it is not the institutions per se 
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which affect every party to the same degree, but the parties’ strategic positions in these 
institutions which yield the most explanatory benefit. Especially, but not only, the level of 
leadership personalization a party employs in its campaign, be it individualized or privatized, 
is most constantly positively influenced by the interaction effect of presidentialization (context) 
and running an executive candidate (partisan). Hypothesis 5.2 therefore finds the most support 
in the analysis of personalization presented here. Neither presidentialization alone nor running 
an executive candidate per se show systematic influence on personalization, therefore the 
unqualified presidentialization hypothesis 4 as well as the executive candidate hypothesis 5.1 
have to be rejected.  
The electoral system of a given electoral arena which also affects all parties to the same degree 
only sporadically influences the level of personalization employed by parties competing in 
those arenas, namely only when looking at the complete case analysis of non-leadership-related 
privatized content. The electoral system hypothesis 3 therefore can only be upheld for this facet 
of personalization. From examining this group of variables we can conclude that not the 
institutional arrangements per se influence levels of personalization. In addition, parties need 
favorable assets and a certain position in the respective competition to assess personalization 
as a worthwhile strategy to attract voters and consequently implement it. So what are these 
assets and strategic positions exactly? 
As we have seen in the first sections of chapters 5 to 8, the amount of personalization in 
campaign advertising not only varies between electoral arenas, but also the different parties 
within a certain arena show considerable variation when it comes to the application of 
personalization as a campaign strategy. Whether a party is running an executive candidate or 
not, as seen above in conjunction with presidentialization, systematically influences the levels 
of personalization as theoretically expected. And also a party’s position in the ideological space 
has an independent effect on whether personalization is chosen by party strategists to 
communicate their bid for votes. However, this factor’s influence is more often than not 
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superimposed or absorbed by the presentation of an executive candidate. Here we have the 
empirical problem that three party qualities often coincide: Large parties (1), who tend to be in 
the center of ideological party competition (2), tend to field executive candidates (3) more often 
than small parties on the extremes. Yet in addition to the executive candidate effects, we see 
independent influence of ideological centrism on some aspects of campaign personalization. 
Centrist parties more often generally individualize their communication’s framing, as we can 
see in the multiple imputation analysis, and also more readily individualize content presented 
by or related to non-leaders, as seen both in the complete cases and the multiple imputation 
analysis. Privatization, however, is not significantly associated with ideological centrism. These 
findings indicate that personalization is not systematically replacing policy and parties in 
political advertising, but rather complementing them. Individualization, which was defined as 
depicting or mentioning a political person as an actor or object in an advertisement, is indeed 
observably linked to political centrism, measured directly via a party’s political position as well 
as indirectly by running an executive candidate, but by definition here is more of a packaging 
for other information than information per se. Privatization, however, was defined as depicting 
politicians as private people with family or pursuing a hobby, or presenting their traits instead 
of ideological or policy positions. This qualification makes it the subtype of personalization 
more likely to replace instead of complement genuine political information. But since we do 
not see an association of centrism with this type of personalization, we can conclude that 
personalization is rather used by party strategists to package political information more 
appealingly and thereby also define their unique selling point more clearly, but not as a 
replacement for ideology, party, and policy. The centrism hypothesis 6 therefore finds tentative 
support, but further research will be necessary to uncover the different chicken-and-egg 
problems surrounding the relationship between centrism, running an executive candidate, and 
party size.  
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Intriguingly, populism which routinely makes use of charismatic linkage in party competition 
does not show a systematically positive effect on personalization at all. Not even leadership 
personalization, which can be expected to increase considerably for parties featuring a strong 
leader figure as the embodiment of a movement or “the people” as is defining for populism, is 
systematically higher for populist parties than for non-populists. On the contrary, populism even 
shows a negative effect on general individualization when looking at the multiple imputation 
analysis. So although charismatic linkage (Kitschelt, 2000) and media complicity (Mazzoleni, 
2008) should be the perfect breeding ground for a personalized campaign strategy, the populists 
in this sample do not personalize their campaign content or systematically frame their campaign 
advertising on TV and newspapers more than other parties. Most likely, the populist appeal 
relies more on earned space than the paid space under investigation here. In paid space populists 
can and probably want to uphold an image of being viable competitor parties in a double 
strategy of mobilizing outsiders of the political process as well as convincing insiders. So on 
grounds of the analyses presented above I reject the populism hypothesis 7. Populism does not 
systematically lead to more personalization as a campaign strategy in the paid space 
investigated here. 
Finally, from a rationalist perspective, I also tested the influence of parties’ assets conducive to 
campaigning in a personalized way. Personalization is a costly strategy whose implementation 
crucially relies on well-planned communication and therefore requires professional assistance. 
Especially privatization, which can also backfire as irrelevant and hollow extravaganza when 
not orchestrated professionally, should theoretically be employed more systematically by 
parties, which can rely on a well-funded public relations department or consultancy. 
Empirically, however, professionalization effects are limited to advertisements featuring party 
leaders. Both leadership individualization and leadership privatization are systematically more 
likely to occur when a party’s organization is more professionalized, i.e. has more employees 
and more money, than the competitors’. This concentration on leadership does not come as a 
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surprise since leaders have a tighter grip on the allocation of parties’ centralized resources. The 
campaign headquarters are under direct control of the party leadership, which has few 
incentives to share these resources with backbenchers and can also increase party unity via 
personalization concentrated on leadership personae (see section 2.5.1). For personalization 
concentrated on leadership, the professionalization hypothesis 8 can therefore be upheld. 
General personalization is not affected systematically by parties’ professionalization levels. 
A second type of asset, incumbency, empirically only has a positive significant effect on non-
leadership privatization. This empirical pattern can best be explained by numeric 
considerations: Incumbent parties can rely on the face recognition of a larger and more 
renowned pool of candidates. Not only can they use ministers’ popularity and recognition value, 
but they also have a numerically larger pool of sitting members of parliament ready to invest 
their own popularity for the party’s overall gain. Yet why its effect is only visible for 
privatization in this sample and not for individualization cannot be answered conclusively. The 
incumbency hypothesis 9 therefore cannot be generally upheld. 
9.2 Campaign Personalization and Democracy 
So what are the normative implications of the empirical results found in this study? Pundits and 
scholars alike often denounce personalization as a symptom for or cause of a decline in 
sophisticated political decision-making. Personalization is accused of diluting or unduly 
replacing public political deliberation based on policy or ideology and therefore harming the 
quality of public discourse about collective decision-making and consequently damaging 
democracy. However, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, this judgment is premature. 
When looking at the empirical patterns, we see mostly neutral explanatory patterns like 
institutions at work, rather than factors which are necessarily linked to normative claims about 
personalization like populism. We even see more indications of personalization actually 
promoting a more equal and therefore democratic political discourse than harming it. 
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The most robust explanatory factor for personalization is the institutional environment. Since 
this framework for political competition (ideally, and for the cases under investigation also 
empirically) is the result of constitutional processes with the approval of a great majority of 
citizens, criticism of personalization which is a result of these constitutional architectures is 
misguided. But also the more normatively loaded explanatory factors covered here – 
complexity, mediatization, dysfunctional party competition, and populism – do not lend 
themselves to a negative evaluation of personalization. 
First and foremost, personalization as individualization is systematically used as a campaign 
strategy in electoral contexts, in which voters report that they are overwhelmed with the 
complexity of politics. The more complex the political world appears to the average voter, the 
more parties put names and pictures in their advertisements and the more political persons 
appear as actors or objects of sentences used in these ads, regardless of the semantic content. In 
these contexts, a personalization strategy of party campaign planners cannot at all be dismissed 
as spoiling political information. On the contrary, personalization makes this kind of 
information better accessible for voters unwilling or unable to deeply engage with complex 
ideological or policy-related information by two mechanisms, which allow adequate decision-
making in an economical way. First, by attaching the condensed political proposals brought 
forward in an election campaign to a person, the parties increase the salience of said 
information. Personalization therefore serves as “the spoonful of sugar that makes the medicine 
go down” and ensures that policy-relevant proposals are not crowded out by the overwhelming 
mass of other information a voter is facing in his or her daily life. Second, the personalized 
information also serves as a heuristic shortcut, much like party labels or ideologies, condensing 
political information to a format more easily processable, evaluable, and rememberable by the 
human mind. Via these mechanisms, the political deliberation process during a campaign is 
made even more democratic by not excluding cognitively more limited voters from it. And even 
if the point were to be made that privatization is the real spoiler of political discourse in complex 
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political situations, the empirical results show that privatization unlike individualization has no 
systematic connection to complexity. Therefore this study’s results indicate that personalization 
is more of a remedy fostering functioning egalitarian democratic discourse than hindering 
egalitarian collective decision-making. 
This notion is reinforced by the effects of party competition. Centrist parties, who can be 
expected but do not have to contribute to a cartelized competition of indistinguishable 
ideological positions, thereby limiting the choice of alternatives vital for democracy, are 
systematically using individualization but not privatization to enhance their appeal to voters. 
Unlike privatization, which is much more likely to provide “spectacle, image and theatre” 
(Mair, 2013: 83) and thereby replace ideological and political competition, individualization 
rather complements or amplifies this information. When looking at the policy content vs. traits 
in the quasi-sentences under investigation, about 50% of them in TV and newspaper advertising 
for all candidates as well as leadership (including the privatized ones) do contain policy content 
which is presented by or linked to political persons, not replaced by them. The empirical results 
of this study do not support the notion that personalization precludes political competition, but 
rather complements or amplifies it. 
In addition, the role of mediatization and its alleged hunger for privatized sensationalist 
information burying political sophistication is not nearly as influential for parties’ decisions for 
or against a personalized campaign strategy. In fact, we do not find an empirical connection 
between the mediatization of a political arena and the use of personalization as a campaign 
strategy. Parties do not seem to intentionally want to cater to the media’s wish for 
personalization in their paid campaign communication under investigation here. They might 
adapt other channels of campaign communication to elicit coverage, for example press releases 
or pseudo-events, but in paid space, the level of mediatization or the type of media system does 
not systematically explain the level of personalization in campaign advertising. Thus, also 
condemning personalization in political advertising as contributing to a decline in political 
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media coverage appears as unfounded as the links to political cartelization or spoiling of 
valuable voter attention discussed above.  
Finally, even the link of personalization with populism suspected of harming democracy cannot 
be upheld. This conclusion is based on two grounds. First, as theorized above, populism is not 
harmful for democracy per se. Although often empirically paired with renouncing 
representative democracy and proto-totalitarian tendencies, populism is merely a hull or a 
strategy to promote a wide range of ideologies, which do not always have to be based on 
antidemocratic exclusionary tendencies. The harm for democracy deduced from this is 
theoretically more often grounded in populism’s host ideologies than in its contribution as a 
political strategy. But even if one accepted populism as harmful for democracy per se, for 
example based on its antipluralist notion of an ex ante volonté générale, this study did not find 
an independent reinforcing empirical link of populism with personalization, neither in general, 
nor when concentrated on leadership.  
So to summarize the insights stated above, seeing personalization as inherently harmful for 
democracy is inappropriate. Neither does it show a robust empirical link to populism, nor does 
it automatically spoil or unduly displace political information. On the contrary, it can be useful 
to broaden the base of political deliberation by making the process more accessible to a larger 
audience. Raising the salience of political information as well as offering guidance in a complex 
and confusing information environment are qualities of personalization conducive to 
democracy, and empirically these explanatory patterns are more robust for individualization 
than for privatization. 
9.3 The Road Ahead 
The fact that many hypotheses this study set out to test found only tentative support or could 
not entirely be refuted shows that the comparative study of electoral campaign personalization 
is far from finished. This study provides a step beyond explaining personalization by macro-
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variance over time or in the context of single-country or single-election studies by presenting a 
comparative account of explanatory influence of factors on the contextual as well as the party 
level. Although the analyses provided here have partly shown robust indications of what drives 
parties to adopt a personalization strategy in their election campaign communication, further 
research is in order. The diverse effects of institutions, competition patterns, modernization, 
and party qualities on different facets of personalization presented here can only be a starting 
point for further research expanding the scope of robust results beyond the national, regional, 
and European contexts deliberately chosen to cover a wide but manageable amount of 
institutional variation for this study.  
The eclectic framework of this study paired with the relatively low number of cases did not 
allow all theoretically possible combinations of predictors to be covered. All the more 
remarkable are the findings derived from the analyses presented above, which by design have 
passed a very conservative test. Especially the scarcity or even absence of national or level-
specific idiosyncrasies in most of the analyses underscores the overarching validity of the 
findings obtained here. Systematic influence of presidentialization paired with executive 
candidacies, complexity of the electoral context, the electoral systems’ suitability for personal 
vote-earning attributes, ideological centrism, and party professionalization on different facets 
of personalization has been uncovered in this study, but needs further refinement and testing in 
other circumstances to gain in validity. The complex interplay of motivations for campaign 
planners to adopt a personalized campaign strategy, be it based on the notion of strengthening 
their appeal’s unique selling point or offering a heuristic for voters facing the complex decision 
of whom to vote for, can only gain from analyzing more cases, especially when tracking 
changes in party strategies over time, which would also allow time-variant analyses that this 
study was not equipped to provide. Nevertheless, we now have a more robust base on which to 
evaluate and qualify the modernist expectations a large number of scholars share when thinking 
about political personalization.  
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However, the task of uncovering explanations for campaign personalization will not become 
easier. In the process of further decentralization of campaign activity (Zittel, 2015), fostered by 
the gaining popularity of primaries, open lists, and the ever growing role social media play in 
campaigning, the palette of possible explanations for campaign personalization is growing with 
every candidate, public relations advisor, or party leader facing the choice of whether to put a 
policy proposal or a sympathetic face (or both) in the next campaign ad. On the necessary path 
towards a more refined and overarching multilevel explanation of political personalization in 
election campaigns this study took a first step beyond the large body of literature based on 
macroscopic analyses and single-country or even single-election case studies.  
Beyond a positivist analysis of drivers of personalization as a campaign strategy, this study also 
provided indications for the notion that democracy will not necessarily suffer from 
personalization in campaign communication. Even if personalization is a symptom of an ever 
growing atomization of the public sphere, a tool for populists not well-meaning towards 
representative democracy or a slippery slope towards apolitical beauty contests for political 
office, as some pessimistic pundits tend to claim, these developments are not the only effects 
of personalization. It can also draw the attention of less politically interested or cognitively 
capable voters towards politics and motivate a greater share of the electorate to actually engage 
with politics, thereby alleviating existing biases in participation and consequently 
representation. Furthermore, personalization does not replace the political content of campaign 
advertising, but rather complements or amplifies it. Parties still control the lion’s share of 
campaign funds and as vessels for ideological bases of politics and as selection bodies for 
political personnel are very adaptive and robust and far from being replaced by shiny pictures 
of political celebrities. Voters still associate leaders first and foremost with their parties and not 
with their respective personal traits (Karvonen, 2010: 84).  
Campaign personalization is a strategic choice made by rational individuals. Every time the 
incentives change, the calculation balancing out costs and benefits has to be adapted anew. 
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What and how strong these incentives have been in recent elections in Canada, France, 
Germany, Spain, and Switzerland has been analyzed above. How they will change is a relevant 
question to tackle for the future study of campaign communication. 
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Appendix: Separate Analyses of TV and Newspaper Advertising 
Table A.1 Complete case analyses of general individualization separated by media outlets 
 TV framing 
(1) 
TV content 
(2) 
Newspaper 
framing (3) 
Newspaper 
content (4) 
beta 0 -0.82 
(1.18) 
-1.62 
(1.17) 
-2.78** 
(0.92) 
-1.82** 
(0.88) 
mediatization -0.08 
(0.38) 
0.44 
(0.38) 
1.69 
(1.09) 
1.58 
(1.11) 
complexity 1.06 
(4.26) 
1.84 
(4.37) 
19.45** 
(6.88) 
17.44** 
(6.73) 
elec. system -0.08 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
0.00 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.15) 
presidentialization 0.90 
(1.05) 
3.63** 
(1.08)9 
-3.95** 
(0.99) 
-2.39** 
(0.93) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.71** 
(0.36) 
 
0.60* 
(0.33) 
 
-0.25 
(0.82) 
 
-0.55 
(0.89) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-1.06 
(0.79) 
 
-0.29 
(0.71) 
 
1.71 
(1.32) 
 
1.48 
(1.34) 
centrism 0.26** 
(0.12) 
0.27** 
(0.12) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.20* 
(0.11) 
populism (d) -0.78 
(0.58) 
-0.25 
(0.61) 
-0.68 
(0.61) 
-1.08* 
(0.63) 
professionalization 
(voteshare) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
incumbency (d) 0.05 
(0.47) 
-0.32 
(0.48) 
-0.77** 
(0.43) 
-0.58 
(0.43) 
 
France (d) 
 
-0.21 
(1.22) 
 
-3.87** 
(1.27) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) 0.13 
(0.99) 
-1.15 
(0.97) 
4.26** 
(1.59) 
3.16** 
(1.63) 
Spain (d) 1.95 
(2.03) 
2.71 
(2.05) 
14.19** 
(3.47) 
11.08** 
(3.22) 
European (d) 0.30 
(2.00) 
4.36** 
(2.05) 
-5.12** 
(1.81) 
-2.27 
(1.73) 
Regional (d) 1.00 
(0.76) 
0.95 
(0.74) 
4.25** 
(1.56) 
2.70* 
(1.55) 
N  85  85  58  58 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, 
** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.2 Multiple imputation analyses of general individualization separated by media 
outlets 
 TV framing 
(5) 
TV content 
(6) 
Newspaper 
framing (7) 
Newspaper 
content (8) 
beta 0 -0.59 
(0.93) 
-1.03 
(0.90) 
-0.35 
(0.78) 
-0.61 
(0.71) 
mediatization -0.16 
(0.36) 
0.20 
(0.35) 
-0.54 
(0.55) 
0.15 
(0.60) 
complexity 1.57 
(3.22) 
4.70 
(3.55) 
1.30 
(3.64) 
4.28 
(3.81) 
elec. system -0.08 
(0.11) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
0.20 
(0.13) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
presidentialization 0.54 
(0.82) 
2.12** 
(0.88) 
-0.30 
(0.58) 
-0.46 
(0.54) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.63* 
(0.36) 
 
0.53 
(0.39) 
 
-0.22 
(0.49) 
 
-0.40 
(0.56) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-0.91 
(0.75) 
 
-0.24 
(0.76) 
 
0.48 
(0.72) 
 
0.68 
(0.86) 
centrism 0.26** 
(0.10) 
0.30** 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.15 
(0.09) 
populism (d) -0.86* 
(0.50) 
-0.95* 
(0.53) 
-0.65 
(0.51) 
-1.07** 
(0.53) 
professionalization  -0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
incumbency (d) -0.07 
(0.43) 
-0.30 
(0.45) 
-0.33 
(0.36) 
-0.23 
(0.35) 
 
France (d) 
 
0.72 
(1.31) 
 
-1.78 
(1.67) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) 0.04 
(0.90) 
-0.70 
(0.90) 
1.05 
(1.15) 
1.36 
(1.05) 
Spain (d) 1.77 
(1.69) 
2.98* 
(1.78) 
2.10 
(1.75) 
3.32** 
(1.68) 
European (d) -0.18 
(1.49) 
1.87 
(1.57) 
-0.16 
(1.04) 
-0.21 
(0.98) 
Regional (d) 0.86 
(0.59) 
0.15 
(0.59) 
-0.56 
(0.72) 
-0.29 
(0.75) 
N 127 127 127 127 
Notes: Means of mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, pooled standard deviations in 
parentheses, reference country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * 
credible interval > 90%, ** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.3 Complete case analyses of leadership individualization separated by media outlets 
 TV framing 
(1) 
TV content 
(2) 
Newspaper 
framing (3) 
Newspaper 
content (4) 
beta 0 -1.00 
(1.32) 
-2.53** 
(1.23) 
-2.57** 
(0.86) 
-1.48 
(0.91) 
mediatization 0.09 
(0.41) 
0.44 
(0.40) 
1.41 
(1.11) 
1.36 
(1.13) 
complexity 0.59 
(4.62) 
0.49 
(4.42) 
15.52** 
(6.44) 
12.88* 
(6.63) 
elec. system 0.06 
(0.13) 
0.00 
(0.12) 
-0.20* 
(0.15) 
-0.15 
(0.15) 
presidentialization -0.12 
(1.07) 
2.57** 
(1.10) 
-2.71** 
(0.94) 
-1.10 
(0.94) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.98** 
(0.36) 
 
0.62** 
(0.32) 
 
-0.20 
(0.86) 
 
-0.31 
(0.89) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-1.23 
(0.78) 
 
-0.51 
(0.73) 
 
0.69 
(1.29) 
 
0.46 
(1.29) 
centrism 0.20* 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
-0.23** 
(0.11) 
-0.36** 
(0.11) 
populism (d) -0.33 
(0.61) 
0.80 
(0.66) 
-0.41 
(0.63) 
-0.77 
(0.61) 
professionalization 
(voteshare) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
incumbency (d) 0.14 
(0.48) 
-0.36 
(0.47) 
-0.82* 
(0.45) 
-0.66 
(0.44) 
 
France (d) 
 
-0.24 
(1.26) 
 
-3.14** 
(1.26) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) 0.56 
(1.06) 
0.24 
(1.02) 
2.14 
(1.64) 
0.68 
(1.57) 
Spain (d) 1.69 
(2.27) 
2.65 
(2.10) 
11.15** 
(3.06) 
7.54** 
(3.16) 
European (d) -0.55 
(2.05) 
3.54* 
(2.11) 
-3.13* 
(1.79) 
-0.06 
(1.74) 
Regional (d) 0.27 
(0.77) 
1.00 
(0.76) 
4.21** 
(1.53) 
2.86* 
(1.62) 
N  85  85  58  58 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, 
** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.4 Multiple imputation analyses of leadership individualization separated by media 
outlets 
 TV framing 
(5) 
TV content 
(6) 
Newspaper 
framing (7) 
Newspaper 
content (8) 
beta 0 -0.94 
(0.92) 
-1.91** 
(0.92) 
-1.07 
(0.68) 
-0.64 
(0.58) 
mediatization -0.03 
(0.37) 
0.11 
(0.35) 
-0.44 
(0.59) 
0.07 
(0.46) 
complexity -1.43 
(2.77) 
0.32 
(3.09) 
1.59 
(3.32) 
2.58 
(2.93) 
elec. system 0.04 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.13) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
presidentialization 0.19 
(0.73) 
1.79*** 
(0.79) 
-0.62 
(0.59) 
-0.35 
(0.49) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.79** 
(0.36) 
 
0.41 
(0.39) 
 
0.12 
(0.53) 
 
0.06 
(0.48) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-0.69 
(0.76) 
 
0.39 
(0.81) 
 
0.09 
(0.81) 
 
0.09 
(0.74) 
centrism 0.18* 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(0.10) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.31** 
(0.09) 
populism (d) -0.26 
(0.50) 
0.14 
(0.52) 
-0.52 
(0.49) 
-0.97** 
(0.48) 
professionalization  -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
incumbency (d) 0.17 
(0.42) 
-0.03 
(0.43) 
-0.50 
(0.36) 
-0.46 
(0.36) 
 
France (d) 
 
0.15 
(1.33) 
 
-1.83 
(1.55) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) 0.12 
(0.83) 
-0.17 
(0.86) 
1.34 
(1.11) 
0.67 
(1.13) 
Spain (d) 0.72 
(1.55) 
1.72 
(1.64) 
3.04** 
(1.53) 
2.84** 
(1.30) 
European (d) -0.01 
(1.23) 
2.05 
(1.41) 
-0.77 
(1.06) 
0.03 
(1.12) 
Regional (d) 0.52 
(0.52) 
0.51 
(0.57) 
0.14 
(0.68) 
0.35 
(0.49) 
N 127 127 127 127 
Notes: Means of mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, pooled standard deviations in 
parentheses, reference country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * 
credible interval > 90%, ** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.5 Complete case analyses of non-leadership individualization separated by media 
outlets 
 TV framing 
(1) 
TV content 
(2) 
Newspaper 
framing (3) 
Newspaper 
content (4) 
beta 0 -0.50 
(1.20) 
-0.70 
(1.04) 
-3.22** 
(0.82) 
-3.12** 
(0.84) 
mediatization -0.03 
(0.39) 
0.03 
(0.36) 
0.55 
(0.98) 
0.43 
(1.02) 
complexity -0.17 
(4.42) 
-0.04 
(3.90) 
3.11 
(5.81) 
3.25 
(6.24) 
elec. system -0.11 
(0.12) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
0.59** 
(0.15) 
0.52** 
(0.14) 
presidentialization 1.01 
(1.04) 
0.50 
(0.90) 
-1.01 
(0.88) 
-1.24 
(0.87) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
-0.33 
(0.34) 
 
-0.11 
(0.32) 
 
0.63 
(0.70) 
 
0.31 
(0.68) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
0.24 
(0.74) 
 
-0.06 
(0.69) 
 
0.05 
(1.01) 
 
-0.13 
(1.00) 
centrism -0.03 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
0.42** 
(0.10) 
0.34** 
(0.10) 
populism (d) -0.55 
(0.59) 
-0.79 
(0.64) 
0.76 
(0.53) 
0.70 
(0.55) 
professionalization 
(voteshare) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
incumbency (d) -0.12 
(0.45) 
-0.14 
(0.41) 
1.32** 
(0.36) 
1.15** 
(0.37) 
 
France (d) 
 
-0.25 
(1.23) 
 
0.26 
(1.14) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) -1.20 
(1.03) 
-1.24 
(0.93) 
1.24 
(1.35) 
2.23 
(1.40) 
Spain (d) -0.73 
(2.12) 
-0.64 
(1.88) 
2.45 
(2.59) 
3.18 
(2.75) 
European (d) 1.20 
(2.02) 
0.43 
(1.74) 
-0.89 
(1.66) 
-1.48 
(1.63) 
Regional (d) 0.60 
(0.75) 
0.08 
(0.65) 
-1.19 
(1.42) 
-1.02 
(1.45) 
N  85  85  58  58 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, 
** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.6 Multiple imputation analyses of non-leadership individualization separated by 
media outlets 
 TV framing 
(5) 
TV content 
(6) 
Newspaper 
framing (7) 
Newspaper 
content (8) 
beta 0 -0.61 
(0.90) 
-0.71 
(0.86) 
-2.11** 
(0.68) 
-2.55** 
(0.59) 
mediatization -0.01 
(0.34) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.42 
(0.40) 
0.44 
(0.39) 
complexity 2.88 
(3.20) 
2.41 
(3.18) 
2.67 
(2.41) 
3.28 
(2.34) 
elec. system -0.10 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.10) 
0.30** 
(0.12) 
0.29** 
(0.11) 
presidentialization 0.31 
(0.80) 
0.00 
(0.79) 
0.00 
(0.44) 
-0.36 
(0.42) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
-0.10 
(0.34) 
 
0.03 
(0.33) 
 
-0.15 
(0.43) 
 
-0.20 
(0.43) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-0.32 
(0.68) 
 
-0.62 
(0.66) 
 
-0.25 
(0.73) 
 
-0.15 
(0.67) 
centrism 0.04 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(0.10) 
0.17** 
(0.08) 
0.16** 
(0.08) 
populism (d) -0.69 
(0.49) 
-0.82 
(0.53) 
0.28 
(0.43) 
0.28 
(0.42) 
professionalization  0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
incumbency (d) -0.25 
(0.40) 
-0.31 
(0.39) 
0.56* 
(0.33) 
0.55 
(0.34) 
 
France (d) 
 
0.22 
(1.34) 
 
0.43 
(1.26) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) -0.61 
(0.91) 
-0.60 
(0.85) 
-0.03 
(1.06) 
0.89 
(0.97) 
Spain (d) 0.50 
(1.69) 
0.43 
(1.62) 
0.86 
(1.26) 
1.72 
(1.14) 
European (d) 0.01 
(1.45) 
-0.31 
(1.46) 
0.55 
(0.96) 
-0.17 
(0.84) 
Regional (d) 0.23 
(0.57) 
-0.20 
(0.54) 
-0.20 
(0.40) 
-0.34 
(0.38) 
N 127 127 127 127 
Notes: Means of mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, pooled standard deviations in 
parentheses, reference country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * 
credible interval > 90%, ** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.7 Complete case analyses of general privatization separated by media outlets 
 TV framing 
(1) 
TV content 
(2) 
Newspaper 
framing (3) 
Newspaper 
content (4) 
beta 0 1.09 
(1.36) 
-1.11 
(1.19) 
-0.27 
(0.89) 
-1.00 
(0.63) 
mediatization -0.06 
(0.41) 
0.17 
(0.34) 
-1.04 
(1.04) 
0.39 
(0.82) 
complexity -1.77 
(4.47) 
-0.47 
(3.82) 
-12.47* 
(6.61) 
6.11 
(5.28) 
elec. system 0.12 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.12) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.11) 
presidentialization -1.45 
(1.20) 
-0.81 
(0.92) 
0.94 
(0.88) 
-1.33* 
(0.68) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.41 
(0.35) 
 
0.09 
(0.30) 
 
2.36** 
(0.78) 
 
0.00 
(0.73) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-0.16 
(0.77) 
 
-0.19 
(0.78) 
 
-5.02** 
(1.27) 
 
2.37** 
(1.03) 
centrism -0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
populism (d) -0.26 
(0.63) 
0.66 
(0.64) 
0.21 
(0.55) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
professionalization 
(voteshare) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
incumbency (d) -0.38 
(0.49) 
-0.23 
(0.43) 
0.33 
(0.39) 
0.06 
(0.31) 
 
France (d) 
 
0.21 
(1.27) 
 
1.27 
(1.05) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) 0.01 
(1.03) 
1.08 
(0.92) 
-2.38 
(1.43) 
0.23 
(1.13) 
Spain (d) -1.34 
(2.17) 
-1.44 
(1.91) 
-5.93* 
(3.10) 
-1.90 
(2.32) 
European (d) -1.16 
(2.30) 
-0.87 
(1.79) 
5.38** 
(1.73) 
-2.47* 
(1.28) 
Regional (d) -0.96 
(0.88) 
0.13 
(0.71) 
-0.50 
(1.45) 
-0.88 
(1.11) 
N   85   85   58   58 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, 
** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.8 Multiple imputation analyses of general privatization separated by media outlets 
 TV framing 
(5) 
TV content 
(6) 
Newspaper 
framing (7) 
Newspaper 
content (8) 
beta 0 0.19 
(0.96) 
-1.39 
(0.93) 
-1.27* 
(0.67) 
-1.22 
(0.81) 
mediatization 0.09 
(0.37) 
0.11 
(0.34) 
-0.11 
(0.58) 
0.63 
(0.54) 
complexity -1.29 
(3.19) 
-5.00 
(3.69) 
-3.51 
(3.32) 
3.83 
(3.36) 
elec. system 0.12 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
presidentialization -0.72 
(0.88) 
0.53 
(1.03) 
-0.42 
(0.56) 
-1.11* 
(0.56) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.50 
(0.39) 
 
-0.18 
(0.35) 
 
1.27** 
(0.54) 
 
0.13 
(0.43) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-0.84 
(0.80) 
 
0.46 
(0.73) 
 
-2.58** 
(0.92) 
 
0.80 
(0.67) 
centrism 0.05 
(0.10) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
populism (d) 0.12 
(0.51) 
0.53 
(0.54) 
-0.05 
(0.45) 
0.25 
(0.46) 
professionalization  0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
incumbency (d) -0.46 
(0.43) 
-0.19 
(0.43) 
0.06 
(0.32) 
-0.06 
(0.34) 
 
France (d) 
 
-0.29 
(1.44) 
 
1.24 
(1.46) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) 0.53 
(0.85) 
0.35 
(1.01) 
-0.15 
(1.08) 
0.32 
(1.04) 
Spain (d) -0.20 
(1.63) 
-3.04* 
(1.78) 
-0.41 
(1.67) 
-0.63 
(1.72) 
European (d) 0.05 
(1.61) 
1.70 
(1.98) 
1.64 
(1.17) 
-1.45 
(1.04) 
Regional (d) -0.48 
(0.64) 
0.97 
(0.74) 
0.74 
(0.72) 
-0.16 
(0.73) 
N 127 127 127 127 
Notes: Means of mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, pooled standard deviations in 
parentheses, reference country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * 
credible interval > 90%, ** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.9 Complete case analyses of leadership privatization separated by media outlets 
 TV framing 
(1) 
TV content 
(2) 
Newspaper 
framing (3) 
Newspaper 
content (4) 
beta 0 -0.02 
(1.20) 
-2.48** 
(1.02) 
-2.60** 
(0.93) 
-2.93** 
(0.77) 
mediatization 0.07 
(0.40) 
-0.08 
(0.32) 
-0.62 
(0.86) 
1.65* 
(1.03) 
complexity -0.78 
(4.75) 
-2.96 
(3.52) 
-8.45* 
(5.46) 
12.41** 
(5.65) 
elec. system 0.17 
(0.13) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
presidentialization -1.07 
(1.16) 
0.02 
(0.90) 
-0.50 
(0.77) 
-1.14 
(0.92) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.84** 
(0.35) 
 
0.32 
(0.28) 
 
2.90** 
(0.77) 
 
-0.37 
(0.74) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-1.32* 
(0.78) 
 
-0.19 
(0.67) 
 
-4.97** 
(1.16) 
 
0.52 
(1.07) 
centrism 0.07 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.25** 
(0.10) 
populism (d) -1.06* 
(0.61) 
0.42 
(0.55) 
1.21** 
(0.54) 
-0.13 
(0.53) 
professionalization 
(voteshare) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
incumbency (d) -0.55 
(0.48) 
-0.39 
(0.38) 
0.34 
(0.37) 
-0.60 
(0.41) 
 
France (d) 
 
0.03 
(1.35) 
 
-0.07 
(1.03) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) 0.14 
(1.08) 
-0.01 
(0.85) 
-0.71 
(1.26) 
-0.01 
(1.44) 
Spain (d) -0.29 
(2.20) 
-1.92 
(1.70) 
-2.52 
(2.61) 
3.54 
(2.37) 
European (d) -1.10 
(2.25) 
0.51 
(1.68) 
3.91** 
(1.44) 
-0.17 
(1.70) 
Regional (d) -0.62 
(0.77) 
0.79 
(0.63) 
0.24 
(1.27) 
2.87** 
(1.34) 
N   85   85   58   58 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, 
** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.10 Multiple imputation analyses of leadership privatization separated by media 
outlets 
 TV framing 
(5) 
TV content 
(6) 
Newspaper 
framing (7) 
Newspaper 
content (8) 
beta 0 -0.07 
(0.91) 
-2.80** 
(0.79) 
-2.43** 
(0.62) 
-2.29** 
(0.65) 
mediatization -0.02 
(0.34) 
-0.03 
(0.27) 
0.04 
(0.53) 
0.17 
(0.42) 
complexity -3.49 
(3.15) 
-3.20 
(2.88) 
-3.80 
(3.18) 
2.65 
(2.49) 
elec. system 0.17 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
0.08 
(0.12) 
presidentialization -0.40 
(0.80) 
0.41 
(0.76) 
-1.33 
(0.49) 
-0.38 
(0.47) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
0.59* 
(0.33) 
 
0.24 
(0.27) 
 
1.62 
(0.43) 
 
0.07 
(0.41) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
-0.80 
(0.69) 
 
0.32 
(0.57) 
 
-2.93 
(0.73) 
 
0.09 
(0.68) 
centrism 0.09 
(0.10) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.19** 
(0.08) 
populism (d) -0.75 
(0.49) 
0.07 
(0.45) 
0.39 
(0.41) 
-0.26 
(0.42) 
professionalization  -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
incumbency (d) -0.39 
(0.42) 
-0.39 
(0.36) 
0.04 
(0.29) 
-0.32 
(0.31) 
 
France (d) 
 
0.05 
(1.31) 
 
-0.42 
(1.08) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) -0.45 
(0.85) 
0.01 
(0.76) 
0.86 
(0.80) 
0.47 
(1.07) 
Spain (d) -1.43 
(1.66) 
-1.61 
(1.43) 
0.74 
(1.45) 
0.51 
(1.32) 
European (d) 0.05 
(1.37) 
1.00 
(1.40) 
0.83 
(0.81) 
-0.28 
(0.99) 
Regional (d) -0.30 
(0.53) 
0.87* 
(0.52) 
1.23 
(0.74) 
0.26 
(0.49) 
N 127 127 127 127 
Notes: Means of mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, pooled standard deviations in 
parentheses, reference country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * 
credible interval > 90%, ** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.11 Complete case analyses of non-leadership privatization separated by media 
outlets 
 TV framing 
(1) 
TV content 
(2) 
Newspaper 
framing (3) 
Newspaper 
content (4) 
beta 0 -0.18 
(1.24) 
-0.76 
(1.01) 
-1.04 
(0.80) 
-1.85** 
(0.82) 
mediatization -0.06 
(0.40) 
-0.14 
(0.31) 
-0.62 
(0.98) 
-0.77 
(0.95) 
complexity -1.81 
(4.43) 
-5.33 
(3.36) 
-4.65 
(5.71) 
-5.56 
(6.27) 
elec. system -0.05 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
presidentialization -0.11 
(1.06) 
-0.16 
(0.85) 
1.03 
(0.87) 
0.12 
(0.72) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
-0.32 
(0.36) 
 
-0.14 
(0.28) 
 
0.23 
(0.73) 
 
0.15 
(0.76) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
0.90 
(0.79) 
 
-0.69 
(0.63) 
 
-0.86 
(1.19) 
 
1.09 
(1.12) 
centrism -0.15 
(0.12) 
-0.30** 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
0.41** 
(0.10) 
populism (d) 0.69 
(0.64) 
-0.18 
(0.53) 
-0.46 
(0.54) 
1.73** 
(0.53) 
professionalization 
(voteshare) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
incumbency (d) 0.05 
(0.47) 
0.14 
(0.44) 
0.09 
(0.38) 
1.35** 
(0.37) 
 
France (d) 
 
0.15 
(1.22) 
 
1.01 
(0.96) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) -0.47 
(1.01) 
-0.23 
(0.79) 
-1.32 
(1.52) 
-0.64 
(1.30) 
Spain (d) -1.37 
(2.12) 
-4.05** 
(1.66) 
-3.13 
(2.62) 
-3.96 
(2.82) 
European (d) 0.73 
(2.06) 
0.19 
(1.66) 
1.74 
(1.73) 
-1.45 
(1.44) 
Regional (d) -0.06 
(0.78) 
0.03 
(0.64) 
-0.84 
(1.32) 
-2.62* 
(1.39) 
N   85   85   58   58 
Notes: Mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, standard deviations in parentheses, reference 
country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * credible interval > 90%, 
** credible interval > 95% 
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Table A.12 Multiple imputation analyses of non-leadership privatization separated by media 
outlets 
 TV framing 
(5) 
TV content 
(6) 
Newspaper 
framing (7) 
Newspaper 
content (8) 
beta 0 -0.44 
(1.02) 
-1.10 
(0.84) 
-1.81** 
(0.61) 
-1.60** 
(0.68) 
mediatization 0.04 
(0.35) 
-0.11 
(0.32) 
0.12 
(0.46) 
0.47 
(0.45) 
complexity 1.79 
(2.92) 
-6.03 
(4.00) 
0.77 
(2.66) 
0.42 
(2.89) 
elec. system -0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.09) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
presidentialization -0.62 
(0.72) 
0.57 
(1.19) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
-0.06 
(0.49) 
 
presidentialization * 
executive candidate 
 
-0.10 
(0.35) 
 
-0.31 
(0.34) 
 
0.03 
(0.48) 
 
-0.36 
(0.37) 
 
executive candidate (d) 
 
0.23 
(0.73) 
 
-0.06 
(0.70) 
 
-0.36 
(0.79) 
 
0.34 
(0.63) 
centrism -0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.26** 
(0.10) 
-0.04 
(0.07) 
0.23** 
(0.08) 
populism (d) 0.79 
(0.52) 
0.06 
(0.58) 
-0.32 
(0.39) 
1.04** 
(0.48) 
professionalization  0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
incumbency (d) -0.16 
(0.43) 
0.20 
(0.42) 
-0.03 
(0.30) 
0.52* 
(0.31) 
 
France (d) 
 
-0.44 
(2.58) 
 
0.85 
(1.47) 
 
- 
 
- 
Germany (d) 0.40 
(0.88) 
-0.52 
(0.96) 
-0.75 
(1.07) 
-0.56 
(0.90) 
Spain (d) 0.51 
(1.58) 
-3.85** 
(1.80) 
-0.19 
(1.38) 
-1.02 
(1.45) 
European (d) -0.30 
(1.25) 
1.56 
(2.25) 
0.83 
(1.05) 
-0.18 
(0.94) 
Regional (d) -0.37 
(0.55) 
0.59 
(0.83) 
0.25 
(0.50) 
-0.22 
(0.64) 
N 127 127 127 127 
Notes: Means of mean posterior beta regression coefficients with logit link, pooled standard deviations in 
parentheses, reference country is Canada for TV and Switzerland for Newspaper, reference level is national, * 
credible interval > 90%, ** credible interval > 95% 
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